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IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


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Hiotographic 

Sdences 

Corporation 


23  WIST  MAIN  STT^lftT 

WIBSTIR.N.Y.  145»1 

(716)  873-4S03 


-: 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHM/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


V 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


T 
tc 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best 
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□    Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I      I   Covers  damaged/ 


a 

D 
D 
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D 
D 


D 


Couverture  endommagie 

Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaurie  et/ou  pelliculie 

Cover  title  missing/ 

Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

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Pages  damaged/ 
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D 
& 

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n 

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Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed/ 
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Additional  comments:/ 
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Wrinkled  pages  may  film  slightly  out  of  focus. 


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Ce  document  est  fiimA  au  taux  de  rMuction  indiqu*  ci-dessous. 


10X 

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1 

Th«  copy  filmtd  hw  hm  b—n  r«produc«d  thanks 
to  th«  g«n«rosity  of: 

Univtriity  of  British  Columbia  Library 


L'oxomploiro  filmi  f ut  roproduit  grlco  i  la 
g4n4rosM  da: 

Univarsity  of  British  Columbia  Library 


ails 

du 

idifier 

une 

nage 


Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  bast  quality 
posslbia  considaring  tha  condition  and  iaglbility 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  liaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  spacif ications. 


Laa  imagaa  sulvantaa  ont  4t4  raprodultas  avac  la 
plua  grand  soin,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattatA  da  I'axamplaira  film*,  at  an 
conformltA  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
fiimaga. 


Original  copies  in  printad  papar  covers  ara  f  ilmad 
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or  illustrated  impression. 


The  lest  recorded  frame  on  eech  microfiche 
shell  contein  the  symbol  —^  (meening  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  ▼  (meaning  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 


Lee  exempieires  origlnaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
papier  est  ImprimAe  sent  fiimAs  en  commenpent 
par  la  premier  plat  at  en  termlnant  soit  par  la 
darnlAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impresslon  ou  d'lliustration,  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  las  autres  exempieires 
origlnaux  sont  fiimAs  en  comment  ant  par  la 
pramlAre  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impresslon  ou  d'iliustratlon  at  en  terminant  par 
la  darnlAre  pege  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboies  suivants  apparattra  sur  la 
darnlAre  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  seion  le 
cos:  le  symbols  — »-  signifie  "A  SUiVRE",  le 
symbols  ▼  signifie  "FIN". 


Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  retios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  ere  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hend  corner,  left  to 
right  end  top  to  bottom,  es  many  frames  es 
required.  The  following  diegrems  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  cartes,  pisnches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  Atre 
fiimis  i  des  teux  de  rAduction  diffirents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  itre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  cllchA,  il  est  filmi  k  partir 
de  i'angle  supirieur  geuche,  de  gauche  A  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'Imeges  nAcessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mAthode. 


ata 


ilure, 


IX 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

"WP^wwwifSnw^ 


\^^WtH..¥mj"Mf§f*^  i'»,l/".i'W''"  "'Vi''^<MmppBM 


^ppfl 


PEBPET0AL  WAB, 


# 


THE  POLICY  OF  MB.  MAHISON. 


SKIHO  A   CAVDXO  KKAMliVATIOV  Or  Bit   LATB   MBSSAOB  T«   OOH' 
OBBSS,  to  ri^; ilBBSFBOTt  TBB  BObLOWIVO  TOPieBS»..VII. 

THE  FRETEMDElt  ITEGOTIATIONS    FOR  PEACE....THE  ISSPOSk 
TANT  AND  INTERESTING  SUBJECT  OF  A 

GONSGRIFr  MIUTIA.... 


ABB 


THE  ESTABUSHMENT  QF  AN  IMMENSE  St^qnXNG  ARMY  OF 
GUARDS  AND  SPIES,  UNDER  THE  NAMK  OF 

A  liOG  AL  VOLUNTEER  FO||pB. 


"  Turn  **  Jaetiu*  AlidHiwi  teeundum  Pr€Hif*.^.gravhir  remtdUi  gutm  dt- 
Seta  frani,  tuanmgue  kgttm  aticlor  idem,  ae  mtbvtrtur  gmr  armu  fuebatur. 


urmUwMdt!* 


TACITI  ABBilpyPM  LIB.  II.:. 


LIBBBALLY  TBANSLATBB   >' 

^  Then  James  Madiioa,  ■  Meond  time  Freiident,  adopted  a  remedj  for  the 
'wrongaof  our  aeMiefi,  infinitely  more  injuriooi  to  them  than  the  evila  wbieh. 
they  rairered»...he''ordered  oat  the  militia,  in  eontempt  of  that  Tery  Constitation 
of  vhieh  he  was  one  of  the  priaeipal  framers.  Id-  ihw^  vhatever  he  attempted 
to  Tindieate  by  anB%  by  arms  he  lost" ' 


c  ./■ 


BY  A  NEW-ENGLAND  FARMER^        "^'  #  **     <r  Cl 

AVTHOR  or  A  fcXTB  PAMPHbBT,  ENTITLED, '<  MB.  MABISOS'S  WAR.^ 


1 

BOSTON: 

..       '                        ■( 

'i 

Printed  by  Cheiter  Stebbfna, 
1813. 

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1 

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nr^niiaaLijii^'n 


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.'      iin.iiip|[gp|p>jii,  |.i  >! 


INTRODUCTORY   REMARKS. 

TO   THE   PEOPLE    OF   KEW-ENOLAND,  NEV-TOBK9 
NEW-JERSEY,  AND    DELAWARE.  , 

HOWEVER  much  to  be  regretted  by  every 
friend  to  commerce^  and  civil  liberty,  must  be  the  re- 
election of  Mr.  Madison,  still  it  is  a  most  cheering 
and  consolatory  reflection,  that  the  struggle  has  man- 
ifested an  energy,  an  intelligence,  a  spirit  of  concord 
and  union,  a  magnanimous  disposition  to  'sacrifice 
party  feelings,  and  personal  considerations,  in  the  cit- 
izens of  the  commercial  states,  which  is  unexampled 
in  the  history  of  this  country.  It  was^  indeed  to  be 
feared,  that  no  pressure,  however  great,  no  sufferingEi^ 
however  severe,  would  detach  men  from  those  chains 
of  parly  with  which  they  bad  been  so  long  bound. 
But  we  are  most  happily  undeceived ;  a  sense  of 
common  danger,  a  conviction  of  common  interest,  and 
of  the  absolute  necessity  of  union  for  relief  from  op- 
pression, snapped  asunder  the  bonds  of  faction. — 
Mutual  condescension,  mutual  consultation  soon  ob- 
literated the  memory  of  past  distinctions,  (which  after 
all  were  merely  nominal,)  and  we  now  find,  with 
the  exception  of  the  dependents  upon  government,  and 
those  under  their  influence,  but  one  great  and  united 
people,  from  Maine  to  Delaware. 

It  ought  indeed  to  be  so;  for,  jfrom  Maine  to  Dela- 
ware we  have  one  common  interest,  and  that  is.  the 


I' 

4 


i     I 
s 

} 

I 


praservation  of  Commerce,  which  from  Delaware 
soathwardsy  they  are  determmed  to  destroy.  Still 
men  do  not  alwaye  perceive  their  interest  Bat  in 
this  case,  they  could  not  shut  their  eyes ;  it  was  like 
*'  Heaven's  own  lightning,"  it  flashed  conviction  upon 
ihose  who  were  stone  blind. 

l^ve  years  successive  commercial  restriction,  was 
found  ineffectual;  it  made  us  grow  lei^ler  to  be  sure, 
but  we  were  strong  and  able  to  survive  it.  Our  per. 
secutors  had  not  patience  to  endure  our  lingering 
death  \  they  therefore  got  up  the  guillotine  of  a  mari* 
linie  war,  to  cut  off  our  .heads  at  a  stroke. 

This  last  act  of  desperation,  has  accomplished  our 
wishes ;  it  has  opened  the  eyes  of  the  people,  and 
notwithstanding  the  reelection  of  Mr.  Madison,  not 
in  vain.  If  we  are  as  firm  and  resolute  in  the  pursuit 
of  our  purposes,  as  moderate  and  conciliatory  as  we 
Yukve  hitherto  been;  if  we  continue  to  sacrifice  to  the 
attainment  of  peace  and  prosperity,  our  party  pas. 
sions,  we  are  certain  of  success.  Let  our  political 
euemies  triumph  in  their  partial  victory;  let  them 
attempt  to  undervalue  our  courage,  our.  opinions  and 
our  importance;  we  shall  shew  them  in  the  next 
Congress,  that  no  government  can  wage  an  unneces- 
saiy  war  against  the  sentiments  and  interests  of  the 
people. 

We  predicted  this  change,  as  did  many  others,  six 
months  ago,  in  the  pamphlet,  entitled  <<  Madison's 
War.'*  We  advised  the  people  to  despise  the  anti- 
republican,  despotick  opinion,  that  the  citizens  have 
no  right  to  discuss  the  merits  of  a  war,  after  it  is  de- 
clared. We  recommended  a  constitutional  resistance^ 
a  resistance  at  the  polls.  The  people  have  done  so  ; 
and  what  is  the  glorious  and  unexampled  resuH? 


SIX 


■-1fj?i' 


l^ever  since  the  Declaration  of  Independence^  bas 
such  an  union  been  witnessed.  In  the  lower  House 
of  Congress^  which  alone  could  have  been  effected  in 
so  short  a  time  by  popular  elections^  we  shall  proba- 
bly have  a  peace  majority. 

The  present  prospect  is,  that  not  one  member  of 
Congress,  from  Maine  to  Delaware,  will  be  in  fayour 
of  the  war. 

In  Massachusetts,  at  no  period  of  its  histoiy,  has 
it  ever  enjoyed  so  united  a  delegation.  Its  voice  will 
now  have,  as  it  ought  to,  its  due  weight.  Let  us  ex-< 
amine  this  respectable  power,  which  has  risen  up  as 
it  were  by  magick,  or  by  the  finger  of  Heaven,  against 
a  daring  and  headstrong  administration^ 

These  northern  and  ndddle  states,  who  are  now 
united  in  opinion,  possess  3,000,000  of  inhabitants^ 
considerably  more  than  did  the  whole  United  States 
at  the  time  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence. — 
They  are  a  body  of  freemen,  distinguished  for  their 
industry  and  virtue.  They  are  the  owners  of  nearly 
two  third  parts  of  all  the  tonnage  of  the  United  States, 
and  furnishes,  probably  three  fourths  of  all  the  native 
seamen.  They  are  totally  opposed  to  a  war  for  the 
privilege  of  protecting  British  seamen  against  their 
own  sovereign.  They  know,  from  their  own  experi- 
ence, that  this  subject  of  impressment  is  a  mere  in» 
strument,  wielded  by  men  who  are  utterly  indifferent 
about  the  sufferings  of  the  sailors  or  the  merchants. 

The  display  of  the  true  principles,  upon  which  this 
subject  ought  to  be  considered,  is  the  main  object  of 
the  following  Essays. 

We  are  aware  that  the  friends  of  administration, 
(and  some  few  who  ought  to  know  better  the  rights 


^;-. 


and  duties  of  a  citizen,)  with  uncommon  pretensions 
to  patriotism,  have  bridled  themselves  in  with  a 
haughty  and  censorious  air,  when  they  have  read 
these  essays,  and  have  thought  to  condemn  them,  and 
to  render  the  author  odious,  by  representing  him  as 
supporting  the  claims  of  Great-Britain,  and  as  aban- 
doning the  rights  of  America. 

It  is  a  vulgar  clamour,  which  the  author  heeds  not, 
he  has  no  popularity  to  seek,  and  he  fears  not  for  the 
reputation  of  his  integrity,  with  the  wise  and  good ; 
but  as  such  a  clamour  may  lead  feeble  minds  to  read 
with  distrust,  and  to  weigh  with  uneven  scales,  it  may 
not  be  amiss  to  suy  a  word  or  two  upon  this  subject. 

Is  morality,  when  applied  to  questions  between 
nations^  of  a  different  character,  and  founded  on  dif- 
ferent principles  from  what  it  is,  when  applied  to  in- 
dividuals ? 

Is  man  an  infallible  being  ?  or,  if  he  eiTs,  is  he 
never  to  turn  from  the  eiTor  of  his  way  ?  is  he  never 
to  examine  the  rectitude  of  his  own  principles  ?  or,  if 
convinced  of  his  error,  is  he  never  to  confess  it,  and 
alter  his  conduct ;  but  must  his  pride  prompt  him  to 
pftrsevere  in  wrong  doing  ?  If,  moreover,  he  becomes 
,  satisfied  that  his  interest  as  well  as  his  duty  require 
a  change  of  conduct,  must  he  still  adhere  to  his 
errors? 

Can  not  a  nation  do  wrong  ?  do  we  not  contend 
that  Britain  has  often  done  so  ?  and  is  it  impossible 
that  America  should  sometimes  partake  of  human  in- 
firmities ? 

And  if  a  nation  does  wrong,  must  its  citizens  defend 
even  its  errors  ?  Must  they  spill  their  blood,  and  6x- 
haust  their  treasure,  and  lose  their  liberties,  rather 


than  expose  the  national  favlta  f  But  if  the  doctrine 
be  true,  that  you  cannot  discuss  such  a  question  freely 
and  shew  the  mistakes  or  the  misconduct  of  ;^our  own 
country^  the  people  will  go  on  blindfolded,  and  will 
contend  with  honest,  but  mistaken  zeal,  for  principles 
which  if  they  had  fully  understood,  they  would  have 
shuddered  at  supporting. 

I  have  now  given  to  my  adversaries  the  mostfavoar- 
able  side  of  the  argument  for  them.  But  the  question 
is  not  whether  our  country  is  in  the  wron^^',  but 
whether  a  few  men  in  power  and  place,  men  whose 
power  thrives  by  war,  whose  salaries  are  unaffected 
by  it,  cannot  be  in  the  wrong  ?  The  country  is  oppo- 
sed to  the  war,  for  the  question  of  impressment.  The 
country  knows  that  it  is  a  question  grossly  exaggera- 
ted, not  worthy  of  such  sacrifices.  The  country  does 
not  wish  to  protect  British  seamen,  nor  to  deprive 
Great  Britain  of  her  natural  defence. 

But  my  last,  and  most  complete  justification  is,  that 
in  my  opinion,  it  would  be  against  our  interest,  as  a 
nation,  and  against  the  interest  of  the  seamen  espe- 
cially, to  gain  the  question  in  dispute.  The  moment 
our  flag  shall  be  a  complete  asylum  to  British  seamen, 
under  which  they  will  be  free  from  all  search, 
100,000  of  them  would  find  the  way  to  our  ports,  re- 
duce the  wages  of  our  native  seamen,  or  send  them 
about  our  streets  to  beg.  It  would  be,  in  my  opinion, 
the  most  destructive  policy  which  could  be  adopted. 

t  will  then  ask,  whether  a  man  may  not  patriotic- 
ally oppose  a  pretension  of  his  own  country,  which  he 
thinks  will  be  essentially  injurious  to  it? 

I  shall  conclude,  by  quoting  the  words  of  an  emi- 
nent politician,  who  wrote  a  century  ago.       "If 


:i 


;«:•& 


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m 


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■in 


therefore^  said  he,  in  futare  times,  it  shall  be  visible* 
that  some  men,  to  build  np  their  own  fortunes,  are 
pushing  at  their  country's  ruin,  good  patriots  must 
then  exert  all  their  virtue,  they  must  reassume  the 
courage  of  their  ancestors  ;  but  chiefly  they  must  sa- 
crifice to  the  publick,  all  their  ancient  animosities  $ 
they  must  forgive  one  another ;  it  must  no  more  be  re- 
membered of  what 'party  any  man  was;  it  being  suffi- 
cient to  enquire  whether  he  always  acted  honestly. 
At  such  a  time,  the  best  men  of  both  sides,  if  the  name 
of  party  still  remains,  must  shake  hands  together, 
with  a  resolution  to  withstand  the  subtle  and  diligent 
enemies  of  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  country. 
In  such  a  juncture,  not  only  the  best  men  of  all  parties 
must  be  taken  in,  but  we  must  be  angry  with  no  sort 
of  men,  who  will  unite  against  the  common  enemicB 
of  our  commerce  and  peace." 

UitTcnant'f  Enay  on  the  Doty  of  Priiwte  Men,  he. 


ing  an 


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ce. 


MB.  MADISON'S  MESSAGE. 

NO.  I. 
J^OtlEIGN  AND  CIVIL  WAR  ItESOLVED  UPON ! 

Before  we  can  have  the  requisite  time^and  leisure 
to  express,  and  display  the  profound  and  awful  im- 
pressions, which  have  been  made  npon  us  by  thip 
unparalleled  documeL'^—Before  we  shall  be  able  to 
stnp  this  message  ot  that  almost  impenetrable  cloudy 
with  which  Ctia  present  Chief  Magistrate  knows  how 
to  envelope  the  niost  alarming  desiens,  and  projects — 
Before  we  di:aplay,  tb^t  cold,  relentless,  inflexible, 
and  audacious  spirit,  which  seems  to  consider  the 
sufferings  and  distresses  of  a  whole  people  as  mere 
political  pastime— ^which  regards  the  loss  of  armies, 
and  the  destruction  of  thousands  of  our  fellow  men 
as  trifling  incidents  in  the  game,  which  it  has  pleased 
certain  sportsmen  to  play,  I  think  it  may  be  well  to 
give  to  the  publick  in  a  concise  form,  more  intel- 
ligible than  the  message  was  designed  to  be,  the 
leading  principles,  positions,  and  opinions,  which  it 
has  pleased  Mr  Madison  to  advance. 

I  am  well  aware,  that  many  good,  well  meaning 
men  in  reading  this  message  will  be  carried  away  at 
first  with  the  amicable,  generous  and  noble  profes- 
sions of  its  author — ^It  is  precisely  the  art  of  appear- 
ing to  be  what  one  is  riot<— of  assuming  virtues  and 
principles  which  are  foreign  to  our  character — of  hid- 
ing and  sedulously  and  artfully  concealing  our  de- 
signs, which  constitutes  that  dangerous  talent  that 
has  rendered  so  many  men  the  scourges  of  the  coun- 
try in  which  they  were  bom — It  is  only  by  stripping 


m 


;f:i 


IIPI,^IJP.IIIIIIJIJII 

/ 


10 

them  of  this  disguise,  by  comparing  carefally  their 
conduct  with  their  professions,  that  we  can  ascertain 
the  real  merit  or  demerit  of  men—we  mean  to  at- 
tempt tliis  difficult  task,  though  conscious  of  our  want 
of  many  of  the  qualifications  necessary  to  its  full  and 
able  execution. 

The  first  and  most  important  idea  which  the  Mes- 
sage presents,  and  which  runs  through,  and  forms  a 
distinguishing  feature  in  it,  is  that  the  WAR,  how- 
ever disastrous-— however  burdensome,  however  fruit- 
less, however  hopeless  and  desperate,  is  to  be  not 
only  persevered  in,  but  more  expensively,  and  more 
ferociously  carried  on. 

£very  paragraph  is  so  expressed — every  thought 
is  so  modelled — every  fact  is  so  coloured,  presented 
or  moulded,  as  to  bring  the  mind  to  the  necessity  of 
waging  this  unnecessary  and  ruinous  war,  for  aught 
we  see,  ad  infinitum. 

No  art  which  could  have  a  tendency  to  inflame 
the  passions — No  motive,  which  could  excite  the 
pride,  the  cupidity  or  the  vengeance  of  men  has  been 
overlooked  or  left  unui^ed.> 

We  are  then  in  the  first  place  to  consider  this  Mes- 
sage as  an  unequivocal,  and  bold  declaration  that  this 
war,  notwithstanding  the  submission  of  Great  Britain 
and  her  repeal  of  her  orders  in  GouncH,  must  and 
shall  be  continued  with  increased  expense,  probably 
increased  disasters,  and  with  the  certainty  of  ultimate 
failure. — ^We  shall  in  future  essays  shew  that  these 
dreadful  consequences  must  follow — ^that  the  expenses 
will  be  increased  tenfold — the  disasters  will  be  mul 
tiplied  without  end — and  that  the  termination  must 
be,  and  will  be  against  us. 

The  second  proposition  which  the  Message  pre- 
sents to  us,  is,  that  the  ulamatum,  the  sine  qua  non  of 
a  peace  is  already  changed — It  is  expressly  admitted 
by  the  President  that  the  Orders  in  Council  are  re-, 
pealed  and  repealedin  such  a  manner  as  <Uo  be  capable 
of  explanations  meeting  the  views  of  this  Government." 


11 

But  that  the  point  now  unsettled,  and  for  which  aione 
the  war  is  carried  on,  is  the  refusal  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment to  suspend  the  practice  of  impressment — 
This  then  is  avowed  to  be  the  sole  cause  ofprossecu- 
ting  the  war — ^There  is  an  end  to  the  restraints 
upon  our  commerce,  but  we  are  to  wage  this  war  for 
the  exemption  of  British  seamen  from  impressment. 

It  is  very  fortunate  foe  the  desired  and  very  desir- 
able unanimity  among  the  people,  which  is  rapidly 
taking  place,  that  we  should  Imow  from  so  high  au- 
thority, that  the  cause,  for  which  we  aie  enduring 
such  privations,  and  expending  so  much  blood  and 
treasure,  is  the  protection  ofrenegadoes  and  deserters 
from  the  British  navy — ^we  are  fighting  not  for  an 
American,  but  a  British  interest. 

The  third  great  feature  of  the  Message,  is,  that  the 
Governors  of  the  two  old  and  venerable  states  of 
Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  are  declared  to  be 
somewhat  in  a  state  of  insurrection — ^They  are  (as  it 
were)  recommended  to  be  put  under  the  ban  of  the 
Empire. 

If  the  war  Congress,  the  high  mettled  racers  of  the 
South  should  be  as  warmly  impressed,  as  the  Mes- 
sage seems  to  intend  they  shall  be,  we  must  expect  to 
see  it  followed  by,  a  declaration  that  Massachusetts 
and  Connecticut  are  in  rebellion— by  a  suspension  of 
the  habeas  corpus,  and  by  commissions  to  Gen.  King 
and  the  volunteers  whom  he  has  raised,  to  coerce  the 
the  refractory  states. 

The  least  we  can  expect  from  this  part  of  the  Mes- 
sage is  a  law  placing  the  militia  under  the  orders  and 
lashes  of  the  officers  of  the  standing  army — and  our 
papers  will  soon  give  us  another  affecting  detail  of 
the  ceremonies  with  which  the  deserters  from  the  mi- 
litia are  shot. 

We  have  much  to  say  on  this  interestins  sub- 
ject— this  alarming  stride  to  despotism  which  is  pro- 
posed by  introducing  the  conscription  laws  of  France 
into  our  copntiy,  but  it  must  be  the  subject  of  special 


til-; 


mm 


ftnd  separate  consideration — ^We  now  only  mean  to 
indicate  the  topicks  wliich  the  Message  presents. 

The  fourth  subject  which  the  Message  furnishes,  is 
the  increase  and  encouragement  of  the  standing  army 
and  militfa. 

New  bounties — new  pay — ^new  encouragement  to 
these  locusts  who  are  consuming,  like  their  predeces- 
sors in  Egypt;  every  green  thing — every  fertile  plant 
in  our  late  happy  and  peaceful  country — For  what 
purpose  are  they  to  be  raised  ?  to  repel  invasion  ? 
We  are  threatened  with  none  ;  to  conquer  Canada? 
For  what  purpose?  to  protect  British  seamen  from 
impressment ;  and  will  the  conquest  of  Canada  ef- 
fect this  ?  We  know  it  will  not ;  our  path  is  on  the 
ocean ;  we  complain  that  it  is  obstructed ;  in  order 
to  clear  it  we  turn  our  backs  upon  the  very  path 
which  we  would  open,  and  march  in  an  opposite  di- 
rection. This  is  a  curious  mode  of  effecting  an  ob- 
ject ;  but  it  will  be  said  that  the  capture  of  Canada 
will  coerce  Great-Britain ;  I  admit,  that  if  a  man 
steals  my  horse,  I  may  compel  him  to  do  me  right  by 
taking  his  house  or  his  farm  or  any  thing  necesaarif 
to  him;  but  is  Canada  neceasar^  to  Great-Britain ? 
No ;  is  it  as  important  to  her  as  her  own  seamen  P 
No ;  Then  she  will  never  give  up  to  our  demand  of 
protecting  her  own  native  subjects,  even  if  we  take 
Canada. 

But  fifthly  and  lastly  ;  The  Message  suggests  an- 
other dreadful  thought ;  a  thought  which  brings  to 
our  minds  all  the  horrors  of  Baltimore ;  It  appears 
i*^  us,  in  a  covert  and  yet  very  perceptible,  and  very 
obvior?  manner,  to  reccommend  an  extension  of  con- 
structive treasons. 

The  whole  history  of  the  Tudors  and  Stewarts 
cannot  exhibit  a  latitude  of  expression  more  suited 
to  make  every  thing  a  crime,  than  the  President's 
phrase  of  ^^  corrupt  and  perfidious  intercourse  with  the 
enemy." 

Suppose  a  bill  framed  in  these  words,  declaring 


2b 


■iiMPHnaiPMNifWM 


13 

any  man  guilty  of  treason,  who  should  he  found  hold- 
ing  a  '^  corrupt  and  perfidious  intercourse  with  the 
enemy." 

Suppose  the  habeas  corpus  suspended,  and  Gen. 
King  ordered  to  escort  any  man  on  whom  the  Presi- 
dent's,  or  Dr.  Eustis's,  or  Gen.  Dearborn's,  or  Mr. 
Hill's  suspicions  might  light  to  Washington,  there  to  be 
tried  by  a  packed  jury,  returned  at  pleasure  (that  is 
chosen  by  the  Marshal  who  is  the  President's  ser- 
vant.) What  do  you  think  his  chance  would  be  ?  For 
my  part  I  had  rather  take  my  chance  with  the  mercy 
of  a  Presidential  mob,  than  a  Presidential  jury — ^AU 
the  facta  of  which  a  man  could  be  convicted  are  de- 
tailed  in  the  late  law  forbidding  supplies  to  the  ene- 
my, what  then  can  be  intended  except  to  punish  upon 
surmises  and  suspicion?  The  liberty  of  the  people  is 
in  danger. 


No.n 

It  has  been  the  constant  boast  of  our  administra- 
tion, in  the  midst  of  the  most  hostile  acts,  that  it  is  sin- 
cerely desirous  of  peace — such  professions  cost  but 
little,  and  aiford  the  people  who  suffer,  small  consola- 
tion amidst  the  distresses  and  ruin  occasioned  by  the 
war. 

A  very  moderate  portion  of  ability  is  requisite  in 
framing  letters,  and  despatches,  and  messages  breath- 
ing a  pacifick  spirit. 

Yet  if  the  whole  conduct  of  these  professing  gentle- 
men be  examined  and  analyzed,  and  if  it  has  appear- 
ed, and  shall  yet  appear,  that  their  conduct  is  in  di- 
rect opposition  to  their  declaration,  we  ought  to  enter- 
tain but  one  sentiment  in  regard  to  them,  and  that  is, 
that  by  adding  duplicity  to  mjurous  projects  and  ru- 
inous measures,  they  merit  a  double  portion  of  oup 
resentment  and  distrust. 

An  overwhelming  mass  of  these  pacifick  profesison$ 


14 

flowed  in  upon  us  at  the  moment  when  this  unjust  and 
unnecessary  War  was  declaredj,  and  a  new  edition  of 
the  same  hollow  and  insincere  declarations  has  just 
been  published^  at  the  very  moment,  when  we  are 
earryv^fire  and  award  into  the  peaceful  colonies  of 
Great  Britain — ^when  we  are  excited  by  every  species 
of  exagseration  and  misrepresentation  to  carry  on  the 
Was  with  ferocity  and  fiiry. 

It  is  pretended  by  the  President,  that  at  the  very 
moment  of  his  declaration  of  War,  he  made  new  ef- 
forts to  obtain  peace,  and  even  solicited  an  armistice 
before  an  actual  appeal  to  arms  had  been  made.  We 
shall  say  nothing  upon  this  new  and  unheard  of  proce- 
dure. We  shall  admit,  though  we  think  the  conduct 
extraordinary,  that  if  proj^osals  were  made  to  Great- 
Britain^  such  as  even  a  feeblo,  a  base  and  degraded 
nation  could  accept  from  a  haughty  and  much  more 
powerful  foe,  that  the  administration  deserve  credit 
for. 

But  if  it  shall  appear,  as  it  will,  that  the  offers  made 
were  not  only  illusory  but  insulting ;  if  they  were 
such  as  any  nation  not  I'eady  to  pass  under  the  yoke, 
would  have  rejected  ; — ^if,  in  sliort,  it  must  have  been 
foreiieett  tliat  they  would  be  rejected  by  Great-Britain, 
i  can  only  say  that  the  people  ought  to  view  with  dis- 
dain this  attempt  to  impose  upon  their  understandings. 

It  is  my  design  to  analyze  this  whole  correspon- 
dence with  Great-Britain,  and  I  fear  that  I  shall  be 
compelled  to  shew,  to  the  disgrace  of  our  nilers,  that 
all  this  parade  of  negotiation  had  only  one  object  in 
view,  to  enable  the  President  to  make  a  shew  of  a  pa- 
cifick  disposition — ;to  lull  the  fears  and  excite  the  hopes 
of  the  people  ;-^to  secure  the  reelection  of  the  •iuthor 
of  this  War  to  the  Presidency, 

In  executing  this  task,  I  must  entreat  the  attention 
of  my  readers  to  two  circumstances  which  they  must 
keep  in  mind  throushout  the  whole  discussion. 

The  one  is,  that  m  examining  tlye  negotiations  and 
propositions  of  our  artful  cabinet,  propositions  adroit- 


15 

iy  stated,  cavefully  considered,  cautiously  es^ressed^ 
combining  all  the  talents  of  the  President  and  Ids  min- 
isters, very  considerable  time  and  attention  will  be  re- 
quisite. 

.  I  am  persuaded  that  to  the  great  mass  of  readers^ 
the  subject  will  be\ininteresting-— the  topics  are  too  re- 
fined, the  argument  too  elaborate  and  complicated  for 
general  use. 

It  is  only  from  those  whose  means  of  information, 
and  whose  power  of  discrimination  qualify  thetn  to 
follow  a  continued  train  of  reasoning,  and  whose  pa- 
triotism and  zeal  will  induce  them  to  undertake  it^ 
that  I  expect  attention. 

It  is  however  a  solemn  duty  in  all  those,  who  know 
how  often  the  People  have  been  deceived  by  the  8<yj^h- 
29m8  and  false  pretensions  of  the  Cabinet,  to  examine 
this  subject,  and  to  attend  to  the  essays  of  any  mltn 
who  will  devote  his  time  and  whatever  talents  he  may 
possess  to  this  arduous  duty. 

T^e  second  circumstance  worthy  of  consideration  is 
fh'  that  it  is  impossible  to  discuss  and  to  prove, 
the  isincerity  of  the  offers  made  by  our  own  cabinet 
without  indirectly  Justifying  the  British  cabinet  in 
ejecting  them.  Hence  it  may  be  expected  that  the 
old  clamour,  of  supporting  the  pretensions  of  our  ene- 
my will  be  revived,  and  if  wc  were  to  utter  these  sen- 
timents in  Baltimore  we  might  be  exposed  to  martyr- 
dom and  massacre.  We  simply  however  present  to 
all  tend  consciences  this  plain  •  apology.— Whether 
our  rulers  have  sincerely  and  honestly  solicited  and 
sought  for  Peace  is  an  important  question.  If  they 
have  J  all  opposition  ought  to  he  withdrawn,  and  we 
should  unite  in  their  favour.  If  they  have  not ;  but  if 
in  place  of  it,  they  have  endeavoured  to  deceive  the 
people  by  insincere  professions  of  peace,  they  merit 
our  highest  censure  and  indignation. 

I  cannot  perceive  how  this  question  can  be  in  any 
manner  discussed  without  involving  in  it,  either  a 
censure  or  an  ff^;?ro/;flf/o?M)f  the  British  Government 


i 


16 

In  rejecting  the  overtures.  If  any  man  can  see  a  mid- 
dle coarse  let  him  take  it. 

For  ourselves,  conscious  of  as  much  patriotism  as 
Mr.  Madison  pretends  to,  and  seeing  no  reason  as  he 
does  for  covering  up  our  thoughts  in  dark,  ambiguous, 
unintelligible  language,  we  shall  proceed  boldly  to 
shew  that  his  late  extraordinary  proposals  for  an  Jir- 
mistice  were  unreasonable,  hostile,  and  calculated  to 
produce  every  thing  hut  Peace. 

Having  already  extended  the  necessary  prelimina- 
ry observations  to  so  great  a  length ;  the  limits  of  a 
newspaper  essay  will  only  permit  us  to  make  these 
important  introductory  remarks  on  the  subject  of  the 
late  extraordinary  and  unreasonable  propositions  for 
an  Armistice. 

The  first  is,  that  it  is  we  believe  the  first  time,  in  the 
history  of  nations,  that  a  proposal  for  an  Armistice 
was  made  by  the  party  declaring  an  offensive  war,  be- 
fore he  had  struck  a  single  blow  upon  the  enemy ; — 
before  he  had  gained  or  was  likely  to  gain  a  single 
advantage.  If  we  should  put  this  measure  into  a 
simple  form,  we  should  say,  that  it  was  in  the  nature 
of  a  menace — **  There,  Sir,  you  have  failed  to  yield 
to  our  threats,  because  you  thought  we  did  not  dare  to 
make  War,  we  now  shew  you  that  we  have  courage, 
therefore  yield."  Is  this  a  natural  and  usual  mode 
of  conciliating  an  enemy,  and  of  reconciling  him  to 
terms  which  he  had  before  rejected  ? 

A  brave  andpowerfeul  nation  would  have  preferred 
to  have  shewn  its  prowess — ^to  have  wrested  some- 
thing from  its  enemy  which  it  could  offer,  as  the  e- 
quivalent  for  concession. 

The  second  remark  which  occurs  to  us,  without 
entering  at  large  into  the  terms  proposed,  is  that  we 
offer  lo  Great  Britain  precisely  the  same  terms  which 
were  offered  by  Mr.  Monroe  in  I8O7. — We  offer  to 
exclude  British  seamen  from  our  publick  and  private 
ships. — On  those  terms,  properly  secured,  she  offered 
to   modify  her  practice  of  impressment.     This  is 


upon  record.  Mr.  Monroe  i9  bound  to  acknowledge 
this  fact  for  we  have  it  under  his  own  hand.  We  eaU'^ 
not  refrain  from  asking  the  question,  why  this  pointy, 
if  now  ofi'ered  in  sincerity,  was  not  accepted  heforethe 
War? 

If  it  had  been,  as  the  Orders  in  Council  were  vol- 
untarily  withdrawn  by  Great  Britain,  no  c^use  of  war 
would  have  remained.  We  shall  shew  in  our  next 
essay  why  Great.Britain  did  not  accede  to  the  terms 
offered  by  our  cabinet.  In  short  we  shall  shew  that 
there  was  only  a  feint — a  pretence — an  appearance 
of  acceding  to  those  terms  on  the  part  of  our  cabinet. 

Lastly — It  is  evident  by  the  apparent  offer,  (and 
though  I  shall  shew  it  was  only  an  offer  in  appear^ 
ance,  yet  it  is  so  far  a  commitment  or  admission  of  our 
cabinet)  that  we  admit  that  Great-Britain  has  been 
always  right  in  complaining  of  the  enticement  and  en- 
listment of  her  subjects  in  time  of  War  :-^Because 
c'lr  cabinet  now  propose  to  prohibit  by  law  the  enlist- 
ment of  British  sailors,  and  surely  they  would  not  a- 
gree  to  this  if  by  the  law  of  nations,  we,  as  a  neutral 
nation,  have  a  right  "so  to  enlist  or  employ  them.  Our 
cabinet  is  not  made  of  such  stuff  as  to  give  up  to 
Great-Britain  any  legitimate  rights.  They  admit 
therefore  they  have  been  in  the  wrong, 


ir  I 


ti-  i^ 


;.'rl 


NO.  m. 

I  HK  FUOPOSITIONS  RECIPROCALLY  MADE  BY  THE  AMERICAN 
AND  BRITISH  CABINETS  FOR  AN  ARMISTICE,  AND  THE  REA- 
SONS ASSIGNED  FOR  THEIR  REJECTION. 

To  facilitate  the  examination  of  this  subject,  I  pro- 
pose to  consider, 

i8t.  What  were  tlie  speciflck  propositions  respec- 
tively made? 

'^nd.  In  what  manner  they  were  received  by  the 
different  governments  including  herein  the  answers 
severally  made. 


18 


§ 


H  I 


'    Sd.  The  reasonableness  of  these  several  propost- 
tionsy  and  replies. 

If  we  were  to  decide^  as  to  the  nature  of  any  prop- 
ositions  made  for  an  Armistice,  either  from  the  prac- 
tice heretofore  adopted  by  all  civilized  nations,  or 
fh)m  the  rules  of  natural  justice,  equity  and  decorum, 
we  shoul4  certainly  conclude  that  the  offer  ought  to 
be  perfectly  reciprocal ;  not  claiming  for  the  party  who 
proposes  it  any  advantage  over  the  other  to  whom  it' 
is  proposed;  otherwise  a  rejection  must  be  expected, 
and  we  must  look  to  some  other  motive  than  the  avow- 
ed one  for  the  proposition.  To  expect  that  an  enemy 
in  time  of  war  would  voluntarily  yield  any  point  with- 
out an  equivalent  must  be  absurd — ^There  is  only 
one  exception  to  this  rule,  and  that  is,  where  the  party 
who  makes  an  unequal  and  unreciprocal  demand, 
has  gained  some  great  advantage  in  the  war,  or  is  in  a 
contution  so  manifestly  superior  in  point  of  force  as  to 
give  him  a  right  to  dictate  the  conditions  of  an  Armis- 
tlce-^Thus  we  have  seen  Bonaparte  often  insisting, 
as  for  instance,  to  the  king  of  Sardinia,  after  the  battle 
at  Coni,  and  to  Austria  before  the  treaty  of  Campo 
Formio,  on  terms  which  any  equal  and  unsubdued  foe 
would  have  spumed — In  all  such  cases  we  consider  it 
the  language  of  a  haughty  master  to  a  humble  and  con- 
quered enemy — We  believe  that  the  annals  of  modern 
^Europe  cannot  exhibit  a  case  where  between  two  par- 
ties perfectly  equal,  and  before  the  chances  of  war  had 
been  tried,  terms  totally  devoid  of  reciprocity  have 
been  demanded — Much  less  could  any  man  conceive, 
that  the  rulers  of  seven  millions  of  people,  not  inured 
to  war,  with  six  frigates,  and  ten  thousand  ill-disci- 
plined, raw  and  inexperienced  troops,  would  demand, 
as  a  condition  of  a  mere  suspension  of  hostilities,  t]\t 
relinquishment  of  a  right  exercised  for  four  centuries 
from  an  old  powerful  nation  comprising  sixteen  mill- 
ions of  people,  witli  300,000  regular  troops  and  400 
Hliips  of  war. 

Yot  sucli  a  case  we  undertake  to  shew  has  Mr. 


19 

Madison  for  the  first  time  exhibited — ^The  Otdeirs  in 
Council  and  blockades  having  been  removed  as  it  is 
now  confessed  to  the  satisfaction  of  our  cabinet,  the 
practice  of  Great  Britain  of  reclaiming  heroirn  native 
seamen,  a  practice  which  we  shall  shew  under  our 
third  division  to  have  been  coeval  with  the  existence 
'  of  her  marine,  and  a  practice  uniformly  adopted  by 
all  other  nations,  especially  by  America  and  lier  ally 
France,  this  ancient  practice  was  the  only  remaining 
ground  of  war,  and  the  only  source  of  dispute  between 
tlie  two  countries. 

Great  Britain  claims  it  as  a  right — we  contend 
that  it  is  a  wrong  done  to  us.  Now  Mr.  Madison 
/  asks  as  a  condition  of  even  a  suspension  of  arms,  and 
as  the  very  commencement  of  negotiation,  that  Great 
Britain  shall  relinquish  the  exercise  of  this  which 
she  claims  as  a  right — *'  We  will  not  hear  you,"  says 
Mr.  Madison,  <<till  you  give  up  your  claim,  and  then 
we  will  treat  with  you  about  the  justice  of  it,  or  the 
modes  of  indemnifying  you  for  giving  it  up." 

The  first  question  is,  did  Mr.  Madison  make  this 
monstrous  and  preposterous  claim  ?  Could  he  insult 
any  nation,  however  feeble,  by  such  a  preliminary 
proposition  ? 

One  man  says,  I  do  not  understand  the  demand  in 
this  light — another  says,  Mr.  Monroe  explained  and 
took  it  back  in  a  subsequent  letter,  which  by  the  way 
was  not  written  till  six  days  before  the  Message. 

A  third  gentleman  with  honest  zeal  exclaims,  it  is 
not  possible  Mr.  Madison  could  have  been  guilty  of 
playing  so  broad  a  farce  ! 

I  shall  prave  by  unqestionable  evidence  that  such 
a  proposition  was  made,  for  whicli  no  equivalent  was 
offered  to  Great  Britain. 

In  Mr.  Monroe's  instructions  to  JVIr.  Russell,  dated 
.Tune  S6th,  eight  days  after  the  declaration  of  war,  he 
authorises  and  directs  him  as  follows  :  "  If  the  Orders 
in  Council  are  repealed  and  no  illegal  blockades  sub- 
iiitituted  to  them,  and  orders  are  given  to  discontinue 


'm!. 


«0 

the  imjDvesspient  of  seamen  [mark  it  reader !  any  aea^ 
men,  British  or  American,  naturalized  or  not]  from  our 
vessels,  and  to  restore  those  already  impressed,  there 
is  no  reason  why  hostilities  should  not  immediately 
cease — securing  these  objects,  you  are  authorized  tu 
stipulate  an  arinistice." 

Now,  no  language  could  be  clearer  to  shew,  that 
the  actual  discontinuance  of  the  practice  of  impress- 
ment must  precede  even  an  armistice — In  other 
words,  a  question  which  has  been  twenty  years  in  dis- 
cussion between  the  two  nations,  a  question  founded 
0n  sevisral  centuries  usurpation,  if  you  please  so  to 
call  it,  a  question  in  which  Great-Britain  is  support- 
ed by  the  practice  of  America  and  France,  as  I  shall 
most  amply  prove,  this  question  which  she  considers 
a  vital  one  for  her  marine,  Great-Britain  is  required 
to  give  up  as  a  condition  of  a  temporary  suspension 
of  arms. 

Mr.  Russell  our  minister  understood  his  instruc- 
tions in  the  light  in  which  I  do— and  no  man  can  un- 
derstand them  otherwise. 

In  his  letter  to  Lord  Gastlereagh  of  August  M, 
1813,  he  says  *•  that  he  is  authorised  to  stipulate 
with  his  Britannick  Majesty's  government  an  armis« 
tice  mi  condition  that  ttie  orders  in  council  be  repeal- 
ed, and  no  illegal  blockades  substituted ;  and  that  or- 
ders be  immediately  given  to  discontinue  the  impress- 
ment of  persons  from  American  vessels,  and  to  restore 
ihe  citizens  of  the  United  States  already  impressed." 

Here  we  find  the  discontinuance  of  the  practice  of 
impressment  a  condition  precedent  to  an  armistice — 
It  IS  curious  also  to  notice  the  legal  precision  of  Rus- 
sell's terms — -They  are  to  require  the  discontinuance 
of  impressment  of  "j»er8o»s,"  that  is,  of  all  or  any  per- 
sons— but  those  he  requires  to  be  restored  are  only 
"  American  citizens" — ^We  are  astonished  that  they 
had  not  the  eflfirontery  to  demand  the  re-delivery  of 
British  subjects  who  had  been  impressed— But  on  re- 
jection it  is  as  well  and  nearly  the  same,  because  the 


terms  '*  American  citizens"  includes  British  sailoM 
naturalized,  many  of  whom  obtained  naturalization 
in  twenty.four  hours  after  they  came  on  shore — ^This 
topick  we  shall  however  examine  when  we  consider 
the  reasonableness  of  the  ptopositionst 

Lord  Gastlereagh  comprehended  Mr.  RusselFs  de- 
mand in  the  same  manner  in  wliich  Mr.  Russell 
liad  understood  his  instructions. 

^^  I  cannot,  said  his  Lordship,  refrain  on  one  single 
point  from  expressing  my  surprise,  namely,  that  as  u 
condition  preliminary  even  to  a  suspension  of  hostil- 
ities, the  United  States  have  thought  fit  to  demand 
that  the  British  government  should  desist  from  its  an- 
cient and  accustomed  practice  of  impressing  British 
seamen  from  the  merchant  ships  of  a  foreign  state 
simply  on  the  assurance  that  a  law  shall  hereafter  be 
passed,  &c.  &c." 

His  Lordship  goes  on  to  declare  that  Great-Britain 
is  now  ready  as  she  has  been  heretofore  to  agree  to  a- 
ny  substitute  which  may  accomplish  the  satne  end — 
but  this  will  come  particularly  under  consideration 
when  we  come  to  the  second  proposed  division. 

The  present  design  is  merely  to  prove,  that  our 
government  did  demand  tlie  discontinuance  of  im- 
pressment as  a  preliminary  even  to  any  negotiation — 
But  some  gentlemen  have  construed  a  phrase  in  Mr. 
Monroe's  letter  of  the  27th  of  Oct.  to  Sir  J.  B.  War- 
ren, as  denying  the  intention  to  demand  the  relinquish, 
ment  of  impressment  as  a  preliminary— We  know  they 
are  mistaken,  and  that  government  do  not  even  now 
pretend  that  they  are  ready  for  an  Armistice,  unless 
the  practice  of  impressment  be  first  relinquished — 
Tlic  clause  on  which  doubts  have  arisen  is  this,  Mr. 
Monroe  in  his  letter  to  Sir  John  B.  Warren,  says, 
'*  Lord  Castlereagh  in  his  note  to  Mr.  Russell,  seems 
to  have  supposed,  that  had  the  British  government 
accepted  the  propositions  made  to  it,  Great-Britain 
would  have  sus])euded  immediately  the  exercise  of 
a  right  on  the  mere  assurance  of  this  government  that 


I ' 


Vm 


a  law  would  be  afterwards  passed  to  prohibit  the  eui-^ 
ployment  of  British  seamen  in  the  service  of  the  U- 
nited  States ;  and  that  Great-Bi'itaiH  would  have  vo 
agency  in  the  regulation  to  give  effect  to  that  pi'oposi- 
ttonJ*  <<  Such  an  idea,"  lie  adds,  <<  was  not  in  the 
contemplation  of  this  government,  nor  is  it  to  be  infer- 
red from  Mr.  Russell's  note ;  but  lest  such  an  inference 
should  be  drawn,  subsequent  instructions  were  given 
to  Mr.  Russell  with  a  view  to  obviate  every  objection 
of  the  kind  alluded  to.  These  instructions  bear  date 
S7th  July,  and  were  forwarded  by  tlie  British  packet 
Althea." 

Now,  what  is  it  that  Mr.  Monroe  means  to  deny  ? 
That  the  relinquishment  of  impressment  was  an  abso- 
lute preliminary  ?  Or  that  it  was  not  expected  that 
Great-Britain  should  have  no  voice,  no  agency  in  the 
terms  of  the  act  of  Congress  which  might  be  passed 
to  regulate  them  ?•  We  say  clearly  the  latter — We 
prove  this  by  the  new  instructions  of  July  S7th  to 
Mr.  Russell,  which  arc  given  in  the  documents,  and 
which  expressly  stipulate,  that  impressment  must  be 
instantly  abandoned  as  a  ])reliminary  to  an  Armistice. 

It  however  provides  that  Great-Britain  shall  be 
consulted  as  to  the  terms  of  the  provision  restricting 
the  employment  of  British  subjects. 

This  then,  and  this  only  is  the  point  which  Mr. 
Monroe  meant  when  he  said  that  Lord  Castlereagh 
misunderstood  the  claims  of  our  government — This  is 
further  proved  by  tiic  very  same  letter  to  Sir  John  B. 
Warren,  which  is  dated  «)nly  sixteen  days  since,  in 
i!vhich  it  is  added  ^^  that  a  suspension  of  impressment 
during  the  Armistice  seems  to  be  a  necessary  conse- 
quence— ^It  cannot  be  presumed,  while  the  parties  are 
negotiating,  that  the  United  States  would  admit  the 
right,  or  acquiesce  in  the  practice  of  the  opposite  par- 
ty." This  alone  settles  the  question  as  to  what  was 
demanded^  but  we  shall  remove  all  doubt  hereafter. 


83 


NO.  IV. 
TILE  SEVEUAL  TROPOSALS  FOR  AN  ARMISTICE  CONSIDERED, 

If  any  doubts  should  still  remain  on  the  mind  of 
any  one,  whether  the  absolute  and  entire  discontinu- 
ance of  the  practice  of  reclaiming  her  own  seamen  out 
of  merchant  ships  on  the  high  seas,  was  demanded 
by  Mr.  Madison,  of  Great-Britain,  as  a  condition  of 
granting  a  suspension   of  arms  only,  those  doubts 


must  be  entirely  removed  by  the  following  additional 
facts. 

Mr.  Monroe,  when  he  denies  that  Lord  Castlcreagb 
understood  Mr.  Russell  and  our  Government  aright, 
refers  to  his  explanatory  letter  of  July  27th  by  the 
British  packet  Althea,  in  which  he  say9>  that  the  o-. 
riginal  proposi  ion  is  fully  explained.  On  examin- 
ing  that  letter,  we  find  it  again  asserted,  that "  theOr^ 
ders  in  Cou:icil,  illegal  Blockades  and  Impressments, 
were  the  principal  causes  of  the  war,  and  ir  they  were 
removed,  you  might  stipulate  an  Armistice." 

The  only  differences  between  this  new  explanato- 
ry letter  and  the  former  one  are  the  following  : 

ist,  Mr.  Russell  was  authorised,  by  the  last  letter, 
not  to  insist  upon  a  written  stipulation  to  be  contain- 
ed in  the  instrument  declaring  the  Armistice,  but  he 
was  especially  directed  to  procure  an  "  informal  un- 
derstanding, so  as  to  admit  of  no  mistake,"  that  im^ 
pressmeuts  should  be  instantly  discontinued. 

2nd.  He  was  to  make  the  Government  of  Great- 
Britain  distinctly  to  understand,  that  all  stipulations 
as  to  the  exclusion  of  British  seamen  from  our  ships 
must  ultimately  depend  on  Congress,  whose  consent 
would  be  necessary  to  give  validity  to  the  bargain  di- 
plomatically agreed  upon. 

AVhen  we  come  to  the  ponsideration  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  the  several  proposals,  we  shall  resume  this 


,;t. 


ill  ! 


a4 

fact,  and  aak,  whether  from  the  very  acknowledgecl 
uncertainty  of  the  temper  of  Congress  on  this  delicate 
subject,  it  would  have  been  expected  of  Great-Britain 
that  she  would  yield  so  ancient  a  claim  for  the  advan- 
tage of  a  promise  which  the  maker  of  it  avowed  he 
had  no  power  to  fulfil,  and  where  the  execution  of  it 
rested  upon  the  good  v.  ill  and  good  faith  of  such  men. 
as  Seaver  and  Cutts — ^and  Bibb  and  Troup — and 
Crrundy  and  Clay — and  Wright  and  Nelson  ? 

Another  proof  that  our  Government  never  contem- 
plated even  an  Jlrmistice,  but  upon  condition  that 
Great  Britain  would  get  down  upon  her  knees,  put  on 
the  penitential  garments,  and  renounce  the  error  of 
her  ways,  will  be  found  in  a  still  later  letter  from  Mr. 
Monroe  to  Mr,  Russell,  assigning  the  reasons  why 
the  President  rejected  the  early,  and  for  us,  very  fa- 
vourable offers  of  Sir  George  Prevost  and  Mr.  Foster, 
for  an  Armistice. 

This  letter,  dated  August,  :31st,  states,  that,  ^^  As 
a  principal  object  of  the  war  is  to  obtain  redress  a- 
gainst  the  British  practice  of  Impressment,  an  agree- 
ment to  suspend  hostilities,  even  before  the  British 
Government  is  heard  from  on  that  subject,  might  be 
considered  a  relinquishment  of  that  claim." 

A  pretty  curious  sort  of  reasoning,  and  one  for  aught 
we  see  which  would  forever  put  an  end  to  all  Armis- 
tices ! !  For  one  party  or  the  other  might  always  urge 
that  the  agreement  to  the  Armistice  would  be  consid- 
ered a  relinquishment  of  his  claims,  ai.d  therefore,  that 
theothermust,  as  a  preliminary  even  to  discussion,  put 
him  in  possession  of  what  he  demands,  otherwise  he 
could  not  in  honour  negotiate. 

But  the  most  conclusive  proof,  that  an  Armistice 
would  never  be  agreed  to,  unless  Great  Britain  would 
yield  {not  the  point  of  honour  only)  but  her  ancient, 
and  as  she  deems  most  interesting  right  (and  how  dear 
it  is  to  her  we  shall  hereafter  shew),  will  be  found  in 
the  last  clause  of  Mowoc's  letter  to  J.  B.  Warren,  in 
which  he  says, 


S5 


Ught 

lis- 

irge 

Isid- 

that 

I  put 

ho 


ticc 

lid 

;ar 
in 
in 


^<  If  therb  is  no  objection  to  an  accommodation  re- 
lating to  Impressment  other  than  the  suspension  of 
fho.  British  claim  to  Impressment  during  the  Armis- 
tice, there  can  be  none  to  proceeding,  without  the 
ARMISTICE  to  the  discussion  and  arrangement  of  an 
article  on  that  subject.  The  great  question  being  sat- 
isfactorily adjusted,  the  M^ay  will  be  open  ixi  an  At- 
mistice,^'  &c.  / 

Here  then  the  question  is  put  at  rest. — If  Great- 
Britain  had  been  mistaken  as  to  our  demand  of  an 
immediate  suspension  of  her  practice  of  taking  Brit- 
ish seamen^  it  was  the  most  simple  thing  in  the  world 
to  have  intimated,  after  saying  as  Mr.  Monroe  does^*^ 
**  If  that  is  the  only  objection  on  the  part  of  Great- 
Britain  to  the  Armistice,  proposed  by  us,  why  we  will 
agree  directly  to  the  Armistice,  and  to  an  immediate 
negotiation  pending  the  •Armistice  on  the  subject  of 
Impi-essment.*' 

But  the  reverse  is  Mr.  Monroe's  alternative—**  If 
you  will  not  agree  to  suspend  Impressment  as  intro- 
ductory to  an  Armistice,  why  we  will  negotiate  without 
an  ArmisticeJ^  Which  is  equivalent  to  saying,  that 
an  A  rmistice  will  never  be  granted,  until  you  yield  this 
point. 

We  shall  shew,  by  and  by,  that  the  last  offer  of 
without  Ml  Armistice,  is  the  mere  shad- 
ow of  a  shade — a  pure  phantasm,  which  will  e- 
lude  the  grasp,  though  it  is  well  calculated  to  de- 
ceive the  credulous,  and  lead  the  seekers  of  popular- 
ity astray. 

We  have  shewn  what  were  the  precise  and  only 
terms  offered  by  uh  to  Great-Britain,  that  while  we 
proposed  simply  to  withhold  actual  hostilities,  keep- 
ing on  our  Non-Importation  law,  which  we  declared 
to  be  the  most  efficient  War  measure,  we  demanded  of 
her  not  merely  a  correspondent  cessation  of  captures 
and  warlike  measures,  but  the  immediate  suspension 
of  an  interesting  right  during  the  Armistice,  which 
might  either  be  protracted  by  negotiation  through  the 


treating. 


»6 

whole  European  war,  or  Great-Britain  would  have 
the  odium  of  breaking  it  off,  and  thus  give  our  cabi- 
net all  the  popularity  and  benefits,  at  home  and  a- 
broad,  of  waging  a  defensive  war,  in  place  of  the  odi- 
um of  carrying  on  an  offensive  one. 

Nor  were  the  inequality,  and  preposterous  nature 
of  these  terms  the  worst  features  in  the  negotiation. — 
Our  Government  and  Minister  took  care  not  only  to 
make  Great-Britain  perceive,  that  we  were  afraid  to 
trust  her  during  an  Armistice,  even  after  she  had  vol- 
untarily abandoned  the  two  great  formerly  avowed 
causes  of  war ;  but  they  reminded  her  of  the  vast  in< 
juries  she  had  wantonly  committed  upon  us,  and  the 
unprecedented  forbearance  of  the  United  States,  and 
lest  all  this  language  and  this  extraordinary  demand 
should  not  induce  her  to  reject  our  proposals,  orders 
were  given  to  hint  to  her,  that  after  these  humiliations 
were  submitted  to,  we  had  many  "  rods  in  pickle,'' 
for  which  she  must  prepare  her  Imperial  back. 

'*  Although  there  are  many  just  and  weighty  caus- 
es of  complaint  against  Great-Britain  (says  Mr. 
Madison,  in  his  instructions  for  an  Armistice,  in  his 
hollow  instructions  to  make  a  shew  of  an  Armistice), 
you  will  perceive  that  the  Orders  in  Council,  illegal 
Blockades,  and  Impressments  are  of  the  highest  im- 
portance,'' 

Gracious  Heaven !  !  What  hopes  can  that  nation 
ever  have  of  arriviug  at  an  end  of  its  labours  ! !  The. 
toils  of  Hercules,  and  the  disasters  of  Job,  have  nti 
comparison  with  them. — I  had  thought  that  the  ten 
derness  of  our  government  for  Great-Britain  had  in- 
duced them  and  their  editors,  the  National  Intelli- 
gencer, Aurora,  and  Chronicle,  to  state  to  us  all  thn 
various  causes  of  dissatisfaction  against  her. — I 
Jiad  thought  that  after  atoning  for  the  attack  on 
the  Chesapeake,  relinquishing  all  illegal  Block- 
ades— rescinding  the  Orders  in  Council,  and  re- 
nouncing Impressmen*",  there  would  remain  no  causo 
of  dissatisfaction   aga.nst  Great-Britain ;  but  she  is 


m 


S7 

now  told,  that  these  are  only  the  higher  causes  of 
complaint,  and  that  after  she  has  .submitted  to  all 
the  humiliations  demanded  of  her,  our  Attorney- 
General  will  then  file  a  bill,  and  present  a  specifica- 
tion of  the  other  **  just  and  weighty  causes  of  com- 
plaint.'' I  can  only  say,  that  I  never  yet  heard  the 
bitterest  enemy  of  England  mention  any  other  causes, 
than  those  enumerated  by  Mr.  Madison. — ^What  pos- 
sible encouragement  then  could  the  British  cabinet 
have,  to  agree  to  our  proposals,  when  they  could  see 
.  no  termination  to  complaints,  and  pretexts,  and  caus- 
es, for  avoiding  an  ultimate  arrangement,  and  when 
the  exclusion  c/  British  trade,  (the  only  real  object  of 
France  in  obliging  us  to  enter  into  this  war)  was  to 
be  continued  until  Peace  should  be  finally  conclud- 
ed? 

The  government  of  Great-Britain  lost  no  time  after 
the  war  was  known,  in  making  to  our  cabinet  propo- 
tsals  for  an  Armistice.  These  proposals  were  like  all 
propositions  between  equal  states,  perfectly  recipro- 
cal. They  require  of  us  to  suspend  hostilities  only, 
in  consideration  of  suspending  hostilities  on  their  part. 
They  are  silent  as  to  Impressments— and  would  any 
person  enquire  why  ?  It  may  be  answered,  that  Im- 
pressments never  had  been  presented  to  Great-Brit- 
ain as  in  themselves  the  cause  ofwar^-^They  had  ex- 
isted prior  to  Jay's  treaty,  and  that  treaty  was  made 
without  demanding  their  discontinuance — they  con- 
tinued during  the  whole  of  Mr.  King's  residence  in 
Europe,  as  well  as  during  Mr.  Monroe's,  and  the  lat- 
ter also  made  a  treaty  in  which  they  were  left  as  the 
subjects  of  future  arrangement. — How  then  could  G. 
Britain  presume  that  this  would  be  on  our  part  a  sine 
qua  non  of  an  Armistice  ? — Especially  as  the  discus- 
sion on  that  topick  with  Monroe  and  Pinkney  had 
shewn  that  many  months  would  be  required  to  ar- 
range it? 

The  universal  sentiment  in  England  and  America 
was,  tliat  if  the  Orders  in  Council  and  Blockade!^ 


1 '  i  ■  i  f ' 


13  III 


sliould  be  withdrawn,  the  cause  of  War  Would  c^as^ 
— at  least  it  was  supposed  that  hostilities  might  ceisLse, 
and  the  other  subjects  be  matter  of  negotiation  for  a 
definitive  Peace. 

Our  cabinet  knew  well  that  tliis  state  of  things 
would  t|ike  place — They  knew  from  our  minister  in 
Fiance,  Barlow,  that  the  French  decrees  had  been 
repealed  on  the  S8th  of  April,  181S.  This  was 
known  here  before  the  declaration  of  War.  They 
knew  equally  well  that  Great-Britain,  according  to 
her  pledge,  would  (as  she  afterwards  did)  repeal  the 
Orders  in  Council. — To  prevent  the  eifects  wliich 
this  would  produce  in  this  country.  War  was  previ- 
ously declaredr-^^ut  the  repeal  of  the  Orders  in 
Council  might  create  clamours  for  peace  in  the  Uni-» 
ted  States— Here  too  they  had  their  plaister  for  tlie 
wound.— tA  proposal  must  be  made  for  an  Armistice, 
and  to  the  astonished  cabinet  of  Great-Britain,  fond- 
ly anticipating  the  return  of  peace  by  the  repeal  of 
the  Orders  in  Council,  the  old  subject  oi her  claiming 
her  own  seamen,  so  long  and  so  often  discussed  and 
never  before  presented  even  as  a  sine  qua  nort  of  a 
treaty,  makes  a  splendid  figure  in  the  foreground,  as 
a  preliminary  even  to  a  cessation  of  the  shedding  of 
human  blood.  8uch  is  the  dijference  in  the  propo- 
sals of  the  two  cabinets— While  the  one  repeals  her 
obnoxious  measure,  and  simply  claims  a  mutual  ce^sa- 
tionfrom  hostilities  ,•  the  other  presents  at  the  very 
threshold  of  negotiation,  a  check  mate  which  puts  a 
period  to  the  game  of  peace — We  ask  Great-Britain 
to  yield,  as  a  preliminary,  what  is  well  known  she 
would  not  give  up  without  a  substitute,  until  Dear- 
born shall  have  planted  his  standard  on  the  Tower  of 
liondon. 


m 


i9 


NO.  V. 

ON  THE  HBASONARLENESS  OF  THE  OFFERS  FOR  AH 

ARMISTICE. 

The  principles  on  which  the  practice  of  reclaiming 
,  their  own  citizens  by  belligerents,  is  founded — its 
antiquity,  and  universality. 

We  cannot  decide,  whether  the  proposals  made 
by  our  cabinet  were  or  were  not  reasonable,  without 
entering  into  a  discussion  and  history  of  the  claim 
which  they  required  should  be  surrendered  as  a  pre- 
liminary— 'There  is  no  topick  less  understood,  and 
precisely  for  the  reason,  that  it  has  been  so  long  and 
so  much  talked  about.  Every  man  fancies  he  under- 
stands the  topick  of  every  day's  discourse,  and  there- 
fore gives  himself  no  trouble  about  it ;  and  every 
hour  you  meet  young  and  old  men  talking  most  flip- 
pantly on  this  universally  exercised  right,  without 
having  examined  any  of  the  principles  on  which  it 
is  founded,  any  of  the  difficulties  which  attend  iU 
relinquishment  by  belligerents,  any  of  the  embarrass- 
ments which  have  been,  and  which  we  fear  and 
believe  will  forever  be  in  the  wAy  of  an  adjust- 
ment of  it,  consistently  Witli  the  mutual  rights  and 
interests  of  America  and  Great-Britain.  There  has 
been  another  obstacle  to  a  right  comprehension  of 
this  question — It  has  been  always  treated  with  pas- 
sion and  ill  temper.  All  nations  are  very  jealous  upoii 
questions  where  they  fancy  their  rights  and  their 
honour  are  concerned,  but  few  are  so  extremely 
tender  and  so  little  ready  to  exercise  their  reason 
and  their  impartiality  as  a  certain  class  of  Americans. 
It  is  enough  always  for  such  men,  that  Great- Britain 
exercises  a  right  which  produces  some  inconvenience 
to  us,  or  whicli  reminds  them  of  her  naval  povver, 
without  stoppuig  to  inquire  whether  she  is  singular 


30 


ill  her  pretensions,  or  whether  we  claim  the  same  foi^ 
ourselves.  Indeed  this  description  of  overboiling 
patriots  would  be  the  very  first  men  to  cry  Hosanna 
to  any  of  our  naval  o£Bcers  who  should  do  a  bold  and 
questionable  thing  to'  any  neutral  nation,  if  that 
act  should  promote  our  interest  or  our  glory. 

In  examining  this  claim  of  taking  out  their  own 
iubjects  from  neutral  merchant  ships,  by  belligerents, 
we  shall  consider, 

1st.  The  principles  on  which  it  is  founded. 

2d.  Its  antiquity,  in  point  of  usage  by  Great-Britain . 

3d.  The  ordinances  of  France,  on  the  same  point. 

4th.  The  former  negotiations  on  this  subject  be- 
tween us  and  Great-Britain. 

5th.  The  unalterable  resolutions  of  Madi?'^n  on 
that  subject,  as  expressed  in  a  letter  which  was  writ- 
ten in  1807,  to  our  ministers,  chiding  them  for  having 
dared  almost  to  adjust  it,  and  declaring  that  our  flag 
must  cover  all  En^ish  sailors  who  have  been  here 
ttto  years,  whether  naturalized  or  not,  both  prospec- 
tively as  well  as  retrospectively. 

It  will  appear  from  this  last  document,  that  there 
is  no  hope  of  an  adjustment,  because  the  offer  to  ex- 
clude British  sailors,  lately  made,  is  so  expressed, 
as  that  it  will  admit  of  our  employing  them  in  one 
day  after  they  have  landed,  if  we  make  them  Amer- 
ican citizens — such  we  shall  shew  must  have  been 
the  intention. 

1st.  We  shall  consider  the  principles  upon  which 
all  belligerents  claim  the  right  to  the  service  of  all 
their  citizens  or  subjects  in  time  of  war. 

It  is  one  of  the  principles  tlie  most  universally  ad- 
mitted of  any  which  we  know  of,  that  allegiance  and 
protection  are  reciprocal— that  every  nation  has  a 
tight  to  the  services  of  all  its  citizens  in  time  of  war 
-^that  the  allegiance  due  from  a  native  citizen  en- 
dures during  his  life,  and  altiiougli  some  liberal  wri- 
ters contend  for  the  right  of  expatriation,  or  a 
ehange  of  allegiance  in  time  of  peace,  yet  even  these 
writers  deny  this  right  to  any  citizen  when  his  coua* 


oral 
jnai 


Si 

try  is  at  war.  This  maxim  is  a  fundamental  one  of 
the  common  law  of  England,  and  has  been  adopted 
by  us  since  our  separation  from  that  country. 

In  a  very  famous  case  in  Connecticut,  which  was 
tried  before  Judge  Ellsworth,  in  which  one  Williams 
had  attempted  to  change  his  allegiance,  had  obtained 
the  rights  of  a  French  citizen,  and  had  accepted  a 
command  in  the  French  service,  the  Federal  Court 
decided,  that  no  American  citizen  could  change  his 
allegiance,  and  sentenced  Williams  to  punishment 
for  compromilting  the  Neutrality  of  the  United  States, 
by  entering  into  the  service  of  a  foreign  state.  The 
United  States  were  tlien  at  peace,  and  of  course  our 
Courts  adopted  the  narrowest  possible  construction  ; 
for  no  writers  deny  the  right  of  every  country  to  com- 
mand the  services  of  its  citizens  in  time  of  war. 
France  never  retaliated  this  treatment  of  her  natu^ 
ralized  and  adopted  citizens. 

Nations  not  only  deny  the  right  of  a  subject  to  change 
his  country  and  allegiance  in  time  of  war,  but  they 
4*laim  the  right  to  the  active  services  of  their  citizens 
in  such  times  of  peril. 

The  impressment  laws  of  Great-Britain,  and  the 
conscriptions  of  France,  are  proofs  of  this  proposi- 
tion— and  the  United  States  contend  for  the  same 
right  The  drafting  of  their  militia,  which  is  a  co-< 
ercive  measure,  obliging  the  citizens  who  may  happen 
to  be  drawn  to  military  service,  is  of  the  same  char- 
acter, and  founded  upon  the  same  principles. 

Our  Constitution  has,  to  be  sure,  limited  this  pow- 
er by  consent  of  the  people,  to  the  cases  of  ^*  insurrec- 
tion, resistance  to  the  laws,  and  actual  iaviision,^^  and 
lias  reposed  the  power  of  judging  of  the  existence  of 
these  exigences,  in  the  commanding  ofli^ers  of  tho 
several  independent  states ;  but  the  right  of  drafting 
and  forcing  the  militia  into  service,  in  case  those  ex- 
igences exist,  is  unquestionable,  and  proves  the  gen- 
eral proposition,  that  every  nation  has  a  right  to  com- 
jnand  tlie  sorvicos  of  its  citizens  in  time  of  war. 


■\\u 


w 


ii 


If  allegiance^  then,  is  perpetual,  extending  to  the 
life  of  the  citizen,  and  if  that  allegiance  includes  the 
obligation  to  render  military  service,  it  cannot  be  ne- 
cessary to  shew,  tliat  a  man  is  bound  to  enter  into  the 
«ervice  of  his  native  country  whenever  and  wherever 
required. — Still  less  can  it  be  necessary  to  shew,  that 
two  perfect  rights  cannot  exist  in  two  different  coun- 
tries at  the  same  moment  to  the  services  of  the  same 
man. 

A  man  may,  however,  contract  a  second  obliga- 
tion— he  may  enter  into  a  new  allegiance  by  being 
naturalized  in  another  country. — Such  an  allegiance 
is,  however,  inferior  to  the  other,  and  cannot  derogate 
from,  or  diminish  the  duty  which  he  owed  to  his  for- 
mer sovereign. — The  first  obligation  is  paramount 
and  superior,  and  whenever  the  two  duties  come  into 
conflict,  the  second,  later  and  inferior  duty  must  yield 
to  the  first  and  the  superior  obligation. 

The  only  remaining  question  is,  to  what  extent  and 
in  what  places  can  the  sovereign  exercise  this  right 
over  the  person  and  services  of  the  citizen?    Our 
Government  contend  that  it  can  only  be  exercised  in 
the  country  of  which  such  person  is  a  subject  or  citi- 
zen.— The  writers  of  the  laws  of  nations  are  silent  on 
this  subject.     The  reason  of  their  silence  as  we  ap- 
prehend, is,  that  until  our  country  made  it  a  question, 
every  nation  considered  that  it  had  a  right  to  demand 
the  persons  and  the  services  of  its  citizens,  in  every 
situation  where  they  were  not  under  the  territorial 
jurisdiction  of  another  independent  country. — We 
shall  shew  under  our  other  heads  that  though  writers 
on  general  law  have  been  silent  on  the  question, 
whether  the  sovereign  power  of  coercing  the  citizens 
to  military  service  may  be  exercised  on  the  high  seas, 
yet  that  the  constant  usage,  the  undisputed  usage  of 
all  nations,  is  the  cause  of  this  silence — and  that  like 
many  other  universally  admitted  principles  of  nation- 
al law,  necessarily  resulting  from  certain  acknowl- 


88 

edged  rights,  it  is  omitted  merely  because  it  was| 
never  questioned. 

Tiie  great  question  between  us  and  Great-Britain 
is,  wlietlier  her  claim  to  demand  and  take  her  own 
seamen  on  the  high  seas,  is  a  novel  or  unjust  prin- 
ciple  ? — Whether  it  is  a  violation  of  onr  rights,  or 
an  interpolation  in  tlie  doctrines  of  international  law  ? 

The  law  of  nations  admits  the  right  of  belligerents 
io  enter  on  board  of  neutral  merchant  ships  for  the 
|>urpose  of  making  certain  examinations^  They  have 
a  right  ia  examine,  la#,  Whether  they  are  carrying 
articles  contraband  of  war.— ^2rf,  Whether  the  pix)p- 
erty  be  that  oS  an  enemy. — 3rf,  They  have  a  right  io 
examine  strictly  the  persona  on  board,  because  if 
they  are  enemies,  they  have  a  right  to  take  them  out. 

Here,  then,  there  is  an  end,  by  the  acknowledged 
law  of  nations,  to  the  absolute  inviolability  of  the  flag, 
The  high  seas  are  by  these  acknowledged  and  uni- 
versally admitted  principles  considered  a  sort  of  com- 
mon  territory,  in  which  certain  rights  of  belligerents 
may  be  exercised  which  are  not  permitted  in  neuiral 
countries.  If  then  a  belligerent  may  take  out  of  a 
neutral  ship  persons  owing  allegiance  to  his  en&my^ 
though  shipped  in  neutral  countries,  it  must  be  on  the 
principle  that  the  neutral  flag  on  the  high  seas  cannot 
protect  all  who  sail  under  it, — ^It  admits  the  right  of 
examination  and  search,  and  seizure  of  persons  as 
well  as  papers  and  goods. — ^These  are  undisputed 
and  unquestioned  rights.— But  if  a  belligerent  can 
take  out  his  enemy  from  a  neutral  ship  merely  because 
lie  may  possibly  iw/wre  him  hereafter,  with  how  much 
more  reason  can  he  take  his  own  subject,  who  owes 
him  perpetual  allegiance  and  whose  servicehe  actually 
needs  P  I  shall  shew,  in  my  next  essay,  that  "all  the 
objections  that  have  been  urged  against  the  claim  of 
Great-Britain  arising  from  the  ai'bitrary  and  imper- 
fect nature  of  the  inquiry  by  an  ignorant  and  obsti- 
nate naval  officer,  apply  as  well  in  one  case  as  the 
other. 


m 


I'i^ 

Ij    • 

^m  '' 

m 

^:  1^ 


34 


NO.  VI. 

THE  PRINCIPLES  ON  WHICH  BELLIGERENTS  CLAIM  THE 
BIOUT  TO  TAKE  THEIR  OWN  SUBJECTS  ON  THE  HIGH  SEAS.— 
THE  ANTIQUITY  AND  UNIVEUSAUTY  OF  THIS  CLAIM. 

By  the  ordinances  of  France,  it  is  provided,  that 
neutral  ships,  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  the  benefits  of 
neutrality,  must  be  navigated  by  a  crew  of  which  the 
captain,  mate,  and  two-thirds  of  the  seamen  are  sub- 
jects  of  the  neutral  country. — It  is  also  provided,  that 
no  seaman  shall  be  entitled  to  the  privileges  of  a  neu. 
tral  citizen,  unless  he  shall  have  been  naturalized  in 
such  neutral  country  before  the  coinmencement  of  the 
war. 

One  of  the  most  popular  objections  to  the  claim  of 
Great-Britain  to  search  and  take  out  her  own  sub- 
jects, is  the  one  stated  by  Mr.  Madison,  in  his  war 
message,  and  that  is,  that  seamen  are  by  this  practice 
subjected  to  the  caprice  and  whim  of  every  petty  na- 
val o£Scer,  without  being  entitled  to  the  privilege  of 
a  trial  by  a  court  of  law,  a  solemnity  necessary  to  the 
condemnation  of  even  a  bale  of  merchandize. 

To  this  plausible  objection  there  are  various  an- 
swers.— ^The  same  loose,  informal,  arbitrary  mode  of 
decision,  is  by  the  acknowledged  law  of  nations  suf- 
ficient to  turn  a  ship  out  of  its  voyage — to  defeat  the 
best  projected  plans — to  expose  a  crew  to  all  the  evils 
of  capture  and  detention. — -Even  the  American  navy 
exercises  the  same  arbitrary  power  over  the  persons 
and  property  of  their  fellow-citizens.-— In  a  late  case 
the  Ariadne,  owned  by  Mr.  Goddard,  of  Boston,  has 
been  seized  at  the  whim  of  a  naval  officer,  the  crew 
removed  out  of  the  ship  and  made  prisoners,  and  the 
ship  and  cargo  sent  back  for  trial,  when  she  had 
committed  no  ofience.  If  it  be  said  that  the  admiral- 
ty  courts  will  give  relief,  by  awarding  damages  in 
siich  cases,  the  answer  is,  that  such  damages  are 


36 

rarely  given,  and  are  never  adequate  to  the  injuiy ; 
and  it  may  be  added,  also,  that  every  seaman  illegally 
impressed  has  a  like  remedy,  in  the  courts  of  law 
of  Great-Britain,  and  if  their  poverty  and  friendless 
situation  preclude  them  from  seeking  it,  it  is  the  duty, 
and  it  would  be  very  easy  for  a  neutral  government  to 
appoint  agents  to  prosecute  for  damages,  whieh  we 
have  no  doubt  would  be  honourably  awarded  in  all 
cases  of  illegal  detention. 

But  the  best  answer  to  this  objection  to  the  univer- 
sal practice  of  belligerents  of  taking  out  their  own 
seamen,  is  this,  that  the  same  caprice,  the  same  infor- 
mal and  uncontrolled  authority  is  exercised  rightfully 
by  the  law  of  nations,  so  far  as  respects  enemies  found 
on  board  neutral  ships.  This  would  be  found  as  ex- 
tensive an  evil  to  neutrals,  if  a  case  should  ever  hap- 
pen in  which  a  neutral  and  a  belligerent  should  speak 
the  same  language,  and  the  other  belligerent  should 
have  as  great  a  superiority  as  Great-Britain  has  upon 
the  ocean.— >In  such  a  case,  the  neutral  would  often 
be  exposed  to  seizure  and  dei  ention,  being  mistaken 
for  an  enemy  ;  and  all  the  objections  which  are  made 
to  the  exercise  of  the  right  over  his  own  subjects  in 
neutral  vessels  by  a  belligerent  would  apply  with  as 
^eat  force,  and  yet  no  question  could  exist  a$  to  the 
right. 

We  have  said,  that  one  cause  of  the  silence  of 
writers  uioon  the  law  of  nations,  as  to  the  right  of 
belligerents  to  reclaim  their  own  seamen,  when  found 
within  a  common  jurisdiction,  lik(5  the  high  seas,  was, 
that  this  right  had  never  been  questioned. — It  was  a 
right  so  superior  to  others  which  were  admitted,  that 
no  man  could  raise  a  doubt  upon  it.  Belligerents 
liave  a  right  to  take  out  their  enemy's  property  and 
the  persons  of  their  enemy. — Would  they  not  have  a 
right  to  take  out  their  own  property,  forcibly,  or  frau- 
dulently, or  improperly  withheld?  They  have  a  right 
to  take  out  their  enemy's  persons— have  they  not  uso 
a  right  to  take  out  their  own  subjects,  who  owe  them 
and  who  have  fraudulently  or  forcibly 


alle 


glance, 


w 


M 


'  J 


S6 

withdrawn  themselves  from  the  duties  which  they 
owe  their  sovereign  ? 

But  there  is  another  stronger  reason  why  tliis  sub- 
ject has  not  been  discussed  by  writers  on  the  laws  of 
nations.— 'Until  the  present  war,  the  cases  of  belliger- 
ents seeking  the  protection  of  a  foreign  neutral  llagy 
were  necessarily  rare^  Since  commerce  has  become 
inii)ortant,  within  the  last  two  hundred  years,  the  only 
nations  which  have  been  neutral  have  been  Holland, 
Denmark,  and  Sweden.  These  nations  overflowed 
with  seamen.  The  belligerents  have  been  England^ 
France,  and  Spain.  The  English  sailor  had  rather 
starve  on  board  his  own  ships  than  seek  an  asylum 
in  the  merchant  vessels  of  countries  whose  habits, 
customs,  and  discipline  are  so  different  from  his  own ; 
and  as  to  French  or  Spanish  sailors,  so  loose  and 
durty  in  their  habits,  a  Dutchman  or  a  Dane  would 
never  admit  them  iiilo  their  ships,  let  their  distress 
for  seamen  be  ever  so  great.  Besides,  the  laws  of 
France  and  Spain  are  so  severe  that  their  seamen 
dare  not  enter  into  foreign  service^ 

But  when  the  United  States  became  neutral,  the 
British  sailor  found  an  asylum  in  our  service. — ^The 
high  wages  of  neutral  service,  similarity  of  manners, 
language,  food,  and  discipline,  invited  him  to  our 
employ.  The  habits  also  of  our  southern  states  for-k 
bade  them  to  enter  the  sea  service,  while  their  enters 
prize  induced  them  to  attempt  to  i:val  us  in  naviga- 
tion. 

A  friend  of  mine,  whb  resided  sr  ven  years  in  South-^ 
Carolina,  assured  me,  that  there  was  but  one  seaman 
from  the  port  of  Charleston,  who  was  a  native  of  that 
state.* 

From  these  causes,  obvious,  undisputed  and  gene- 
rally  admitted,  the  British  marine  was  stripped  of  its 
strength,  and  our  southern  states  became  clamorous 

•Note.  The  period,  to  which  my  frienit  alhided,  was  from  1786  to  1793. 
There  muT  be  a  Tew  more  nativgt  of  that  state  in  the  sea-serviee  at.  this  day — 
but  the  habits  of  all  the  southern  states  forbid  their  entering,  into  that  service. 
There  are  native  Amcrieans  who  sail  out  of  the  southern  (lorts,  but  they  art: 
chiefly  of  northern  «rigiu. 


«   I 


87 

for  the  right  of  naturalizing  hnAwotecting  all  sailor*, 
of  whatever  nation,  and  as  the  English  furnished  ut 
seven-eighths  of  i\\h  foreign  mass,  the  evil  became 
intolerable,  and  could  be  resisted  only  by  the  right 
of  reclaiming  them  on  the  high  seas. 

If,  therefore,  no  other  nation  had  heretofore  exer- 
cised this  right — if  it  was  even  novel  in  Great-Britain, 
surely  this  new  case,  and  the  extreme  exigency  of  it, 
would  have  justified  her  in  assuming  the  practice. 

For  where  is  the  sensible  or  cantbd  man  who  will 
deny  that  the  laws  of  nations,  like  municipal  laws, 
must  vary  and  accommodate  themselves  to  the  changes 
in  the  commerce  and  relative  condition  of  nations  ? 
The  whole  law  of  bills  of  exchange  and  policies  of 
insurance  has  grown  up  ovl  of  nothing  within  two 
hundred  years !  'And  if  the  divulsion  of  a  great  em- 
pire, and  the  erection  of  an  immensely  powerful 
state,  speaking  the  same  language  with  the  nation 
from  which  it  is  separated,  shall  have  created  diffi- 
culties and  embarrassments  unknown  to  the  ancient 
world,  are  there  to  be  no  changes  in  the  usages  of 
nations  so  circumstanced  ? 

The  narrow  point  of  the  question  is,  Has  Great- 
Britain  a  right  to  the  services  of  all  her  native  citi- 
%en8  during  war?  We  have  shewn  that  she  has. 
Do  we  withdraw  from  10  to  40,000  of  her  seamen 
fram  her  service  ?  It  is  admitted  that  we  do.  Ought 
she  (if  it  was  a  n6vD  question)  to  submit  to  this  evil  ? 
Clearly  not,  if  she  has  power  enough  to  remedy  it. — 
Is  it  for  our  permanent  interest  to  contest  this  point 
with  her  ?  Most  assuredly  it  is  not— ^for  by  contest- 
ing it  we  not  only  admit  a  competition  to  the  disad- 
vantage of  our  own  native  seamen,  but  so  far  as  the 
British  seamen  supply  our  wants,  so  far  as  they  fill 
up  the  chasm  which  would  be  otherwise  filled  by 
native  Americans,  just  in  the  same  proportion  do  we 
neglect  those  means  of  power  to  which  Great-Britain 
has  been  ever  so  attentive — so  far  do  we  despise  the 
increase  of  our  seamen,  upon  which  the  strength^  and 


I 


88 

•pulence^  and  respectability  of  all  maritime  nations 
depend. 

Under  the  show,  then,  of  protecting  our  seamen^ 
the  southern  states  are  really  contending  for  a  com- 
petition which  reduces  their  wages  and  lessens  their 
number,  and  of  course  the  force  and  independence 
of  the  nation* 

We  have  hitherto  gone  upon  the  idea  that  this 
practice  of  Great-Britain  was  a  novel  one — ^that  it  was 
a  pretension  which  she  has  set  up  in  hostility  to  us, 
or  at  least  against  tis  alone.  We  have  just  assign- 
ed reasons  to  shew  that  if  this  were  true  she  could 
have  a  great  deal  to  say— -because  the  relation  of 
our  two  nations  is  new  and  unexampled.' — But  we 
shall  now  proceed  to  shew,  according  to  our  se- 
cond proposition,  that  Great-Britain  has  exercised 
this  right  against  all  nations  for  more  than  two  cen- 
tnries — that  she  exercised  it  when  we  were  a  part  of 
her  dominions — that  it  was  then  a  portion  of  our  Com- 
mon Law,  and  that  no  nations  pretended  to  complain 
of  the  exercise  of  this  right,  so  far  as  it  respected  mer- 
chant ships. 

If  this  case  shall  be  made  out,  and  we  pledge  our- 
selves to  do  it  in  our  next  number,  we  ask  all  candid 
men  whether  it  does  not  materially  change  the  aspect 
of  the  question,  and  whether  instead  of  demanding 
the  rclinqii-'biiiiicn*  of  this  practice  as  a  right,  we  ought 
not  rather  to  negotiate  for  its  abandonment  or  modiii-> 
cation  as  a  matter  of  compromise. — Evils  there  un- 
doubtedly are  arisirie  from  this  very  similarity  of 
language,  which,  w)ule  it  enables  us  to  make  a  deep 
wound  in  the  British  marine,  also  sometimes  exposes 
an  innocent  American  to  be  mistaken  and  impressed 
as  a  British  subject.  But  I  am  persuaded  that  it  will 
be  seen  in  the  end,  that  the  only  fair  remedy  for  the 
evil,  is  the  exclusion  of  all  native  British  seamen 
from  our  service — ^This,  however,  is  very  different 
from  what  our  cabinet  propose,  and  is  what  they  have 
declared  they  never  will  agree  to. 


39 


]sro.  vn. 

THE  ANTIQUITY  OF  THE  BRITISH  CLAIM  OP  IMPRESSIN« 
THEIR  SEA^TEX  ON  THE  HIGH  SEAS  OUT  OF  NEUTRAL 
MERCHANT  SHIPS, 

The  clamor  which  has  been  raised  on  this  subject^ 
arising  from  the  occasional  abuses  of  the  exercise  of 
this  unquestioned  right;  has  led  many  persons  to  sup- 
pose, that  this  is  an  usurpation  on  the  part  of  Great- 
Britain,  of  modem  date,  and  applied  particularly  a- 
gainst  us. — If  it  were  generally  known  that  this  is 
an  ancient  usage,  founded  on  uuiversally  admitted 
principles,  and  applied  by  her  to  all  nationSf  even  be- 
fore this  country  existed  as  a  nation,  all  moderate  and 
reasonable  u^en  would  say  that  it  could  not  and  ought 
not  to  be  expected,  that  an  old  and  powerful  nation 
should  yield  up  its  ancient  usages  merely  because 
we  saw  fit  to  find  fault  with  them.  Judge  Black- 
stone,  who  wrote  before  the  separation  of  the  two 
countries,  and  could  therefore  have  no  allusion  to  the 
present  contest,  lays  it  down  as  a  settled  maxim  of 
the  law  of  England,  that  ^^  natural  allegiance  is  per- 
petual and  cannot  be  affected  by  a  change  of  time, 
place,  or  circumstance,  nor  can  it  be  changed  b^ 
swearing  allegiance  to  another  sovereign — The  sub- 
ject may  to  be  sure  by  such  means  entangle  himself^ 
but  he  cannot  unloosen  the  ban^^s  which  connect  him 
with  his  native  country."  He  cites  a  famous  case  of 
M'Donald,  who  went  to  France  in  his  infancy,  and 
had  a  commission  from  the  French  King,  but  being 
found  in  arms  against  his  native  country,  he  was  tri- 
ed and  convicted  of  treason  ;  nor  does  it  appear  that 
France  ever  complained  or  retaliated  his  conviction, 
as  she  probably  contended,  and  we  shall  shew  she 
has  always  contended,  for  the  same  principle, — ^Wc 
have  adduced  these  opinions  and  this  case  as  an  an- 
swer to  a  plausibie  objection  made  by  Mr.  Madison, 
and  seized  with  avidity  by  many  persons^  that  as 


.It 


\'-'\- 


40 

Great-Britain  naturalizes  foreign  seamen  after  two 
years  service  in  her  navy,  she  is  inconsistent  in  refus- 
ing  us  the  same  right. — But  the  question  is  wholly  mis- 
understood by  some,  and,  we  fear^  purposely  ipisstated 
by  our  cabinet. — Great-Britain  does  npt  deny  our  right 
to  naturalize  her  sailors,  but  she  denies  our  right  to 

S'xiftcct  them  against  her  prior  and  superior  claims.— 
er  laws  admit  that  a  man  may  emigrate,  be  natural- 
ized, and  owe  allegiance  to  a  foreign  state,  but  they 
deny  that  these  facts  absolve  him  from  his  fii'st  and 
natural  allegiance, 

;  In  order  to  mal^e  out  the'case  of  inconsistency  against 
her,  we  ou^ht  to  shew  that  she  protects  foreign  sail- 
ors  naturalized  in  her  country  against  their  own  nat- 
ural sovereign-^We  challenge  any  and  every  man  in 
the  country  to  produce  such  an  instance-<-rNo"-rWith 
all  her  sins  and  oppressions,  it  will  not  be  found  that 
she  has  contradicted  the  principles  on  which  her  ma- 
I'ine  power  reposes-^principles  consecrated  by  the 
universal  practice  of  nations — ^by  the  decisions  of  her 
courts^!— -by  the  writings  of  her  most  eminent  jurists, 
and  by  her  long  diplomatick  discussions  with  thin 
pountiy. 

ISTo— If  a  solitary  case  of  her  refusal  to  acknowledge 
ihe  rights  of  a  natural  sovereign,  and  of  her  setting  up 
l^r  own  naturalization  laws  against  natural  alle- 
giance could  have  been  found,  it  would  not  have  es- 
(»ped  the  leagle  eyes  of  Mr.  Madison  and  his  preder 
fressor. 

Some  persons,  however,  (and  among  the  rest  the 
late  t^resident  Adams,  when  he  went  over  to  the  pres- 
ent administration)  were  so  aware  that  general  prin- 
ciples and  universal  usage  were  in  favour  of  the  right 
<n  belligerents  of  impressment  of  their  own  sailors  on^ 
the  high  seas,  that  they  thought  it  best  to  strike  at  the 
Koot  of  the  whole  practice,  by  denying  the  right  of 
impressment  even  in  the  territory  of  Great- Britain. — 
Mr.  Adams  took  his  notions  from  the  doubts  express- 
ed by  some  of  the  old  writers.    Sir  Michael  Foster 


ho 


41 

has  most  learnedly  proved  its  great  antiquity,  and  tlie 
invariability  of  the  practice,  and  it  has  been  clearly 
settled  to  be  the  common  law  of  England,  by  Lord 
Mansfield  and  Lord  Kenyon^^-See  Cowper  017-  &th 
term  Kepoi'ts  276- 

If  then,  by  the  common  kw  of  England,  no  man 
can  cbmige  his  alle^ance,  not  even  by  residence  from 
infancy  in  a  foreign  country,  nor  by  naturalization^ 
nor  by  holding  a  commission  under  a  foreign  state, 
and  if  every  seafaring  man  is  by  law  liable  to  im-> 
pressmenlt  within  the  realm,  all  which  doctrines  were 
'iieftled  before  the  divulsion  of  ok'  separation  of  the  two 
(  ttries,  and  therefore  ought  not  now  to  be  qnestioBN 
o.«J  />^  us,  the  only  remaining  point  is,  to  inquire  wheth> 
ei  Great-Britain  has  asserted  and  exercised  this 
claim  on  board  of  foreign  shiptiy  on  a  common  jurist 
diction,  the  high  seas,  and  this  too  frc^i  very  ancient 
times. 

The  first  instruction  I  have  met  with,  was  one  is« 
sued  by  the  Earl  of  Northumberland,  Lord  High 
Admiral  of  England,  to  Sir  John  Pennington,  dated 
April  %  1640. 

<*  As  you  meet  with  any  men  of  war,  merchantf,  or 
other  shipff  or  vessels,  belonging  to  any  foreign  prince 
or  state,  p'dher  at  sea,  or  in  any  road  where  you,  or 
any  of  hi-  Majesty^ s  fleet  may  happen  to  come,  you 
are  #.'  .•e^:Lf.  tc  see  ichether  there  he  any  of  His 
Majethj  .>  ejects  on  hoard;  and  if  any  seamen, 
gunnersj  dots,  or  mariners,  f  whether  Engiishy 
Scotch,  or  S  '.,*iij  be  found  on  board,  you  are  to  cause 
suchof  H-fj  Majesty's  subjects  to  be  taken  forth,  and 
so  dispTaed  of  as  they  be  jorthcaming  to  answer  their 
coniempt  of  his  Majesty^s  Proclamation  in  that  kind," 

By  the  proclamation  here  spoken  of,  is  intended 
the  upiual  proclamation  issued  by  all  sovereigns,  and 
in  tl. .  present  war  especially,  by  France,  Denmark, 
Bp  i'%  .ind  England,  ordering  home  all  their  seam«a 
from  M  service  of  foreign  states,  neutral,  as  well  as 
bplligerent. — The  above  cited  instruction  was  re» 
6 


:'1 


■■■ 


48 

peatedly  carried  into  effect^  and  the  particulai*  cases 
are  cited  by  writers  on  this  subject. — ^In  a  very  famous 
case  in  the  year  1687^  four  Bcotchmen  and  a  boy 
were  taken  out  of  a  Dutch  ship  of  war,  and  complaint 
having  been  made  by  the  Dutch  government,  it  was 
referred  to  the  Judge  of  Admiralty,  Sir  Richard 
Raines. — ^The  Memorial  complained  that  this  prac- 
tice might  be  inconvenient  to  foreign  ships  in  stress  of 
weather,  and  would  hinder  merchant  ships  in  their 
voyages,  ^c.  To  \\  j^h  Sir  Richard  Raines  replied, 
*'  As  if  His  Majesty  be  deprived  of  the  use  of 

Ms  own  subjects  for  his  en  n  expemtions,  thai  foreign- 
ers might  use  them  for  theirs*' 

We  find  that  the  same  claims,  the  same  objections, 
and  the  same  rational  and  just  answers  were  made  in 
the  reign  of  James  II.  as  at  the  present  day.  In  the 
reign,  however,  of  Charles  the  U.  great  complaints 
havine  been  made  of  the  search  of  foreign  ships  of 
war,  the  instructions  were  modified  so  as  only  to  in- 
clude merchant  vessels,  and  the  instructions  and 
practice  have  continued  the  same  from  that  period  to 
the  present. — ^The  writers  from  whom  I  have  obtain- 
ed these  important  facts  cite  in  support  of  them 
pPepys  MS  Collection.! — As  Mr.  Pepys  was  the 
person  who  drew  up  the  instructions,  better  authority 
cannot  possibly  be  cited. 

It  appears  that  these  instructions  have  been  execut- 
ted  bom  against  the  Dutch  and  French,  and  have 
been  issued  to  every  officer,  in  every  war,  for  nearly 
two  hundred  years,  and  the  writers  who  speak  of  the 
right  in  the  reign  of  Charles  the  11.  call  it  an  ancient 
and  acknowledged  right.  Would  it  then  be  reason- 
able to  expect  tnat  Ghreat-Britain  should  abandon  the 
usage,  and  give  up  her  ancient  practice  in  favor  of  us 
aione,  when  the  similarity  of  language,  and  the  exten- 
sive practice  of  frauds  in  the  granting  certificates  of 
protection,  as  well  as  the  impositions  in  procuring 
naturalization,  render  the  practice  doubly  important 
against  us  ? 


f. 


I 


4B 


Our  navi^tion,  doubled  in  tbe  space  of  ten  yeaii> 
and  yet  it  is  absolutely  imposible  that  our  seamen 
could  have  multiplied  in  the  same  ratio — ^If,  however, 
we  should  suppose  that  the  seamen  increased  in  a 
full  ratio  to  population,  they  would  not  increase  more 
Hian  90  per  cent,  in  ten  years — hence  there  must  have 
been  a  deficit  of  at  least  10  or  15,000  seamen,  all  of 
whom  were  supplied  by  Great-Britain.  An  Enelish 
writer,  on  this  subject,  seems  to  be  fully  aware  of  the 
extent  of  this  evil,  and  of  the  naturo  of  the  fraudS"^ 
he  gives  two  examples  out  of  two  thousand,  which  he 
says  can  be  adduced — ''Henry  Donaldson  made 
oath  before  the  Mayor  of  Liverpool,  that  on  the  Idth 
of  December,  1800,  he  procured  a  protection  from 
Joshua  Sands,  collector  of  New- York,  by  assuming 
the  name  of  Henry  Kent — ^that  it  was  obtained  on 
the  oath  of  a  woman,  who  swore  for  several  other 
Englishmen  on  the  same  day^-rhe  said  the  woman 
was  charged  with  having  sworn  to  several  hundred 
in  a  short  time.''  Sworn  to  before  Tbo.  Golightly, 
Mayor — Liverpool,  May  17, 1810. 

Another  impressed  on  the  same  day  at  Liverpool, 
had  about  him  a  certificate  signed  by  Mr.  Graaf,  De« 
puty  Collector  in  Philadelphia,  which  he  got  by  giv-> 
mg  an  old  man  four  dolors  for  swearing  ''  that  he 
knew  his  father,  mother,  &c,"  whereas  he  had  nei-> 
ther  father  or  mother,  as  described,  nor  had  he  ever 
been  in  America.  These  and  many  other  affidavits 
and  documents  have  beep  taken  by  the  British  gov- 
cniment,  and  they  well  jmow  th^  extent  of  these  a- 
buses  and  the  vast  di^culty  of  remedying  them  by 
any  act  of  Congress  whatever. 

Great  as  has  been  the  profit  to  the  southern  states 
by  the  employment  of  British  seamen  f  who,  either 
naturalized  or  not,  have  constituted  three  quarters  of 
their  crews,  we  find  them  talk  of  stipulations  to  ex-, 
dude  British  seamen//  Do  you  believe  them  iqi 
earnest?  No — ^when  you  come  to  the  provisions  of  the 
bill,  you  will  find  them  require  (as  Mr.  Madison  said 


44 

tliey  alwmys  should  insist)  thai  a  seaman  natui'alized 
but  one  day  before,  or  resident  here  two  years,  should 
not  be  considered  a  British  seaman.  Great-Britain 
knows  these  pretensions — She  knows  that  three  sue 
cessive  negotiations  have  failed ;  one  with  Mr.  Pink- 
ney,  19  years  ago— <me  with  Mr.  King,  13  years 
since,  and  the  last  with  Messrs.  Monroe  and  rink- 
ney,  five  years  since,  from  the  difficulty  of  proposing 
any  remedy  for  mutual  abuses  of  acknowledged 
rights.  What  these  proposals  were  we  shall  shew 
hereafter. 


NO.  viii. 

IK)CTRINES  AND  PRACTICE  OF  FKANCG,  AS  TO  RECLAIMINa 

HER  OWN  SEAiMEN. 

It  may  perhaps  be  said,  as  it  was  by  some  persons 
in  relation  to  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees,  that  the 
practice  t)f  France  ought  to  be  no  justification  to 
Great-Britain.  We  adiiiit  this  to  be  true  in  some 
cases,  and  with  some  qualification — ^But  when  we  are 
discussing  the  existence  of  a  rights  under  the  laws  of 
nations,  we  have  no  better  mode  of  ascertaining  it, 
than  the  long  established  usage  of  the  greatest  states 
in  Europe.  If  France,  under  all  her  later  monarchs, 
has  set  up  the  same  principles,  and  has  watched  over 
the  preservation  of  her  seamen  with  a  much  more 
jealous  and  severe  eye,  than  Great-Britain  has  done, 
we  think  it  goes  far  to  establish  the  existence  of  the 
right  for  which  Great- Britain  contends.  If  the  two 
gi'eat  rivals  of  Europe  have,  in  all  their  maritime 
wars,  united  in  admitting  any  one  principle,!  think 
we  may  say  of  it,  that  it  has  much  more  claim  to  the 
place  of  an  unquestioned  right,  than  many  of  the  dog- 
mas which  are  laid  down  as  such  by  the  writers  on 
publick  law. 

I  shall  shew  that  France  holds  the  doctrine  of  al- 
legiance being  perpetual— t|iat  she  is  peculiarly  jeal- 


oitB  of  the  claim  over  her  seamen,  and  is  even  crueV 
in  her  laws,  refusing  them  the  right  of  expatriation-— 
that  while  she  recognizes,  as  does  Great-Britain,  both 
in  her  own  practice  and  in  that  of  other  states,  the 
right  of  naturalixatioHf  she  undertakes  to  deny  that 
this  can  give  any  new  claims  to  protection  to  the  natU' 
ralized  person  against  his  own  sovereign.  We  shall 
shew  that  she  goes  farther,  and  denies  to  neutrals  the 
rigiit  to  naturalixe  her  enemies,  so  as  to  protect  them 
against  her  arms.  Lastly,  it  will  be  seen  that  by  re- 
peated edicts  she  authonzes  the  seizure  of  her  own 
seamen  in  time  of  war,  in  her  own  ports,  on  board  of 
neutral  vessels — and  at  sea. 

The  authority  I  shall  cite  will  be  Mons,  Lc  Beau, 
now  superintendantf  in  Paris,  of  the  details  of  the 
laws  relative  to  the  marine  and  colonies.  I  have, 
liowever,  in  every  case  taken  (not  the  inferences  of 
M,  LeBeau)  but  the  laws  and  ordinances  themselves. 

By  the  laws  of  France,  ever  since  the  reign  of 
Louis  Xiy,  all  French  seamen  are  classed,  and  there 
are  regular  oflicers  appointed  to  enrol  and  licence 
them — without  such  &,n  enrolment  no  man  can  exer-. 
cise  even  the  boat  or  fishing  navigation.  Thus  the 
government  knows  every  man  in  its  marine  service, 
for  every  man  who  is  a  sailor  is  considered  as  being 
a  part  of  the  marine.  In  time  of  peace,  no  man  ii 
permitted  to  ship  a  sailor  without  carryins  him  to  the 
bureau  or  office  of  the  class  in  which  he  is  enrolled, 
and  there  setting  him  inscribed  on  his  roll  of  equip- 
age,— In  time  of  war,  the  commissaries  of  the  classes 
themselves  are  forbidden  to  let  any  seaman  be  ship- 
ped either  for  the  fishery,  commerce  or  privateering, 
unless  such  seaman  shfi^ll  have  liis  conge,  or  dismis- 
sion from  the  public  marine.  Thus  in  time  of  war 
France  commands  every  seaman  in  her  dominions. 
Having  thus  explained  the  general  police  relative  to 
seamen,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  the  various  statutes 
or  ordinances  which  prove  the  points  I  have  above 
stated.    1st.  The  laws  of  France  deny  the  right  of 


46. 

expatriation^  and  go  farther  than  Great-Britain^  be- 
cause they  make  the  serving  on  board  the  vessels  of 
other  nations,  whether  enemies  or  not,  a  crime. 

By  an  edict  of  February,  1050,  all  masters  of  ves- 
sels, being  French  subjects,  are  forbidden,  whether 
they  are  domiciliated  in  France  or  not,  that  is,  whether 
tiiey  have  acquired  another  domicil  or  home  in  a  for- 
eign country  or  not,  to  take  commissions  from,  or  use 
any  other  flag  than  that  of  France,  under  the  penalty 
of  being  treated  as  pirates. 

By  an  edict  of  August,  I676,  the  pain  of  death, 
which  had  been  before  inflicted  upon  all  the  subjects 
of  France,  found  in  the  service  of  foreisn  states  or 
princes,  was  changed  for  that  of  service  mthe  gallies 

This  last  edict  is  very  clear,  and  from  its 
language  it  is  manifest  that  whether  taken  in  arms  or 
not,  against  their  own  sovereign,  they  are  liable  to 
this  punishment. 

By  an  edict  of  October,  1784,  it  is  provided,  that, 
**  Any  classed  seaman,  who  shall  in  time  of  peace  be 
fauna  serving  in  foreign  ships,  shall  be  sentenced 
to  fifteen  days  confinement,  and  reduced  to  the  low- 
est wages,  and  shall  serve  two  years  extraordinary 
at  the  lowest  rate ;  but  those  who  in  time  of  war 
shall  be  ARRESTED  IS  foreign  ships,  or  pass- 
ing into  foreign  countries,  shall  be  sentenced  to  three 
years  service  in  the  gallies.'' 

By  the  same  edict,  ''  It  is  made  the  duty  of  the 
chiefs  or  heads  of  the  department  of  classed  seamen, 
to  make  search  for  the  deserters  from  merchant  ser- 
vice, to  arrest  them  and  send  them  to  "the  oflRcers  of 
the  admiralty.  They  shall  also  make  known  to  the 
admiralty  any  classed  seamen,  who  having  passed 
into  foreign  countries,  shall  have  been  arrested." 

I  have  given  a  literal  translation  of  the  parts  of 
these  two  passages  which  apply  to  the  case,  because 
this  last  edict  was  passed  in  a  time  of  profound  peace, 
in  the  reign  of  Louis  XVI.  and  is  still  in  force. 


4f 

It  not  only  fully  justifies  my  first  position,  that 
France  denies  that  her  seamen  can  expatriate  them- 
selves,  even  in  time  of  peace,  and  that  she  makes  it  a 
severe  crime  in  time  of  war  for  them  to  pass  into  any 
foreign  countries,  not  excepting  neutral  states.  But 
it  supports,  and  is  the  great  foundation  upon  which  I 
repose,  to  prove  that  she  claims  the  right  to  arrest 
them  on  hoard  neutral  ships,  either  in  French  ports 
or  on  the  high  seas.  We  must  suppose  the  French 
admiralty  instructions  to  he  conformable  to,  and  aa 
broad  as  their  edicts. 

If  so,  they  must  instruct  their  marine  officers  to 
arrest  any  trench  seamen  ^' found  on  board  foreign 
ships.^'  This  I  admit  may  mean  in  the  ports  of 
France,  and  so  far  as  this  goes,  it  proves  that  the 
flag  of  a  neutral  does  not  cover  all  who  sail  under  it 
— and  this  part  also  corresponds  to  the  British  prac- 
tice of  impressments  in  their  ports. 

But  it  goes  farther,  it  orders  the  arrest  of  sailors 
found  on  board  neutral  ships,  or  <^^  passing  into  for-: 
eign  countries,"  **  ou  passant  en  pays  etrangers,^^ — 
this  must  intend  found  oik  board  foreign  ships  on  the 
HIGH  SEAS — and  surely  the  second  section  can  have 
no  other  possible  interpretation,  because  it  applies  to 
French  seamen,  who  <^  having  passed  into  foreign 
countries,  shall  be  arrested." 

Lest  any  person  disposed  to  cavil,  and  without  eX' 
amining  the  question  closely,  should  pretend,  that 
these  sections  allude  to  seamen  found  on  board  ene- 
mies vessels — I  answer,  that  upon  seamen  in  that 
case,  the  pain  of  death  is  inflicted,  and  the  first  cited 
section  of  the  edict  of  1784,  explicitly  provides  for  a 
case  when  France  is  at  peace. 

We  shall  now  shew  that  France  pays  no  regard  to 
the  naturalization  laws  of  other  countries,  at  least  so 
as  to  deem  them  a  protection  to  the  subjects  of  her 
enemy,  who  may  have  been  naturalized  during  the 
war  in  neutral  states — and  yet  she  naturalizes,  for- 
eigners herself — thereby  proving  what  we  have  stat- 


48 

^d  above,  that  nations  by  conferring  the  privileges  of 
naturalization  do  not  understand,  that  they  give  the 
person  any  protection  out  of  their  own  territory,  that 
they  do  not  admit  that  it  is  in  the  power  of  a  neutral 
to  protect  the  native  subject  of  an  enemy  against  cap- 
ture, B.nd  a  fortiori  not  the  native  subject  of  the  bel- 
ligerent captor  against  his  own  sovereign's  claim. 

By  an  ordinance  of  July,  1704,  it  is  declared  that 
^^No  passports  granted  by  neutral  princes,  either  io 
owners  or  masters,  who  are  aubjecta  of  our  enemies, 
shall  be  valid,  unless  they  shall  have  been  naturalized 
and  have  transferred  their  domicil  before  the  present 
war.^* 

This  edict  is  confirmed  and  continued  by  another 
in  1744  and  in  1778. 

If  the  simple  principle  of  this  edict  should  be  ac- 
ceded to  by  our  government,  there  would  be  an  im- 
mediate settlement  of  the  differences  with  Great-Brit- 
ain.  She  would  be  probably  very  willing  to  admit, 
that  such  of  her  subjects  as  were  naturalized  before 
the  war  should  be  protected  under  our  flag.  It  ought 
to  be  observed,  however,  that  this  would  be  gratui- 
tous on  her  part,  because  she,  as  well  France,  con- 
tends for  the  perpetuity  of  allegiance. 

By  a  decree  of  the  French  republick,  in  the  very 
height  of  her  pretensions  for  free  principles,  dated  Fri- 
niaire,  an.  5th,  it  is  provided,  that  ^^  All  captains  of 
neutralized  vessels  shall  prove  by  certificates  of  their 
own  minister  near  the  French  court,  that  they  were 
horn  in  an  allied  or  neutral  countiy,  under  pain  of 
bei^  treated  as  spies." 

Here  the  right  of  expatriation  and  the  protection 
of  naturalization  are  denied. 

Let  us  pause  here  a  moment — ^William  Duane,  an 
Englishman  naturalized  in  America,  would  by  the  a« 
bove  edict  be  liable  to  be  hung  as  a  spy  in  France, 
notwithstanding  his  letters  of  naturalization,  and  his 
being  covered  by  the  American  flag :  yet  Mr.  Mad- 
ison contends  that  this  same  William  Duane  would 


be 


49 


iUd  perfectly  protected  on  the  high  seas  by  this  SAme 
paper  against  his  own  natural  sovereign. 

By  another  decree,  8th  Brumaire,  an.  7.  it  is  pro^ 
vided,  that 

<<  All  individuals,  natives,  originating  in  the  coun- 
<<  tries  of  our  allies  or  neutrals,  who  shall  bear  a  com* 
*'  mission  from  our  enemies,  or  make  a  part  of  the 
<<  crews  of  vessels  of  war,  or  OTHERS,  shall  be 
'<  for  this  single  fact  declared  pirates,  and  treated  as 
"such." 

Both  G.  Britain  and  France  had,  for  many  years 
before,  invited/oret^  sailors  into  their  service,  and 
had  given  them  the  privileges  of  native  bom  seamen> 
or,  as  the  French  term  it,  of"  RegnicoleSy^  yet  nei- 
ther nation  understood,  it  seems,  by  that  stipulation  that 
they  could  protect  them  either  against  their  being 
punished  for  such  entry,  by  their  own  sovereign,  or 
their  being  treated  as  pirates  by  their  enemies. 

By  an  edict  of  the  year  6th,  Yentose  8.  it  is  de- 
clared, 

"  That  all  English  sailors,  on  hoard  neutralflags, 
in  the  ports  of  France  should  be  arrested; — and 
every  man  who  spoke  the  English  language  should 
be  considered  English,  unless  he  could  prove  by 
authentick  evidence  and  documents,  that  he  was 
American." 

Here  we  see,  what  would  be  the  state  of  our  pro- 
tectums  with  a  vengeance,  had  France  been  able  to 
keep  her  fleets  at  sea  during  the  war.  Every  Amer- 
ican or  person  speaking  the  English  tongue,  would 
ha  presumed  English  /  ! 

I  shall  not  cite,  as  I  could,  many  other  edicts  tend- 
ing to  prove  the  same  points,  but  shall  conclude  with 
stating  one  out  of  many  cases  in  which  France  has 
carried  these  principles  into  effect  on  the  hish  seas — 
that  we  have  not  a  thousand  cases  of  the  kind  is  be- 
cause her  ships  are  scarcely  ever  at  sea,  and  we  have 
not  50  French  seamen  in  our  employ.  In  the  year 
1806,  Admiral  Willaumez  in  a  French  ship  ctilled 


% 


50 

the  Foudroyanty  met  with  au  American  brig  and  for- 
cibly  took  out  four  French  seamen,  who  had  entered 
in  this  countty  : — not  content  with  impressing  them 
— ^he  wrote  as  follows  to  Gen.  Turreau;  Ambassador 
of  France: — 

**  My  Lord — I  have  just  apprehended  four  sea- 
men deserters,  from  the  Yaleureuse  frigate,  which  I 
found  on  board  an  American  brig,  where  they  had 
engaged  at  17  dollars  per  month. — ^Now,  Sir,  if  you 
can  succeed  in  making  the  American  eovernmerit  pay 
down  a  compensation  for  thus  seducing  our  seamen, 
you  will  punish  it  in  a  manner  it  feels  most  its  ava- 
rice, as  those  people  have  been  for  three  years  sedu- 
cine  our  best  men  from  us." 

Here  we  see  the  doctrine — the  practice — and  the 
•purit  to  make  us  pay  for  it ! ! ! 


NO.  IX. 


THE  SEQUEL  OF  MR.  RUSSELL'S  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH 
LORD  CASTLEREAGH. 

It  had  been  my  original  intention  at  this  time,  to 
have  laid  before  the  publick  the  negotiations  between 
Mr.  Monroe  and  Mr.  Pinkney,  and  Lords  Holland 
and  Auckland,  and  to  have  shewn,  not  only  the  strong 
disposition  of  Great-Britain  so  to  arrange  the  practice 
of  taking  out  British  seamen^  as  to  afford  little  or  no 
cause  of  complaint  to  this  country,  as  also  the  almost 
insurmountable  difficulties  which  then  presented  them- 
selves. 

It  will  appear  from  this  negotiation,  that  our  gov- 
ernment knew  the  full  extent  of  these  difficulties,  and 
that  they  could  therefore  very  easily  impose,  if  they 
were  so  disposed,  on  the  American  people,  by  renew- 
ing the  general  propositions  in  vague  and  indefinite 
terms,  while  they  were  sure  that  when  they  should 
come  to  the  details,  there  were  a  thousand  points 


ing 


51 


which  could  be  started,  which  would  defeat  an  ulti- 
timate  arrangement. 

In  this  spirit,  we  shall  now  shew,  that  the  late  ne- 
eotiation  was  probably  undertaken,  and  that  so  far 
n'om  proving  a  disposition  to  make  peace,  or  to  ar- 
range amicably  the  question  of  impressment,  it  affordi 
to  my  mind  the  most  decisive  proof  of  the  opposite 
intentions. 

I  am  obliged  to  postpone  the  consideration  of  the 
former  negotiation,  in  order  to  take  a  review  of  the 
documents  which  have  been  given  to  us  by  piece-mealy 
since  these  essays  were  commenced. 

It  will  be  recollected,  that  I  undertook  to  shew  in 
my  early  remarks,  that  Mr.  Madison  required  of 
Great-Britain  an  absolute  and  entire  relinquishment 
of  the  practice  of  taking  her  own  seamen^  as  a  prelim- 
nary  to  an  armistice,  and  that  he  offered,  in  return, 
.e  barren  assurance  that  Congress  might,  if  they 
should  see  fit,  make  a  law  excluding  British  seamen 
from  our  vessels,  without  defining  either  the  terms  of 
such  an  act,  or  what  we  should  understand  by  British 
seamen. 

We  also  proved,  that  the  explanatory  and  last  tn- 
structiona  given  by  Mr.  Monroe  to  Mr.  Russell,  and 
under  which  alone  he  had  any  authority  to  treat,  still 
renewed  the  offensive  condition  of  a  previous  renun- 
ciation by  Great-Britain  of  the  righty  as  a  preliminary 
to  a  negotiation  about  the  manner,  in  which  she  was 
to  be  indemnified  against  the  certain  loss  of  her  mar- 
iners. 

We  have  been  indeed  nnce  astonished  and  hum- 
bled at  the  boldness  of  our  charge  de  affiures,  Mr. 
Russell,  in  asserting  in  his  last  letter  to  Lord  Gastle- 
reagh,  to  which  no  reply  could  have  been  given  from 
its  date,  that  he  had  made  an  offer  of  a  simidtaneova 
relinquishment  of  the  British  right  to  take  their  own 
seamen,  and  of  our  practice,  our  unkind,  impolitick 
and  unneutral  like  practice  of  soliciting  and  employ- 
ing these  subjects  of  a  foreign  state. 


5^ 

My  first  reflection  was,  that  Mr.  Russell  had  kept 
back  from  Lord  Gastlereagh  his  limited  powers, 
which  forbad  his  making  such  an  offer^,  and  that  he 
fondly  entertained  a  hope,  that  overleaping  his  au- 
thority, he  might  have  the  honour,  against  his  orders, 
and  in  direct  disobedience  of  them,  of  restoring  peace 
to  his  suffering  country. 

With  this  impression,  I  again  reviewed  his  instruc- 
tions, and  I  became  again  convinced  that  he  could 
not  mistake  them.  The  absolute,  entire,  and  full  re- 
nunciation of  the  practice,  was  required  as  preliminary 
to  any  sort  of  negotiation,  and  must  precede  the  set. 
tlement  of  the  terms  on  which  we  should  refuse  to 
employ  British  sailors. 

Imagine  then,  fellow-citizens,  what  was  my  sur- 
prise in  perusing  the  late  letter,  probably  gotten  up 
at  Washington,  in  which  Mr.  Russell  states  that  he 
eommuuicated  his  instructions,  limited  as  they  were, 
in  extenso,  and  that  Lord  Gastlereagh  '^  read  them 
over  attentively.'^ 

Instructions,  which  simply  authorized  him  to  renew 
the  very  same  offensive  proposals  which  had  before 
been  re^'icted. 

That  the  people  may  understand  the  nature  of  Mr. 
Jonathan  Russell's /amtVtav*  talk  with  Lord  Gastle- 
reagh, it  is  proper  here  to  premise  one  or  two  remarks. 

By  a  declaration  of  war,  all  the  functions,  power, 
and  authority  of  ministers  cease.  Our  own  cabinet 
refused  to  accredit  Mr.  Baker  as  charge  d'affaires 
appointed  by  Mr.  Foster  after  the  war — see  the  cor- 
respondence on  tliis  subject. 

Mr.  Russell  was  therefore  in  London  as  a  private 
American  merchant.  When  he  carried  a  letter  from 
Mr.  Monroe  to  himself,  after  the  war,  to  Lord  Gastle- 
reagh, he  did  it  as  an  individual  American.  He  could 
say  no  more  for  his  government  than  the  letter  said — 
If  he  promised  any  thing,  it  was  Mr.  Russell's  pro- 
mise, and  no  better  than  Mr.  Williams\  or  any  other 
American  citizen  in  London. 


03 

Mr.  Monroe's  letter  then  is  the  true  and  only  prop- 
er evidence  of  the  offer,  and  Mr.  Monroe  required 
Great-Britain  instantly  to  renounce  her  practice  of 
taking  her  own  seamen,  on  the  assurance  that  Con- 
gress might,  but  that  the  President  could  not,  by  our 
laws,  stipulate  that  they  would  pass  a  law  something 
about  the  employment  of  British  seamen.— -As  to 
what  that  law  should  be,  Mr.  Monroe  was  silent,  and 
permit  me  to  add,  he  w&a  properly  silent,  for  it  was 
not  in  Mr.  Madison's  power  to  say  that  he  himself 
should  be  President,  much  less  to  decide  what  Con- 
gress should  or  should  not  do. 

This,  then,  is  the  famous  offer  to  Great-Britain — 
Withdraw  your  practice,  consecrated  by  your  own 
usage  and  that  of  all  other  nations  for  two  hundred 
years,  and  then  we  will  appoint  commissioners  to 
agree  upon  the  terms  of  a  law  to  exclude  British 
sailors  from  our  vessels,  and  if  those  commissioners 
shall  make  suxih  term^  as  shall  be  agreeable  to  Con^ 
gress,  it  is  probable  that  that  body  will  pass  a  law  in 
conformity  thereto. 

We  wish  then  the  publick  to  consider  Mr.  RusselV't 
offers  as  nothing  and  less  than  nothing,  so  far  as  they 
exceed  his  explicit  instructions. 

There  is  one  other  consideration  on  this  subject, 
which  deserves  the  most  serious  attention. — This  quesr 
tion  had  been  discussed  between  the  two  nations  for 
30  years.  To  expect  that  Great-Britain  would  yield 
to  our  arms  before  any  blow  had  been  struck,  what 
she  had  refused  to  our  arguments  and  pacifick  offers, 
is  to  suppose,  that  she  is  the  most  cowardly  t^id  hum- 
ble of  all  nations.  If  we  had  offered  a  cessation  of 
hostilities,  and  a  free  discussion  of  the  question  of 
impressment,  without  demanding  the  recognition  of 
its  injustice,  something  might  have  been  expected. 

I  have  now,  however,  only  begun  with  Mr.  Rus- 
sell's new  and  well-contrived  communications. 
These  remarks  are  merely  introductory.  One  prop- 
osition  all  reasonable  men  will  admit,  that  it  is  safer, 


8% 

much  safer;  to  trudt  to  that  part  of  the  official  cones, 
pondence  where  both  parties  are  mutually  heard  in 
their  own  language,  than  to  any  ex  parte,  subsequent^ 
unanswered  representations  of  one  of  the  parties. 

This  remark  has  the  more  forces  I  beg  the  people 
to  attend  to  it,  when  the  person  who  ^ves  the  subse- 
quent and  ex  parte  statement  depends  on  a  govern- 
mentfor  hia  support — which  government  has  waged 
an  unnecessary  war,  and  is  determined  to  support  it 
from  a  regard  to  consistency,  as  well  as  from  the 
original  unaccountable  motives,  which  urged  it  to 
declare  such  a  war.  Such  a  man,  so  pensioned  by 
the  government,  I  mean  in  its  pay,  is  the  less  to  be 
trusted,  when  he  avows  that  he  thinks  his  statement 
ought  to  unite  all  men  in  a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
war.  He  ought  still  more  to  be  distrusted,  when  his 
statement  is  offered  under  such  suspicious  circumstan- 
ces as  to  date,  purporting  to  be  dated  at  London,  on 
the  17th  of  September,  when  on  the  19th  of  that 
month  he  writes,  that  he  has  not  had  time  to  comwuni- 
cate  it.- — It  will  be  thought  worthy  of  still  less  confi- 
dence, when  I  shall  shew,  that  he  begs  pardon  for 
having  made  it  without  authority,  and  when  he  plain- 
ly intimates  that  he  made  it  with  veiy  little  hope  of 
lis  being  accepted. — It  will  then  be  deemed,  I  be-^ 
jieve,  a  mere  ruse  de  guerre^ 


NO.  X. 

THE  SEQUEL  OP  THE  CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  MR.  RUS- 
SEIJL  AND  LORD  CASTLEREAGH. 

Every  fair  man  and  every  friend  to  honourable 
Peace,  every  one  who  is  ready  to  admit,  that  as  our 
government  plunged  us  into  an  offensive  war,  not 
only  before  we  were  duly  prepared  for  it,  but  when, 
from  recent  events  in  O.  Britain,  it  is  apparent,  that 
it  might  and  ought  to  have  been  avoided,  will  agi'ee 


ma« 


55 


.WIS- 


with  me^  that  it  is  at  least  possible,  that  the  samt 
administration,  urged  by  the  same  motive,  may  have 
made  a  shew  of  paciiick  proposals,  without  any  sin- 
cere design  to  have  them  accepted.  I  ask  not  for 
your  jealousy,  my  fellow  citizens,  I  only  request 
your  candid  and  impartial  inquiry  into  the  pretend- 
ed offers  for  Peace. 

You  will  then  agree  with  me,  that  it  is  necessary 
to  make  a  marked  discrimination  between  the  writ' 
ten  proposals,  and  the  written  answers,  and  any 
verbal  and  oral  communications,  which  may  have 
been  misunderstood,  and  most  easily  misconstrued 
and  misrepresented. 

I  shall,  however,  examine  both,  and  I  feel  the 
most  unlimited  confidence  that  both  of  them  will  re- 
sult in  a  conviction  that  no  Peace  was  expected  or 
wished  for  on  the  part  of  our  administration. 

First,  then,  we  will  examine  the  written  corres- 
pondence between  Mr.  Russell  and  Lord  Castle- 
reagh,  after  the  former  had  received  his  last^  an*^  as 
he  calls  them,  most  Uberal  instructions  from  Mr. 
Monroe. 

Mr.  Russell's  only  letter  containing  proposals  af- 
ter he  reottived  his  last  instructions,  is  dated  the 
ISth  of  September,  in  which  he  proposes,  *'  A  con- 
vention for  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  to  take  effect 
at  such  a  time  as  shall  be  mutually  agreed  upon, 
and  stipulating  that  commissioners  shall  be  appoint- 
ed with  full  powers  to  form  a  treaty,  which  shall 
provide  by  reeiproacal  arrangements,  for  the  security 
of  their  seamen  from  being  taken  or  emj^oyed  in  the 
service  of  the  other  rsower." 

These  are  the  piecise  words,  and  we  admit  that 
this  part  of  the  letter  does  not  seem  to  imply  that 
G.  Britain  should  yield  the  right  as  a  preliminary. 
If  this  had  stood  alone,  G.  Britain  could  not  have 
refused  the  offer  justly,  except  on  the  ground  that 
Russell  was  not  only  not  authorized  by  the  instnic- 


66 

ttons  which  he  communicated  to  Lord  Gastlereagh 
in  eortenso,  but  he  was  explicitly  restrained  from  such 
an  offer — Such  an  objection,  if  made,  would  have 
been  unanswerable,  and  itis  the  very  answer  which 
Lord  Castlereagh  did  make. 

Peruse,  my  fellow«citizens,  these  instructions^ 
and  take  with  you,  the  fact  that  Russell's  diplo^ 
matick  powers  had  wholly  ceased,  and  then  see 
whether  the  refusal  of  Great-Britain  is  any  proof 
of  her  being  unwilling  to  adjust  this  question  with 
any  person  duly  authorized  to  treat  with  unlimited 
powers. 

But  this  is  only  a  small  part  of  the  case — Rus- 
sell  did  not  dare  to  violate  in  so  open  a  manner  his 
instructions — He  therefore  added,  '^  In  proposing 
to  your  Lordship  these  terms,  I  am  instructed  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  his  Majesty's  gov- 
ernment, without  requiring  it  to  he  formal  concern, 
ing  impressments  comprising  in  it  the  discharge  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States  already  impressed." 

What  were  the  commissioners  then  to  consider  ? 
Whether  Great-Britain  should  relinquish  the  right  ? 
No — That  she  was  to  agree  to  do  by  a  clear  but 
informal  understanding. 

The  Commissioners  were  afterwards  to  agree,  if 
they  couldf  to  some  arrangement  to  supply  the  place 
of  impressment. 

I  can  liken  this  case  only  to  a  familiar  one  in 
private  life — One  mnu  claims  a  right  of  way  over 
his  neighbour' 'i  iand — the  other  denies  it.  The  lat- 
ter offers  to  leave  it  to  men,  to  say  what  compensa- 
tion he  shall  receive  for  the  relinquishment  of  it, 
but.  says  he,  you.  m\i»i  first  come  to  an  informal  un- 
derstanding that  you  have  no  right  of  way,  and  then. 
I  will  leave  it  to  men  to  agree,  if  they  can,  what 
shall  be  an  equivalent  to  you  for  giving  it  up. — 
This  however  is  not  so  strong  as  Mr.  Russell's  pro- 
posals.   To  make  it  equally  absurd,  you  must  add, 


mo 
tier 
tot 
this 
1 
tan( 


■'•'V  •'tT*  ^.Vf^H  "!»7«r»^     ' 


if 


57 

'<  After  tbe  refereee  have  agreeii  upon  tlM  ewnptii. 
satiun,  I  must  be  at  liberty  to  say,  fdiether  I  wiU 
give  it  or  not,  beeaose  I  am  a  nan  vrk9  am  sot  m. 
the  habit  of  agreeing  to  or  abiding  by  ttbe  deoi. 

sions  of  any  one." 

Is  this  the  language  of  Mr.  Rttssell  ?  Is  it  poisi- 
ble  that  he  could  have  said  this  to  Lovd  Castlerea^? 
He  4id  say  it.  <<  Your  Lordship  is  aware  that  the 
power  of  the  government  of  the  United  states  to 
prohibit  the  employment  of  British  Sailors  must  be 
eicereised  in  the  Sfnrit  of  the  constitution. ''  Or,  as 
it  was  more  fully  explained  in  his  instructions, 
'^  Congress  might,  and  it  is  probable  that  they  WMld^ 
fulfil  tlie  contract  made  by  the  executive.^  « 

From  this  view  of  the  oiidif  written  ofl^r  nftde  4ii 
Lord  Gasilerengh,  under  the  last  liberal  instruc^dm, 
it  is  manifest,  that  oonmissioners  oould  not  be  ap- 
pointed until  Great-Britain  had  clearly  but  Infor- 
mally pledged  her  hondur  (o  abandon  the  practice  of 
taking  her  own  seamen;  *lliat  the  commiseionera 
had  only  the  power  to  agree,  if  they'cofild,  upon  a 
substitute — and  that  after  all  Congress  might  say 
that  the  spirit  of  our  fi^e  constitution  foi%ade  then 
to  refuse  to  naturalize  any  British  «eamen.  -f'i'f-^'ro-i! 

Lord  Castlereagh  received  these  offers  as  any 
honest  plain  man  of  common  sense  would  reeeriv<6 
them — he  considered  them  as  only  a  covert  mo4e 
of  renewing  the  same  proposals  that  had  been  re- 
jected, and  that  they  tlelivered  up  Great-Britain 
bound  hand  and  foot  into  the  power  of  Mr.  Madison. 

Here  the  negotiation  in  writiii>g  ended. 

Mr.  Russell,  however,  thought  that  by  a  familiar 
inofficial  conversation,  he  could  permiade  Lord  Cas- 
tlereagh to  abandon  his  ground,  and  he  has  given 
to  the  puMick  the  minute  remarks  of  each  party  in 
this  conversation.  -^ ' 

We  must  repeat  that  in  a  case  of  snch  vital  impor- 
tance, where  a  strong  ]iartizan  of  administration  un- 
•s 


58 


dertakes  to  represent  the  terms  and  precise  expres- 
sions of  a  foreign  minister  in  a  long  conference^  and 
where  he  shows  a  disposition  to  give  the  most  un- 
favourable turn  to  the  whole  discussion,  much  al- 
lowance  ought  to  be  made.  Much  allowance  for 
misapprehension — much  for  prejudice — much  for 
the  mortification  of  a  young  man  in  failing  to  effect 
a  favourite  object  where  he  avows  he  acted  without 
authority. 

Much  ought  also  to  be  allowed  for  the  mistakes 
of  a  very  inexperienced  diplomatick  agent,  who  got 
into  his  office  in  a  very  unusual  manner,  converted 
firom  a  supercargo  into  a  sort  of  minister,  and  who, 
according  to  his  own  avowal^  ventured  to  do  what 
Mr.  Madison  said  he  dared  not  do,  that  is  to  stipu- 
late in  behalf  of  Congress  what  sort  of  a  law  they 
would  hereafter  pass  as  to  naturalization. 

Besides  this,  Mr.  Russell  has  been  before  the 
publick  in  a  former  case,  and  few  of  us  have  forgotten 
his  most  memorable  letters  from  France — while 
with  a  truth  and  spirit,  becoming  the  representative 
of  an  honourable  and  impartial  nation,  (I  do  not 
say  administration)  he  was  telling  the  French 
government,  that  there  had  not  been  a  single  case 
which  proved  the  repeal  of  the  French  decrees,  he 
wrote  to  our  minister  in  Great-Britain  that  there 
had  not  been  a  case  which  rendered  their  repeal 
doubtful. 

We  do  not  quote  words — we  adhere  to  the  sub- 
stance— ^the  whole  is  upon  record,  and  let  Mr.  Rus- 
sell's consistency  and  credit  be  tested  by  his  writ- 
ings. At  present,  however,  we  shall  presume  his 
account  of  the  correspondence  as  correct  as  could 
possibly  suit  his  employer,  Mr.  Madison. 

And  what  results  from  it  ?  We  shall  state  : 

4»t.  It  appears  that  Lord  Gastlereagh  saw  his 
whole  instructions,  and  read  them  over  attentively. 

2dly.    That    he  objected  to  treating  with  Mr. 


■>•»■«■  W|r  fm.\w<*  -P/A^-' 


lis 


09 

Bufiselly  because  he  bad  no  autbority  wbatever  to 
Hegotiate  on  tbe  Bubject,  beyond  his  mere  letter  from 
Mr.  Monroe. 

3ily.  That  Lord  Gastlereagb  frankly  stated  the 
insurmountable  objections  which  had  formerly  been 
made  to  the  renunciation  in  toto,  of  the  practice  of 
taking  British  seamen,  and  that  no  British  nnnister 
would  dare  to  surrender  so  ui\jdoubted  and  long 
exercised  a  right. 

isthly.  That  Mr.  Russell  very  offensively,  and 
we  should  say  very  petulantly  and  insultingly, 
compared  the  British  practice  of  taking  their  own 
seamen,  to  the  slave  Trade ;  thereby  intimating 
that  a  British  subject  serving  his  king  and  country 
is  in  the  condition  of  a  West  India  or  Virginia 
negro. 

Qthly.  He  charged  the  British  government  with 
gross  inconsistency  in  keeping  up  the  practice  of 
impressing  their  own  seamen,  while  they  abolished 
the  Slave  Trorfe— thereby  indecorously  and  unnec- 
essarily attacking  and  interfering  with  the  munici- 
pal laws  and  usages  of  Great-Britain. 

Qthly.  He  unjustly  and  insultingly  charged  Great-r 
Britain  with  claiming  the  right  to  impress  Ameri- 
can citizens,  which  she  has  openly  and  frequently  de- 
nied, always  restoring  such  as  have  been  taken  by 
mistake. 

But  lastly,  (and  the  most  important  of  all  his 
strange  proposals)  he  claimed  the  right,  without 
authority,  of  retaining  all  British  subjects  now  nat-> 
uralizedf  and  undertook  to  stipulate  that  Congress 
would  not  in  future  pi  otect  any  British  seamen. 

The  v'V^le  of  this  last  proposal  was  not  only 
without  authority,  (and  he  apologizes  for  it  as  such 
to  his  own  government)  but  it  was  in  direct  oppo->^ 
sition  to  his  instructions,  which  directed  him  to  as- 
sure Great-Britain  that  the  President  could  V4}t  by 
the  constitution,  stipulate  for  Con^ress^ 


WKy  thfen  wat  tt  nade  ?  He  gives  ywL  the  re«. 
Mm>t^betau8e  he  tlioQghi  it  ivould  naite  all  Aiaeri- 
cans  in  favour  of  the  war — and  becaiwe  he  knew 
hill  inruat  of  authority,  and  the  extravagance  and 
looiBtness  of  the  terms  would,  as  they  did,  secura 
the  rejection  of  them  by  Great-Britain.  He  had 
j^dbaUy  ta  ulterioi  reason — He  knew  it  did  not  in 
aaqr  degree  commUour  cabinetf  who  rejected,  with- 
out ceremony,  a  treaty  lawfully  made  with  full  poW' 
frty  hy  Monroe  and  Pinkney,  while  it  might,  aa  it 
probably  has  done,  recommend  him  to  them  as  a 
man  well  fitted  for  the  purposes  and  views  of  a 
eabinet,  whi^ih  has  plunged  the  nation  into  ruin  and 
diidgrace,  and  which  appears  resolutely  bent  op  con- 
tinuing the  same  ruinous  system-  ' 


NO.  XI. 

THfc  IMPORTANT  NEGOTFATION  OP   MKSSHS.  MONROE  AND 
PINKNEY  IN  180C,  A3  TO  IMPRESSMENTS. 

It  is  impossible  to  understand  the  true  merits  of 
the  question  of  Impressments,  and  of  the  offers 
made  between  the  parties  at  different  periods,  with- 
out a  thorongb  examination  of  the  negotiation  be- 
tween the  Wox  ministry  and  Messrs.  Monroe  and 
Pinkney. 

We  may  lay  it  dowA  as  a  settled  point,  that  what- 
^er  THAT  ministry  so  favourable  to  America,  for  so 
many  years  our  defenders  in  Parliament  refused  to 
concede,  whatever  especially  they  declared  that  no 
British  minister  would  ever  dfareto  cede,  never  will 
be  granted  even  at  the  end  of  a  war,  until  the  Brit- 
iah  naval  power  shall  be  broken  down.  Our  gov- 
ernment know,  and  it  is  our  present  object  to  show 
from  documents,  that  the  most  favourable  British 
ministers  liave  declared,  that  on  no  terms  whatever 
ean  they  ever  yield  to  any  nation  their  right  to  take 


our 


^n>i 


mtmifw^ 


L*6 


it 


61 

their  own  aubjecta  out  of  neutral  shipa,  op  ^9  bigh 
seas.  ^ 

If  therefore  lee  insist  that  any  treaty  of  peaoe^  even- 
a  definitive  one,  muM  stipulate  that  Great.Britaiii 
shall  renounce  this  right,  (we  care  not  what  termci 
of  compensation  or  compromise  are  offered  for  ita 
renunciation)  we  are  persuaded  that  peace  will  nev- 
er be  made.  This  oqr  administration  icell  knoWf 
and  therefore  this  renunciation  will  be  made  a,  sina 
qua  non  of  a  treaty^  let  Great  Britain  offer;  as  afae  has 
done,  the  most  honourable  propositions  for  the  pre- 
vention of  abose^  in  the  exercise  of  her  right. 

This  conduct  of  our  Admiuistration  is,  in  effect, 
nailing  the  flag  to  the  mast,  and  the  ship  must  go, 
down,  if  the  people  are  weak  or  prejudiced  enongh 
to  believe,  without  examination,  that  our  flag,  by  the 
law  of  nations,  ought  to  protect  all  who  sail  under  it, 
and  that  Great  Britain  advances  principles  against 
us,  which  she  maintains  against  no  other  nation,  and 
no  other  belligerent  nation  maintains  ;  the  rey«rBe 
of  all  which  is  precisely  the  truth. 

We  know  we  shall  alarm  some  timid  men,  when 
we  say,  that  we  fear  peace  will  never  be  made  if, 
upon  any  terms  or  on  any  conditions,  we  require  the 
absolute  relinquisliment  of  the  right  to  take  British 
native  subjects  out  of  our  merchants,  ships  on  the 
high  seas. 

But  we  see  no  advantage  in  self-deception.  We 
shall  never  make  up  our  mind«  either  to  fi^t  ad  in- 
ternecionem,  to  extermination,  for  this  principle,  «r 
to  make  a  peace  without  obtaining  it,  un^til  we  do 
understand  that  it  never  will  he  yielded.  Then  men 
will  begin  to  think — they  will  then  weigh  the  jus- 
tice of  tiie  British  claim — its  antiquity-^its  univer- 
sality^— its  true  importance  to  us — the  exaggerated 
picture  which  has  been  drawn  of  it — on  the  other 
side  its  being  so  essential  to  the  vital  interests  of 
our  enemy — ^the  prosperiiy  we  have  enjoyed  for 


tvirenty  years  under  its  exercise — ^the  gross  abuses 
of  protections  for  sailors — as  well  as  the  great  facil- 
ities for  naturalization — the  doubtful  benefit  of 
the  encouragement  of  foreigners  at  all — the  certain 
disadvantage  to  our  native  mariners  by  the  compe- 
tion — ^by  the  difiSculty  of  discrimination  which  draws 
even  natives  into  danger — by  the  little  reliance  you 
can  place  on  the  fidelity  of  men  in  case  ofirar,who 
are  fighting  against  their  own  sovereign. 

Such  arguments  will  have  their  due  weight  when 
we  onee  "know,  that  the  war  must  he  eternal^  or  we 
must  abandon  oar  claim  on  Great  Britain  to  re- 
nounce her  natural,  moral,  equitable  right  over  the 
services  of  her  own  subjects. 

Our  government  perfectly  well  understand  this, 
but  they  know  the  people  do  not,  and  therefore  they 
continue  to  make  the  parade  of  offers,  which  have 
been  over  and  over  again  rejected,  as  it  is  our  busi- 
ness to  shew.  The  correspondence  on  the  subject, 
atthetimeof  the  negotiation  in  1806,  comprises  six- 
ty or  seventy  pages,  we  shall  therefore  arrange  the 
points  which  appear  to  be  fairly  deducible  from  that 
negotiation,  and  give  short  abstracts  under  each 
point. 

iM.  Then,  it  will  appear  that  G.  Britain  abso- 
lutely and  explicitly  refused  to  renounce  the  right 
of  taking  her  own  seamen,  and  our  ministers  were 
persuaded  that  it  never  would  be  renounced. 

S(2.  We  shall  shew,  that  her  negotiators  made 
very  honourable  offers  to  ours  to  render  the  exercise 
of  her  right  as  little  injurious  as  possible  to  us. 

Sdly.  That  our  negotiators  deemed  these  offers 
liberal,  and  were  of  opinion  that,  substantially,  they 
gave  us  all  that  we  could  desire — they  were  con- 
vinced that  they  were  the  best  modifications  short  of 
a  surrender  of  what  Great  Britain  tenaciously  in^ 
sisted  upon  as  an  absolute  right. 

^ly.  It  will  appear  that  Qur  ministers  were  se- 


lade 


lers 

they 

bon- 

rtof 

in- 


63 

ercly  reproved  for  their  liberality,  by  our  cabinet^ 
and  in  lieu  of  the  informal  arrangement  made  before^ 
they  were  instructed  to  propose  an  article  precisely 
in  the  spirit  of  Russell's  late  unauthorued  (^etp 
that  is,  that  we  would  protect  all  citizens  whether 
,  natives  or  not,  but  we  would  not  employ  any  Bn- 
glishman  until  he  had  gone  through  the  farce  of 
naturalization. 

We  think  this  display  will  shew,  that  our  gov- 
ernment are  well  persuaded  they  can  fearlessly,  and 
without  danger  of  peace,  (the  thing  they  most  dread) 
make  as  many  oners  as  they  please,  so  long  as  they 
insist  on  the  renunciation  of  the  right,  and  on  the 
validity  of  our  naturalization  laws  to  wash  away 
the  duties  of  natural  allegiance — duties,  in  which 
more  writers  on  the  law  of  nations  are  agreed^  than 
in  any  other  principles  whatever. 

ist.  It  appears  from  Mr.  Monroe's  and  Mr. 
Pinkney's  correspondence,  as  to  tlie  aforesaid  nego- 
tiation, that  Great  Britian  refused  to  yield  up  her 
right,  and  it  was  apparent  she  never  wbuld  yield  it 
on  any  terms. 

In  a  conference  of  Monroe  and  Finkney  with 
Lords  Holland  and  Auckland,  on  the  ^d  August 
1806,  these  noblemen,  who  were  very  friendly  to 
our  nation,  observed,  <<  that  they  felt  the  strongest 
repugnance  to  a.  formal  renunciation  of  their  claim 
to  take,  from  our  vessels  on  the  high  aeaa  such  sea- 
men as  should  appear  to  be  their  own  subjects ;  and 
they  pressed  upon  us  with  much  zeal,  as  a  substitute 
for  such  abandonment,  that  our  crews  should  be  fur- 
nished v.'ith  authentick  documents  of  citizenship  of 
a  nature  and  form  to  be  settled  by  treaty,  which 
should  completely  protect  those  to  whom  they  re- 
lated, but  that,  subject  to  such  protections.  Great 
Britain  should  continue  to  visit  and  impress  as  here- 
tofore," (that  is  their  own  subjects.) 

"  They  enforced  this  by  observing  that  they  sup- 


<r4 

poied  our  object  to  be  to  prevent  the  impressment 
of  American  uamen,  and  not  to  withdraw  British 
uaamen  from  the  service  of  their  country,  in  times  of 
gteot  national  peril,  in  order  to  etnploy  them  our- 
telvet ;  that  their  proposal  would  effect  this  object, 
that  if  thej^  should  consent  to  make  our  commercial 
navy  an  asylum  for  all  British  seamen,  the  effect 
of  such  a  concession  upon  her  maritime  strength,  on 
which  Great  Britain  depended,  might  be  fatal." 

It  is  evident  from  this  extract,  that  even  the  Fox 
ministry,  so  favourable  to  America,  never  could  think 
of  yielding  the  principle.  It  is  apparent  also,  that 
they  were  willing  to  adopt,  and  did  offer,  a  very  fair 
expedient  to  remedy  abuses  in  the  exercise  of  the 
right*  Lastly,  it  seems  from  this  extract,  that  G. 
Britain  is  not  so  mueh  opposed  to  this  relinqnish- 
ment  on  account  of  the  number  of  her  sailors,  now 
in  our  service,  as  from  her  fears,  that  as  s6on 
as  our  navy  shall  by  treaty  become  an  asylum,  no 
Stipulations  on  our  part  can  prevent  its  being  abus- 
ed to  the  utter  destruction  of  her  marine  power. 

On  the  11th  of  Sept.  our  ministers  write  that  they 
consider  the  objections  of  Great-Britain  such  as  will 
not  be  surmounted. 

'  *<  A.11  our  efforts,  they  say,  proved  ineffectual.  The 
ri:ght  was  denied  by  the  British  commissioners,  who 
asserted  that  of  their  own  government  to  seize  its 
subjects  on  board  neutral  merchant  ships  on  the  high 
«eaB.  And  who  said,  that  the  relinquishment  of  it 
at  this  time  would  go  far  to  the  overthrow  of  their 
naval  power,  on  which  the  safety  of  the  state  essen- 
tially depended." 

Our  ministers  at  the  same  interview,  in  Bept.  1806, 
proposed  as  a  substitute  the  restoration  in  future  of 
all  British  deserters  even,  from  their  merchant  ser- 
vice— ^to  this  proposal  the  British  ministers  appear- 
ed to  listen,  but  they  said  it  was  necessary  to  consult 
their  law  officers,  and  the  result  was  as  our  minis- 


60 

tcrs  state  *^  a  rejection  of  the  pfoject  and  v/Mi  it  lUl 
hope  of  obtainiiig  at  that  time  any  gatisfaotory  itip«' 
latione  respecting  Impressment*.'' 

At  their  next  interview  thu^  British  cotnlMssiGnei^ 
presented  the  report  of  theii^  crown  ol&eer^  deeU^- 
ing  hid  opinion  <<  that  OreatBritain  had  a  riglit  to 
the  services  of  her  own  citizens,  and  to  take  ihtm 
oat  of  niaatral  merchants'  ships  on  the  high  seas-** 
that  as  merchant  ships  were  extra-territorial  they 
were  not  admitted  to  possess  such  a  jurisdiction  as 
to  protect  British  subjects  from  their  own  sovereign 
— ^they  stated  further  that  the  admiralty  and  all  the 
crown  officers  had  been  consulted  and  they  added 
explicitly,  though  in  a  very  conciliating  manner^ 
that  it  was  not  in  their  power  to  accede  to  our  pro- 
posal, and  that  all  the  law  officers  united  in  the  o- 
pinion,  that  the  right  of  their  government  was  well 
founded  aiul  ou^t  Tiot  to  be  relinquiahed.  They 
added  ihi.t  a^der  such  circumstances,  the  relinquish- 
ment of  it  was  a  measure  which  the  government  could 
not  adopt  without  taking  upon  itself  a  responsibility, 
which  no  ministry  could  be  willing  to  meet,  howev- 
er pressing  the  emergency  might  he J^ 

Here  ended  the  negotiation  as  to  the  absolute  re- 
nunciation of  the  right,  aad  we  ask  all  candid  men 
whether  we  have  not  fully  maintained  our  first  point, 
that  this  negotiation  proved  that  Great  Britain  will 
never  relinquish  the  right,  however  pressing  the 
emergency  may  be. 

Let  it  be  considered  who  were  the  British  negotia- 
tors— men,  who  for  ten  years  had  condemned  the  Pitt 
ministry  for  their  unbending,  unconciliatory  conduct 
towards  America — men  whom  Monroe  most  extrav- 
agantly praised — men  upon  whom  Mr.  Madison 
himself  has  since  repeatedly  bestowed  high  eulogi- 
ums.  Yet  these  men  declared  that  such  were  the 
feelings  of  the  British  nation — so  united  were  all  its 
civilians  on  the  justice  of  tboir  claim,  that  no  minis- 
9 


66 

t»y  would  ever  dare  to  relinquish  it.  And  do  we 
say  that  she  never  will  in  any  event  relinquish  it? 
NO — She  may  do  it,  not  because  the  Ganadas  shall 
be  wrested  from  her — but  she  may  do  it,  when  the 
American  flag  shall  ride  triumphant  in  the  Downs, 
when  our  Navy  shall  have  acquired  the  supremacy 
which  hers  now  possesses  on  the  ocean,  and  when 
the  wishes  of  France  for  her  downfall  shall  be  ac- 
complished. 


NO.   XII. 

MB.  MONROE  AND  PINCKNEyS  NEGOTIATION  ABOUT  IM- 

PRESSMENTS. 

During  Mr.  Fox's  indisposition,  which  ended  in 
his  death,  our  ministers  had  one  interview  with  Lord 
Grenville — and  I  quote  it  to  shew,  that  another  lead- 
ing man  in  the  same  nation  had  the  same  feelings  as 
Lords  Holland  a.kd  Auckland.  His  Lordship  said 
he''  Had  doubts  of  the  practicability  of  devising  means 
of  discrimination  between  the  seamen  of  the  two 
countries  within  their  respective  jurisdictions,  and  he 
spoke  of  the  importance  to  the  safety  of  Great-Britain, 
in  the  present  state  of  the  power  of  her  enemy,  of  pre- 
serving in  their  utmost  strength,  the  right  and  the 
capacity  of  government  to  avail  itself  in  war  of  the 
services  of  its  seamen.  These  observations  were 
connected  with  professions  of  an  earnest  wish,  that 
some  liberal  and  equitable  plan  should  be  adopted 
for  reconciling  the  exercise  of  this  essential  bight 
with  the  just  claims  of  the  United  States  for  remov- 
ing from  it  all  cause  of  complaint  and  irritation." 

Not  one  word  about  the  renunciation ;  on  the  oth- 
er hand  the  most  firm  and  deliberate  purpose  of  ad- 
hering  to  it,  on  the  most  deep  and  solemn  conside- 
rations. If  British  statesmen  believe  it  to  be  a  right, 
and  a  right  essential  to  their  safety  and  existence,  is 
it  not  idle  to  expect  a  formal  renunciation  of  it  ? 


IS 


er 

But  we  have  said^  secondly,  that  the  British  coiii% 
missioners  have  made  very  honourahle  offers  for  such 
arrangements  as  would  take  away  all  just  cause  of 
complamt. 

One  of  these  we  have  already  noticed,  and  that  is, 
that  A  form  and  mode  of  protection  for  Ajnerican  aea- 
men  should  be  agreed  upon  by  treaty,  and  that  no 
*eamen  possessed  of  one  of  them  should  be  impress- 
ed. 

If  the  object  of  Mr.  Madison  was  only  to  protect 
bona  fide  Americans,  one  would  imagine  this  might 
have  answered. 

On  the  11th  of  September,  after  the  British  com* 
missioners  gave  in  their  final  declaration,  that  no 
British  minister  would  ever  dare  to  concede  the  right^ 
they,  the  British  commissioners,  presented  a  counter 
project,  reciting,  <<  Whereas,  when  one  nation  is  at 
war  and  the  other  at  peace,  it  is  not  lawful  for  the  bel. 
ligerent  to  impress  or  carry  off  from  the  neutral  ves. 
sel  seafaring  persons  who  are  the  natives  of  the  neu. 
tral  country,  or  others,  who  are  not  the  subjects  of  the 
belligerent,  and  whereas,  from  similarity  of  lan- 
guage and  appearance  it  may  be  difficult  to  distin- 
guish the  subjects  of  the  two  states,  the  high  contract, 
ing  parties  agree  for  the  greater  security  of  the  neu- 
tral  subjects,  they  will  respectively  enact  such  laws 
as  shall  subject  to  heavy  penalties  the  commanders 
of  belligerent  ships,  who  shall  carry  off  th&  subjects 
of  the  neutral  on  any  pretence  whatever." 

A  penalty  is  also  provided  for  granting  faUe  pro-> 
tections  to  seamen. 

I  confess  I  can  Scarcely  conceive  a  fairer  offer — ^It 
is  a  most  express  disavowal  of  the  practice  of  taking 
Americans,  or  any  other  seamen,  except  British. 
The  remedv  it  offers  misht  be  made  effectual.  If 
every  captain  of  an  A*nerican  vessel  from  which  an^ 
neutral  citizen  should  be  impressed,  should  be  dir 
rected  by  law,  under  hei^vy  penalties,  to  take  down  at 


HllliilM 


ihfi  tinK  of  Aiiip]^iqs  any  seamen;  his  description  and 
vlscft  qfmxtimty,  and  on  the  arrival  of  the  vessel  at  any 
Ibrelgn  or  other  port^  he  should  be  required  to  trans- 
mit in  duplicates  to  the  secretary  of  state,  and  to  the 
publick  agent  of  seamen  in  London,  the  names,  de- 
seription,  and  places  of  nativity  of  any  and  every  sea- 
men who  shall  have  been  impressed  during  the  voy- 
age, stating  by  whom  and  where  the  same  took  place 
— and  if  the  law  should  direct  the  secretary  of  state 
to  send  to  the  place  where  the  seaman  so  impressed 
Iras  born,  for  the  certificate  of  some  rector,  pastor, 
or  publick  teacher,  together  with  one  civil  magistrate^ 
atjtesting  that  such  seaman  was  born  in  such  place, 
and  if  it  should  be  agreed  by  treaty,  that  such  cer- 
tifieaie,  countersigned  1  y  our  secretary  of  state, 
should  be  in  a  trial  at  law  prima  facie  evidence  oftfie 
fact,  sad  if  the  treaty  should  further  provide,  that  the 
American  agent  in  London  should  have  a  right  as 
the  prochain  ami  of  any  seaman  to  institute  suits  for 
the  penalty  against  the  captain  who  should  have  im- 
pressed such  seamen,  and  if  the  penalty  should  be  ar,c 
heavy  one,  as  was  proposed  by  Great-  Britain,  and 
should  ensue  to  the  benefit  of  the  seaman,  and  if 
mweover  the  seaman  should  be  instantly  discharged 
OM  the  production  of  said  certificate,  we  cannot  con- 
ceive a  more  perfect  security  than  this  would  afford 
against  impressments.  If  the  penalty  should  be  500 
TOllars,  for  example,  and  the  government  of  the  Uni- 
ted States  and  its  officers  should  do  theib  duty,  the 
seaman  would  recover  it  upon  an  average  within 
twelve  months,  and  there  is  scarcely  a  seaman  in 
America,  who  would  not  be  anxious  to  be  impressed 
i>n  apecidation — nor  a  captain  in  the  British  navy  who 
would  dare  to  impress  an  American.  The  on)^'  dan- 
ger the  seaman  would  incur,  would  be  the  neglect 
of  hia  own  govemme'  t.  The  remedy  in  the  mode 
proposed  would  be  ce  tain,  easy  and  expeditious. 

But  this  proposal  was  rejected — ^Why  ?  Because 
it  afforded  no  asylum  to  British  sailors. 


bee 
al 
act 
its 

COl 


69 

The  British  ministers  iinding  this  proposal  lejeet- 
ed,  then  addressed  a  note  to  our  ministers  stating^ 
<<  That  instructions  had  been  given  and  should  be  re- 
peated and  enforced,  for  the  observance  of  the  great- 
est caution  in  the  impressing  i^W^'^A  seamen,  and 
that  the  strictest  care  shall  be  taken  to  preserve  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  from  any  molestation  or 
iiyury ;  and  that  immediate  andj^rompt  redress  shall 
be  afforded  upon  any  representation  of  injury  sustain- 
ed by  them." 

Such  is  the  famous  note  presented  by  the  Fox 
ministry  as  their  nltimatum,  and  which  was  so  satis- 
factory to  both  our  negotiators^  as  to  induce  them  to 
sign  the  treaty. 

If  in  addition  to  these  liberal  instructions  the  other 
proposal  or  project  had  been  accepted,  of  awarding  & 
heavy  penalty  against  any  British  officer  who  should 
impress  an  American,  the  great  cause  of  complaint, 
so  favourable  to  the  views  of  an  administraUmi  that 
seeks  to  prolong  tjie  irritation  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, might  have  been  l<mg  since  removed. 

We  now  proceed  to  shew,  thirdly,  that  these  last 
terms  were  satisfactory  to  our  own  negotiators — fuid 
that  they  contained  a  great  deal  more  than  meets  the 
e^e-^because,  although  Great-Britain  declined  a  re- 
linquishment of  the  claim,  yet  the  <<  high  seas"  were 
purposely  omitted  in  the  proposal,  and  it  was  under, 
stood  that  the  right  w(Hild  only  be  exercised  in  the 
British  territories. 

Our  ministers,  speaking  of  this  offer,  say,  '^  That 
it  was  sent  to  us  as  a  publick  paper,  and  it  was  in- 
tended we  should  so  consider  it,  and  with  the  knowl- 
edge and  approbation  of  the  British  cabinet.  It 
ought  therefore  to  be  held  as  obligatory  as  if  it  had 
been  stipulated  in  a  treaty.  It  is  just  also  to  give  it 
a  liberal  construction,  in  consideration  that  it  is  the 
act  of  the  British  government.  In  that  view  it  mer- 
its attention,  that  every  thing  is  expressed  in  it  that 
could  be  desired,  except  the  relinquishment  of  the 


70 


pHncvple?^ — <<  that  in  speaking  of  impressments,  the 
exercise  of  that  act  on  the  high  seas  is  omitted,  an  o- 
mission  we  know  to  have  been  intentional." 

Two  years  after  this,^ir  proposal — I  call  it  fair, 
because  our  present  attorney-general,  Pinkney,  and 
our  present  secretary  of  state  called  it  so — Mr.  Mon- 
roe addressed  a  letter  to  the  President,  Mr.  Madison, 
on  the  same  subject,  in  which  he  says,  **  That  the 
subject  of  impressments  was  placed  by  that  note  of 
the  British  commissioners,  on  ground  both  honoura- 
Me  and  advantageous  to  the  United  States.  That  the 
term  '^high  seas"  was  omiMet^  infenft(ma%  and  with 
the  view  that  impressments  should  be  confined  to  the 
land'' — ^that  is  to  the  British  territory.  He  said  "  he 
did  not  mean  to  say  that  Great-Britain  would  aban- 
don the  practice  on  the  high  seas  altogether,  but  that 
she  would  abandon  her  former  practice,  and  only  ex- 
ercise it  in  an  extreme  case,  such  as  the  desertion  of 
a  crew  in  a  foreign  and  neutral  country." 

J\row  we  ask  most  significantly,  for  what  we  are  at 
war  ?  For  a  principle  which  Great-Briiain  has  de- 
clared she  never  will  yield  absolutely,  but  which  she 
has  offered  to  modify,  and  check,  and  guard,  and  re- 
strain, in  such  a  manner  as  to  two  oj  our  present 
cabinet  appeared  perfectly  ^^  honourable  and  advan- 
tageous to  us." 

We  are  then  fighting  for  a  principle,  an  abstract 
claim,  which  has  been  in  every  ^'  honourable  and  ad- 
vantageous" light  yielded  by  our  enemy. 

As  soon  as  our  cabinet  found  that  Great-Britain 
never  would  yield  the  principle,  but  that  she  would 
make  such  an  arrangement  as  would  be  <<  honourable 
and  advantageous,''  they  determined  to  adhere  to,  and 
insist  on  the  abstract  principle,  and  to  yield  the  ^<  hon- 
our and  advantage." 

Perish  the  seamen — ^perish  commerce !  but  let  us 
adhere  to  barren  and  useless  rights — This  was  what 
I  was  to  shew  lastly.  Accordingly,  on  the  3d  of 
February,  1807,  when  our  cabinet  found  Great-Brit- 


n 

ain  "was  remly  to  yield  every  thing  but  the  principle 
— that  all  just  causiz  of  complaint  would  be  removedj 
they  determined  to  defeat  the  arrangement,  and  or- 
dered our  ministers  to  insist  on  the  mere  right  and  to 
propose,  as  Mr.  Russell  has  lately  proposed,  '^  that 
the  British  government  should  relinquish  her  right  on 
our  stipulating  that  we  would  not  employ  any  Brit- 
ish senmen,  not  being  a  citizen,  that  is,  not  natural- 
ized, vr  unless  he  has  been  in  our  employ  two  years,'^ 

Here  ended  all  hopes  of  accommodation ;  and  our 
government  well  kuvow  that  they  may  safely  offer  the 
exclusion  of  British  seamen,  so  long  as  they  claim 
the  right  to  protect  all  who  are  now  in  our  country, 
and  demand  of  her  the  admission  that  her  native  bom 
subjects  shall  be  protected  under  our  flag  in  merchant 
vessels  on  a  common  jurisdiction,  the  high  seas.  The 
^eat  point  we  have  in  view  is  now  proved,  That  at 
no  period  has  Great-Britain  been  willing  to  yield  the 
right,  though  she  has  made  '^  honourable  and  advan- 
tageous" offers  for  a  modiiication  of  its  exercise. 

We  cannot  conclude  this  essay  without  quoting 
the  following  sentiments  of  Mr.  Monroe  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  British  offers  about  impressments,  and  the 
^l1y  of  war  on  that  account.  They  ought  to  be 
written  in  letters  of  gold,  and  those  letters  in  capitals. 

'^  The  British  could  not  recede  from  the  ground 
they  had  taken,  or  accept,  by  compulsion,  terms 
which  they  had  rejected  in  an  amicable  negotiation. 
War,  therefore,  seemed  to  be  the  inevitable  conse- 
quence of  such  a  state  of  things  ;  and  I  was  far  from 
considering  it  an  alternative  to  be  preferred  to  the 
encouragement  offered  to  us.  Wjien  I  took  into  view 
our  prosperous  and  happy  condition,  and  that  our 
commerce  flourished  beyond  example,  notwithstand- 
ing the  losses  which  it  occasionally  sustained,  I  was 
strongly  of  opinion  that  those  blessings  ought  not  to 
be  hazarded  in  such  a  question,^^  I  knew  "  that  the 
United  States  were  not  |)repai'ed  for  war — their  coast 
was  unfoi*tified — their  cities  defenceless — their  militia 


7« 

in  many  states  neither  armed  nor  trained — and  their 
whole  revenue  derived  from  commerce — I  could  not 
presume  there  was  just  cause  to  doubt  which  of  the 
altemativea  ought  to  be  preferred." 

In  these  opinions  Mr.  Monroe  is  joined  by  above 
sixty  thousand  people  in  Massachusetts,  according  to 
the  late  elections,  and  probably  some  millions  in  the 
United  States ;  yet  the  war  is  nov/  carried  on  by  an 
administration  of  which  he  is  one,  for  the  very  prin- 
'Cipk  which  he  formerly  declared  was  not  worth  it. 


NO.  XIII. 

•  MR.  MADISON'S  STRICTURES  ON  THE  CONDUCT  OP  GOV. 

STRONG. 

Are  the  militia  under  the  absolute  control  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  ? 

Are  they  bound  to  fulfil  all  the  duties  of  standing 
armies  ? 

Does  a  mere  declaration  of  war  place  the  militia 
under  the  power  of  the  President  ? 

Is  there  no  constitutional  right  in  the  executive, 
judiciary,  and  people  of  the  several  states  to  judge 
whether  the  militia  are  or  are  not  constitutionally  call. 
ed  into  service  ? 

Can  they  be  continued  in  service  at  the  pleasure 
of  the  national  government,  and  ordered  out  of  the 
United  States  ? 

These  questions  are  the  most  interesting  which 
could  possibly  occur  in  our  new  republick.  The  Pres- 
ident has  dared  to  call  the  opinion  of  Gov.  Strong* 
supported  as  it  is  by  our  own  state  judiciary,  *'  a  novel 
and  extraordinary  one.'' 

That  it  is  a  ^^  novel"  one  is  true,  because  Mr.  Mad- 
ison is  the  first  President  wlio  has  ventured  to  give 
an  alarming  and  dangerous  construction  to  the  pow- 
ers of  the  constitution. 


1/ 


73 

If  hia  eonsiructioit  be  right,  we  never  need  talk  hi 
future  of  the  consolidation  of  the  states — ^The  state 
sovereignties  are  extinct.  We  have  one  vast  military 
consolidation ;  and  the  only  remedy  and  bulwark, 
which  the  constitution  provided  against  the  usurpa. 
tion  of  an  ambitious  and  unprincipled  President,  is 
gone.  The  state  governments  have  nothing  left  to 
them  to  resist  any  and  every  species  of  usurpaticm. 

Compared  to  this,  all  our  foreign  disputes  dwindle 
into  insignificance.  If  this  doctrine,  advanced  by 
Mr.  Madison ;  if  this  bold  assumption  and  usurpa^ 
tion  be  submitted  to,  it  is,  in  our  estimation,  of  no 
moment  whether  we  are  conquered  by  Great-Britain 
or  France ;  we  shall  fall  a  prey  to  our  own  domestick 
usurpers,  who  will  be  as  hard  task-masters  as  a  fort 
eign  potentate  could  possibly  be.  '^ 

That  an  attempt  is  seriously  making  to  destroy  thie 
state  sovereignties,  and  of  course  the  union,  we  shall 
prove  by  two  quotations  from  papers  published  under 
the  influence  and  patronage  of  administration^ 

Jn  the  National  Intelligencer,  Mr.  Madison's  pa- 
per, speaking  of  the  refusal  of  the  New- York  miUtia 
to  march  out  of  the  United  States,  to  wage  an  offen- 
sive war,  it  was  observed,  ^^  that  these  wretches  (the 
militia)  dared  to  talk  of  the  constitution,  when  their 
countr^  was  in  danger.'^ 

As  if  a  Quixotick  expedition  into  a  foreign  country 
was  a  proof  that  the  country  was  in  danger<^^and  as 
if  it  was  also  a  crime  in  a  citizen  to  shield  himself, 
his  blood  and  his  life,  his  liberty  and  his  family,  un- 
der the  sacred  provisions  of  the  constitution. 

It  would  seem>  then,  according  to  Mr.  Madison's 
paper,  that  the  constitution  is  to  be  no  safeguard  to 
the  citizen  when  he  most  needs  it,  but  that  to  invoke 
its  aid  and  its  principles  makes  a  citizen  ^'a  wretch  J' 

The  Aurora,  another  Madisonian  paper,  carries  its 
insolence  still  farther. — Speaking  of  the  people  of 
]}few- England,  it  says, 

10 


74 

"  Cim  tli«i6  infi^al  tfait&tt  expect  to  6s«ape  Witb 
ittpilnity  ?  They  have  no  fcMlndatlofi  for  such  for- 
b^li^nfife,  while  they  are  daily  guilty  of  treason  by 
adh^tiiig  to  our  ett^mies.  But  we  do  not  fear  them, 
for  they  are  a  dowtirdly  set  ofHUains.  Neither  the 
GoyeMior  of  Massachusetts  or  Connecticut  dare  fight." 

I^UoW'Citizens,  we  do  not  quote  these  things  to  itt-> 
flankb  your  minds,  or  to  excite  your  rage,  but  to  shew 
^ou  that  your  adh^r^nce  to  the  constitution,  and  to 
ythit  rights,  «xik)se  you  to  the  insults,  and  scoffs,  and 
e^Hitntiiely  of  ^our  Ojiitonetats.  Not  content  with  de- 
i^ltoying  your  comiiieiHse,  they  seem  ripe  for  the  inva- 
ilott  of  your  inost  sacred  rights. 

t  should  despise  these  rash  Writings,  if  it  were  not 
that  thfey  are  countenanced  by  the  President's  Mes- 
sage. 

It  iS)  therefore,  importaht  for  Us  to  inquil^  whether 
(^ir*  Strbhg  has  acted  imprudkntly^-^whiftther  our 
Wm  Judges  have  given  a  col'rupt  or  wicked  opinion  ? 
Whether  the  question  is  so  clear  on  the  side  of  Mr. 
M&dlson,  as  to  justify  him  in  denouncing  Gov.  Strong 
tod  Gov.  GrisWold? 

^thia  is  a  great  and  important  question — and  it 
bug;ht  to  be  treated  with  eorrespondent  and  becoming 
StiiioUShesS  and  deliberation. 

Far  be  it  from  us  to  suppose,  that  We  tAti  add  any 
'^ightto  the  opinions  and  arguments  of  such  great 
aitid  vtenel^ablte  names.  But  it  should  be  remembered, 
that  men  in  high  and  oMcial  stations  cannbt,  without 
lesseningthieir  dignity,  enter  into  the  oJIlce  of  advo- 
cates.— -They  cannot  urge  those  small  considerations, 
and  popular  reasons  and  arguments,  which  liave  an 
essential  bearing  on  the  question. 

We  shall,  therefore,  with  the  indulgence  of  the 
publick,  say  a  few  things  on  this  question,  under  the 
followi^  views  of  it : 

1st.  How  did  Congress  ox  the  President  acquire, 
frotn  the  several  states  or  from  the  jteoplef  the  right 
to  order  out  the  militia  in  any  case  P 


7* 

Sd.  In  what  cases  did  the'  people  authorize  Con- 
gress to  call  out  the  militia  ? 

3d.  Can  they  call  them  out  in  any  other  cases  than 
those  explicitly  authorized  by  the  constitution  ? 
^  4ijth.  In  whom,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  limUa' 
tiotif  reposes  the  right  to  judge  whether  the  deleg^ied 
power  IS  or  is  not  rightfully  exercised— or,  in  other 
words,  of  judging  whether  the  cases  in  which  the 
militia  may  be  called  out,  do  or  do  not  exist  ? 

dtii.  Admitting,  which  we  do  not  believe,  that  the 
right  aijvdging  is  in  the  national  government ;  have 
they  exercised  that  judgment,  in  the  present  case, 
honestly  and  according  to  the  fair  construetion  of  the 
constitution — in  other  words,  do  either  of  the  eases^ 
provided  for  by  the  constitution,  now  eust? 

6th.  Admitting,  as  before,  though  against  our  opin- 
ion, that  C<Migress  have  the  right  of  judging  of  the 
existence  of  the  limited  cases  provided  for  in  the  con- 
fititution,  in  wbleh  the  militia  may  be  called  out,  and 
supposing  that  they  have  grossly  abused  their  trusty 
as  we  shall  show  under  the  fifth  question,  is  there  no 
remedy,  or  if  any,  is  there  any  other  or  better  one^ 
than  a  firm  opposition  and  refusal  of  the  executives  of 
the  several  independent  states  ? 

Laatly.  We  shall  consid«>r  the  mischievous  and  ru- 
inous efiects  which  would  follow  from  the  doctrine 
set  up  by  Mr.  Madison — ^Its  hostility  to  the  freedom 
of  the  citizen,  and  the  absurd  and  contradictory  con- 
sequences which  would  flow  from  its  admission. 

We  are  aware,  that  we  have  taken  broad  ground ; 
but  we  ought  not  to  be  deterred,  on  that  account,  from 
probing  to  the  bottom  so  interesting  and  important  a 
question. 


^ 


76 


NO.  XIV. 

THE  OBUGATION  OF  THfi  CITIZEN  TO  DO  MILITAKY  DUTY  IN 
ALL  WARS,  AT  THE  PLEASURE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT.  OR  THE 
CLAIM  TO  CONVERT  THE  MIUTIA  INTO  A  STANDING  AR- 
MY, CONSIDERED. 

fir8tl}f — ^We  inquire,  by  what  authority  do  the 
President  or  Congress  assume  the  power  to  order  out 
the  militia  in  any  case  ? 

On  the  revolt  of  the  American  colonies  from  Great- 
Britain,  the  absolute  sovereignty  was  transferred  from 
the  king  and  parliament  to  the  people.  Neither  the 
j9tate  governments  nor  the  national  government  possess 
any  rights  which  have  not  been  expressly  delegated 
to  them.  As  against  the  federal  government,  this 
proposition  (obvious  enough  in  itself)  is  made  indis- 
putable by  the  Xllth  article  of  the  first  amendments 
to  the  constitution,  in  tvhich  ^^  all  powers,  not  ex- 
pressly given,  are  declared  to  be  reserved  to  the  states 
respectively,  or  to  the  people." 

.The  federal  government  cannot  claim  the  power  of 
ordering  out  the  militia  as  successors  to  the  old  con- 
federation, for  the  old  confederation  possessed  no  such 
powers. — They  could  do  nothing  with  the  militia,  nor 
could  they  even  raise  troops,  without  the  intervention 
of  the  several  states.  We  went  through  one  war  suc- 
cessfully, with  the  whole  power  of  the  militia  resting 
in  the  states. 

The  federal  government  cannot  claim  this  power, 
as  being  necessarily  incident  to  any  other  power  given 
to  them,  such  as  the  power  and  duty  of  providing  for 
the  common  defence,  because,  first,  there  are  other 
and  ample  means  given  to  them  for  this  purpose,  such 
as  the  powers  of  laying  taxes,  and  of  raising  and 
maintaining  armies  and  navies ; — it  cannot  be  called, 
therefore,  a  necessary  incident. 


\ 


1     ; 


) 


\ 


77 

But,  secondly,  no  rule  of  fair  construction  will  per- 
mit a  limited  aovereign  to  claim,  hy  way  bf  incidental 
:^d  implied  powerSf  thi  extension  of  any  powers  or 
autkiority  which  are  the  subject  of  express  provision 
in  the  instrument  defining  the  authority  to  be  delegat- 
ed. A  grant  of  a  limited  power  over  a  particular 
subject,  excludes  any  further  constructive  or  inci- 
dental power  over  the  same  subject,  as  effectually  as 
any  words  of  negation  or  prohiblMon  could  possibly 
do.  Thus,  for  example,  if  the  coastitution  had  pro- 
vided, that,  *'  Congress  shall  have  power  to  raise  and 
maintain  a  standing  army  of  ten  thousand  men,  or  to 
levy  taxes  to  the  amount  of  two  millions  of  dollars," 
they  would  be  as  much  restrained  from  raising  more, 
as  if  there  had  been  an  express  negative,  or  prohib- 
itory words  in  the  constitution.  They  could  not  have 
raised  more  men  or  money,  without  the  assent  of  the 
several  states,  let  the  emergency  have  been  ever  so 
great,  or  even  if  it  had  been  absolutely  necessary  to 
carry  into  effect  their  undoubted  powers.  They 
must  apply  to  the  states  or  people  for  further  author- 
ity or  aid.  To  suppose  the  contrary  of  these  propo- 
sitions, would  be  to  maintain  that  the  delegate  may 
be  above  his  constituent — ^the  creature  above  his  crea- 
tor. It  would  so  to  the  destruction  of  all  limited 
written  constitutions.  It  would  be  better  to  give  to 
the  constituted  authorities  general  powers  in  atl  cases 
whatever,  and  trust  to  the  rebellion  or  insurrection  of 
the  people,  for  a  remedy  in  case  of  violent  abuse.  If 
these  doctrines  are,  as  we  believe,  indisputable.  Con- 
gress derives  all  its  power  to  call  upon  the  militia  in 
any  case,  wholly  from  the  constitution,  and  that  con- 
stitution having  given  them  that  power  only  in  three 
specified  cases,  they  are  restrained  as  much  as  they 
would  have  been  by  prohibitoi'y  words,  from  ordering 
them  out  in  any  other  cases. 

Secondly — I  would  ask,  in  what  cases  did  the  peo- 
ple authorize  Congress  to  call  out  the  militia  ? 


78 

The  whole  power  given  upon  this  subject,  is  con- 
tained in  the  rollowing  short  sentence,  clear,  strong, 
and  well  defined : 

Congress  shall  have  power  '*  to  provide  for  calling 
forth  the  militia,  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  union, 
fluppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasicmaJ' 

They  ean  call  them  out  in  no  other  cases  whatso* 
ever ;  and  if  they  should  exercise  the  power  in  any 
other  cases,  it  would  be  like  any  other  illegal  assump^ 
tion  of  power,  void«— and  the  remedy  would  be  the 
same  as  if  they  were  to  separate  a  state  without  itii 
consent— -pass  a  bill  of  attainder  against  the  citizens 
of  a  particular  state,  or  exercise  any  other  powers 
whiclC  are  expressly  prohibited  to  them  by  the  conati- 
tution, 

I  take  it,  throughout  this  argument,  for  granted, 
that  there  are  no  men  base  enough  to  contend,  thai 
Congress  may,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  the 
common  plea  of  tyrants,  exercise  a  power  expressly 
prohibited  to  them  ;  yet  from  some  recent  instances  I 
«hould  be  led  to  fear,  that  there  may  be  some  syeo- 

Shants,  who  even  in  such  a  case  would  preach  up  the 
uty  of  obedience  to  our  own  sovemmentf  and  volun^ 
teer  their  arms  in  defence  of  its  avowed  violation  of 
our  riehts. 

Thirdly — Can  Congress  order  out  the  militia  in 
any  other  than  the  three  cases  pointed  out  in  the 
Constitution  ? 

Most  assuredly  not,  according  to  the  argument 
under  the  jirst  question^ — ^The  argument  ex  absurdo 
can  hardly  ever  be  more  strong. — Of  what  use  was  it 
to  authorize  Congress  to  order  out  the  militia  in  three 
specified  cases,  if  they  would  have  the  power  to  or. 
der  them  out  in  all  cases,  or  at  pleasure  without  that 
provision  ?  We  repeat,  that  a  specifick  grant  by  one 
having  authority,  to  one  who  before  had  none,  is  tan- 
tamount to  a  limitation  to  the  exact  extent  of  the 
grant. 
But  we  come  to  the  most  importanii  question. 


the 


79 

Fourthly,  In  whom,  Arom  the  very  nature  of  the 
limitation,  reposes  the  ultimate  right  to  judge  whether 
cither  of  the  three  cases  provided  for  by  the  consti- 
tution does  exist  ? 

We  answer,  generally,  in  the  constituent,  not  the 
delegate  ;  in  the  master,  not  the  servant— u/ftmat<?^ 
in  the  people,  principally  from  the  necessity  of  the 
case  in  the  commanders  in  chief  of  the  militia  of  the 
several  states. 

The  verv  idea  of  limitation  excludes  the  possibility 
that  the  delegate  should  be  the  judge — if  he  were,  his 
powers  would  be  limited  only  by  his  own  judgment, 
or  in  other  words,  his  own  arbitrary  will,  which  is 
no  limitation  at  all. 

In  most  cases,  the  Judiciary  of  the  United  States 
are  the  ultimate  judges  of  the  constitution,  and  wheth- 
er its  powers  are  fairly  pursued. — ^But  in  this  case 
the  remedy  would  be  inadequate. — ^Buring  an  appeal 
to  the  Supreme  Court,  which  sits  but  twice  a  year,^ 
and  which  might  consume  many  months  in  delibenu 
tion,  an  invasion  might  lay  waste  the  country,  and  be 
fatal  to  our  liberties—or  a  rash  President  might  seize 
the  militia,  send  them  on  board  ships,  to  fight  on  the 
borders  of  the  Dwina,  or  on  the  sands  of  Africa — or,, 
if  a  firm  and  dignified  Governor  should  resist  such 
an  usurpation,  a  headstrong  President,  and  obedient 
Congress  might  cai'ry  civil  war,  fire,  and  sword,  inta 
the  state  which  dared  to  asseii;  their  constitutional 
rights. 

There  can  be  therefore  no  umpire. — Either  the 
delegate  or  the  constituent  must  be  the  judge.  To 
suppose  that  the  delegate  should  6e  the  judge  would 
be  to  pervert  the  very  first  principles  of  common 
sense,  prudence,  freedom,  and  common  law. 

Of  common  sense,  because  of  what  use  is  a  limitation, 
if  the  person  you  wish  to  restrain,  can  judge  exclu- 
sively whether  he  breaks  the  limitation  or  not  ? — ^Of 
prudence  and  freedom,  because  if  you  once  permit 
the  delegate  to  be  the  judge  qf  his  own  powers,  what 


•ecudiy  can  you  possibly  have  agaiust  the  grossest 
abuses  ? — ^At  common  law  too^  unless  where  the  au- 
thority is  coupled  with  an  interest,  the  power  of  the 
constituent  is  always  superior  to  that  of  the  attorney, 
or  substitute. 

Besides,  from  the  very  form  of  proceeding,  adopted 
in  ordering  out  the  militia,  &form  rendered  necessa- 
ry by  the  provisions  of  the  constitution,  the  riglit  of 
judging  seems  to  be  necessarily  placed  in  the  Grov- 
ernors  of  the  several  states.  The  orders  are  issued 
to  them — they  must  therefore  decide,  whether  the  or- 
ders are  in  due  form,  and  whether  they  are  issued  in  a 
case  whichauthorizes  Congress  to  order  out  the  mili- 
tia.— ^£n  ordinary  military  cases,  the  subordinate  oflS- 
eer  is  justified  by  the  orders  of  his  superior  officer, 
whether  those  orders  are  right  or  wrong.  But  the 
Governors  of  the  several  states  arfc  not  subordinate  to 
the  President,  until  after  they  are  actually  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States.  For  ordering  out  the 
militia,  which  is  an  act  which  precedes  the  actual 
service,  the  Governors  are  responsible  to  their  constit- 
uents, and  may,  and  ought  to  be  impeached  if  they 
do  it,  at  the  request  of  the  President,  in  any  case,  not 
provided  for  by  the  constitution. 

Now  a  man  cannot  be  liable  to  punishment  for  do- 
ing that  of  which  he  was  not  the  free  judge,  to  de- 
cide whether  he  would,  or  would  not  do  it. 

I  have  said  that  the  form  required  by  the  Constitu- 
tion made  it  necessary  that  the  Governors  should 
judge  whether  tl)e  militia  are  rightfully  ordered  out. 
— I  add,  fuiiiher,  that  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  Con- 
gress to  dispense  with  that  form. — They  cannot  au- 
thorixe  the  President  to  skip  over  the  Governor,  and 
order  out  the  militia,  directly,  or  to  issue  his  orders 
to  inferior  officers — because,  the  President  is  not 
vested  with  the  command  of  the  militia,  by  the  Con- 
stitution, *^  antil  they  are  called  into  actual  ser- 
vice"— and  tuey  are  not  in  actual  service,  until  after 
they  have  been  notified  and  ordered  out.    The  mili- 


81 

tia  Major-Generals  can  recognize  no  order^  but  that 
of  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  state ;  nor  can  any 
Brigadier-Generals  recognize  any  order,  but  that  of 
their  superiors  in  the  militia,  until  after  they  have 
been  ordered  out,  and  are  in  actual  service.  Any 
order,  therefore,  from  the  President,  would  be  of  no 
more  validity,  nor  any  more  justification  to  an  inferior 
militia  officer,  for  ordering  out  the  militict  than  n 
similar  order  from  George^  Prince  of  Wuhs,  Re- 
gent, 8j;c, 

It  is  not  in  the  povtrer  of  Congress  to  mend  this 
matter.  It  can  only  be  effected  by  an  alteration  of 
the  constitution.  We  know  the  President  and  his 
satellites  argue  from  the  possible  abuse  of  this  power, 
by  the  Governors  of  the  several  states  against  the 
right.  "  We  are  not  one  state"  says  the  President, 
if  this  **  novel"  doctrine  be  true.  It  is  not  a  '^^  novel" 
doctrine  that  we  are  not  one  state — ^It  is  a  **  novel" 
doctrine  that  we  are  so.  It  is  an  insolent  and  open 
attempt  at  military  consolidation. — We  shall  say 
n^ore  on  the  subject  of  abuse  of  this  power  here9,fter» 


NO.  XV. 

THE  SPIRIT  DISPLAYED  BY  THK  PRESIDENT  AND  WAR  DE. 
PARTMENT  IN  THEIR  CGNSTRtTCIION  OF  THE  CONSTFrU- 
TION,  AND  THEIl^  BEPRESBNTATION  OF  THE  DANGER  OF 
INVASION. 

Fifthly.— Admitting,  which  we  deny,  and  have 
disproved,  that  the  right  of  judging,  when  the  caset 
occur,  in  which  the  militia  may  be  ordered  out,  rests 
definitively  with  the  President  and  Congress ;  have 
they  in  the  late  orders  to  the  Governors  of  Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut,  and  Rhode-Island,  honestly 
executed' the  trust,  in  the  fair  spirit  of  the  constitu- 
tion— or  in  other  words,  do  either  of  the  three  cuses 
exist  ? 

As  it  is  not  pretended  by  the  President,  that  tht 

11 


mmmm 


lit 


S2 

troops  arc  ordered  out,  in  consequence  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  two  first  cases  ;  as  it  is  well  known, 
that  the  laws  are  not  forcibly  resisted,  nor  has  any 
insnrrectiou  taken  place,  the  only  remaining  ques- 
tion is,  Has  there  been  at  any  period  or  does  there 
now  exist  an  invasion  to  be  repelled  P 

It  would  be  the  duty  of  a  man  ad  ressing  a  society 
of  Hottentots,  or  C;iff.  ee  Negroes,  to  beg  their  par- 
dons, for  ptiying  so  poor  a  compliment  to  their  un- 
dei'standings,  as  to  discuss  this  question  seriously; 
but  since  the  President,  who  ought  to  know  the  char- 
acter, and  talents  of  his  constituents  better  than  w^e 
do,  has  ventured  to  insult  their  understandings,  by 
pretending,  that  this  case  of  invasion,  or  imminent 
danger  thereof,  has  existed,  in  the  true  spirit  of  the 
constitution,  we  trust,  we  may  be  excused,  for  argu- 
ing a  question,  which  every  school-boy,  and  every 
timid  girl,  on  either  of  the  most  exposed  frontiers, 
would  laugh  at  and  ridicule. 

The  words  of  the  constitution,  have  a  wonderful 
legal  precision,  which  one  would  have  supposed, 
would  have  precluded  even  a  Jesuit  from  cavilling  : 
— <*  Congress  shall  have  power  to  provide  for  cal- 
"  ling  out  the  militia  to  repel  invasion.^' 

The  invasion  must  actually  exist,  and  the  militia, 
can  only  be  kept  in  service,  so  long  as  is  necessary 
to  REPEL  it.  The  moment  it  is  repelled,  the  Com- 
manders in  Chief  of  each  state,  have  a  right  instantly 
to  recall  them.  It  seems  as  if  there  was,  (and  there 
most  undoubtedly  was)  an  nncommon  jealousy ^  as  to 
the  power  of  the  federal  government,  over  this  natu- 
ral, and  only  constitutional  bulwark,  of  the  several 
states,  and  of  tlie  people. 

Lest  the  militia  should  be  ordered  out,  premature- 
ly, or  in  c.ise  of  war,  generally,  it  was  provided,  that 
they  should  only  be  called  out  during  foreign  wars, 
in  case  of  *^^  invasion^' — and  lest,  when  once  in  the 
service  of  <he  United  States,  they  should  be  contin- 


83 


cal- 


a 


tied  duria^  the  war,  or  longer  than  the  great,  and 
sudden  exigency  required,  it  was  provided,  that  they 
should  only  be  obliged  to  '*  repel^'  invasion.  ^ 

The  moment  the  invader  was  vepuhei,  the  militia 
had  performed  all  that  the  constitution  required  of 
them,  and  might,  and  ought,  to  be  recalled  by  the 
Governors  of  the  several  states — otherwise,  these 
restrictive  words  have  no  meaning,  and  the  consti- 
tution, might  as  well  have  given  the  whole  command 
to  the  United  States,  without  any  limitation. 

If,  therefore,  Gov.  Strong,  had  trusted  to  Mr. 
Madison's  word,  (a  trust,  which  since  his  procla- 
mation about  the  repeal  of  the  Berlin  decrees,  we 
confess,  would  be  an  extraordinary  one,)  and  had 
ordered  out  the  militia,  \i  would  have  been  his  duty, 
as  as  he  found,  that  the  danger,  had  so  far  van- 

ishetl;,  Jiat  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  United 
States  army,  and  all  tlic  regular  troops,  had  remov- 
ed from  the  maritime  iVonticis,  and  had  actualhr  en- 
tered, or  were  threatening,  the  territories  of  Great 
Britain,  instantly  to  have  recalled  the  drafted  mili- 
tia of  Massachusetts.  As  the  guardian  of  the  rights 
of  the  people  of  this  state,  he  is  bound  to  see  that 
their  lives,  their  fortunes,  and  their  rights,  are  not 
exposed  to  greater  dangers,  than  the  constitution 
requires. 

As  soon,  tlierefore,  as  all  appearance  of  invasion 
was  at  an  end  {'if  there  ever  was  any, J  he  ought  to 
have  retailed  the  militia. 

We  are  aware,  that  the  Congress  of  1795?  did  give 
a  liberal  construction  to  the  constitution,  and  did 
authorize  the  President,  to  order  out  the  militia  in 
case  of  *»  imminent  danger  of  invasionJ^ 

If  this  mbaus  any  thing  more,  tluin  the  actual  ad- 
vance of  a  competent  military  force  of  the  enemy,  to- 
wards our  maritime,  or  internal  frontiers,  with  appa- 
rent intent,  to  invade  them,  the  Congress  of  1795. 
were  mistaken,  and  assumed  a  power,  which  does 
not  belong  to  tiie  National  Government. 


:t 


I 


84 

But  even  this  argument,  will  not  avail  Mr.  Madi- 
son ;  for  grant  that  the  Congress  of  1795,  were  right, 
and  that  the  words  of  the  constitution,  were  ^'  im- 
minent danger  ofinvasion/^  still  it  is  notorious,  that 
no  such  danger  has  existed. 

What  part  of  the  United  States,  has  been  threat- 
ened with,  or  in  imminent  danger  of  invasion  ? 
shall  we  disgrace  our  navy,  by  admitting,  that  our 
ten  ships  of  war,  which  were,  during  the  past  sum- 
mer, superior  to  the  British  force  on  this  coast,  were 
unable  to  repel,  predatory  incursions  ?  was  there 
any  danger,  that  the  commanders  of  British  ships, 
uninstructed,  as  they  must  have  been,  by  their  own 
government,  which  was  ignorant  of  the  war,  would 
mahe  a  predatory  descent,  on  the  shores  of  the  U* 
nited  States  ?  besides,  were  these  accidental,  tem- 
porary, predatory  excursions,  the  "  invasion^'  con- 
templated by  the  constitution,  which  the  arm  of  the 
national  government,  and  its  fortresses  would  be  in- 
competent, to  **  repel  ?"  could  it  be  supposed,  that 
the  frapiers  of  the  constitution  intended,  that  the 
President,  should  order  outthe  militia,  and  keep  them 
embodied,  during  the  whole  of  a  maritime  war, 
through  fear  of  a  temporary,  occasional  descent,  by 
a  privateer  or  a  frigate  ?  are  not  the  local  militia, 
while  at  home,  amply  competent,  to  repel  small  en- 
terprizes  ?  if  not,  we  make  a  grand  parade  about 
our  militia,  to  no  purpose,  and  worse  than  to 
no  purpose.  But  this  is  not  so.  The  militia^  cal- 
led together,  without  any  previous  notice,  drove  be- 
fore them  Earl  Percy,  with  3000  veterans  ;  and  tlie 
militia,  unembodied  until  the  moment  a  fleet  should 
appear  in  our  offing,  would,  in  twenty  four  hours, 
repel  any  British  force,  which  could  possibly  come 
here,  without  having  previous  information. 

Was  there,  then,  any  serious  danger  in  June 
last,  or  has  there  been  since,  of  an  "  invasion"  by 
•€fl,  from  Great  Britian  ?  did  the  President,  appre- 


ii; 


85 

heni  any  ?  if  he  did,  he  betrayed  the  country,  by 
sending  away  the  troops,  from  the  place  where  he 
did  except  *<  invasion"  to  another  place,  where  hft 
did  not  fear  it,  but  where  he  meant  to  make  an  inva- 
sion on  an  inferior  enemy. 

Could  it  be  feared,  that  Britain  would  invade  us, 
before  she  knew  of  the  war  ?  could  it  be  feared,  that 
she  would  do  it,  after  she  heard  of  it,  and  when  we 
found  her,  liberating,  and  sending  away  all  Ameri- 
can ships,  and  an  immense  amount  of  American 
property,  under  the  hopes  of  peace,  to  be  produced 
by  the  repeal  of  the  orders  in  council  ?  is  an  "  inva- 
sion" feared,  even  now,  by  any  one  man  in  the  Uni- 
ted States  ?  NO — it  is  a  groundless,  insulting  pre- 
tence. Great-Britain,  occupied  in  Spain,  and  in  the 
Baltick,and  pressed,  unexpectedly  and  cruelly,  pres- 
sed, by  the  tools  of  France  in  this  country,  will 
scarcely  be  aide  to  defend  her  violonies,  from  butche- 
ry,  and  plunder  and  conquest.  This  was  the  calcu- 
lation upon  which  the  war  was  undertaken.  It  was 
a  repetition  of  the  old  fable  of  the  sick  lion.  Nev- 
er would  the  war  have  been  undertaken,  if  any  real 
danger  of  *<  invasion"  had  existed. 

If  then,  no  danger  of  *•  invasion"  existefd  by  sea, 
will  it  be  pretended,  that  we  were  in  danger  of  "in- 
vasion" by  land  ?  where  is  the  brazen  faced,  party 
politician,  who  will  advance'  such  a  pretence  ?  will 
the  partizans  of  Mr.  Madison  tell  us  this,  when  they 
have  so  often  promised  us,  the  barren  provinces  of 
two  Canadas,  as  a  compensation  for  the  loss  of  our 
commerce,  our  blood,  and  our  treasure  ?  will  those 
men,  who  proposed  and  discussed  a  bill,  for  the  occu- 
pation, and  annexation,  of  the  two  Canadas,  to  the 
United  States,  pretend,  that  these  provinces  will  in- 
vade us ?  will  those  members  of  Congiess,  Porter^ 
Williams,  Cheeves  and  Widgery,  who  have  prom- 
ised us  the  immediate  possession  of  these  provinces, 
tell  us  we  are  in  danger  from  them  ? 


: 


86 

Dut  above  all,  Mr.  Madison  id  precluded  from 
tlie  apology,  because  he  has  sent  three  distinct  arm*^ 
ies  to  invade  Canada — and  we  have  a  right  to  pre^ 
8ume  he  authorized  their  commanders  to  issue  the 
proclamations  which  they  have  done,  in  which  they 
speak  with  contempt  of  the  enemy^s  force  and  pow- 
er, and  of  the  ease  with  which  the  conquest  can  be 
e^  ted,  a  language  very  disgraceful  to  our  nation, 
if  the  prospect  of  success  had  not  been  nearly  cer- 
tain. Besides,  Mr.  Madison  by  refusing:  Sir 
George  Prevost*s  proposition  for  an  armistice,  prov- 
ed he  had  no  fears  of  an  invasion. 

Mr.  Madison  it  appears,  then,  could  not  have 
feared  an  invasion  by  sea,  because  Great-Britatn 
had  no  knowledge  of  the  icar— because  she  liberat- 
ed American  property — repealed  her  Orders  in 
Council,  and  was  making  a  new  embassy  for  peace. 
It  appears,  slso,  that  he  had  no  fears  for  the  sea 
board,  for  he  ordered  away  all  the  troops  for  the  in- 
vasion of  Canada.  It  is  equally  clear  that  he  did 
not  fear  an  invasion  by  land,  because  he  was  both 
making  and  preparing  an  invasion  of  Canada,  and 
he  knew  Great-Britain  had  not  a  force  even  com- 
petent for  defence. 

Yet,  in  face  of  the  clear  sense  and  spirit  of  the 
constitution,  he  ordered  out  the  militia.  This  wc 
call  an  usurpation  ;  but  the  manner  of  doing  it  we 
consider  a  pettifogging  quibble.  In  the  first  appli- 
cation to  all  the  eastern  Governors,  it  was  not  stated 
that  thero  was  an  ^'  invasion'^  to  be  repelled,  or  an 
imminent  danger  of  one,  but  when  the  Governors 
hesitated  on  this  ground,  they  were  artfully  told, 
that  the  danger  of  invasion  had  increased  since  his 
first  demand — but  as  there  was  no  danger  at  first, 
it  still  did  not  follow  that  there  was  much  at  the 
last  application.  In  fact,  Mr.  Madison  knew 
there  was  none.  The  real  design,  we  shall  show 
in  our  next. 


fact 
denci 
easy 
totf 
Bi 
ferre 
war, 
We 
the 
not  a 
pie 
is  a 
call 
nove 
that, 
milit 
in  ai 
gage 


sy 


NO.  XVI. 


THE  QUEStlON  OF  MILl TARY  CONSCRIPTION,  CONCLUDED. 

We  have  shewn,  that  the  right  of  judging  whether 
the  cases  in  which  the  militia  can  be  ordered  out, 
exist,  is  vested,  from  the  veiy  nature  of  the  limitation, 
in  the  Governors  of  the  several  states ;  and  Wti  have 
proved,  that  even  if  this  right  existed  in  the  Presi- 
dent, it  has  been,  in  the  late  casos,  very  unjustly  ex- 
ercised. We  shall  now  say  something  more  on  this 
subject,  before  we  consider  tlie  remedy  for  such  an 
abuse,  and  the  evil  consequences  which  may  follow 
from  this  abuse,  if  not  duly  restrained. 

When  the  Secretary  at  War,  and  the  President, 
were  very  properly  pushed  by  the  Executives  of  thcj 
northern  states,  to  state,  precisely,  the  nature  and  ex- 
tent  of  the  danger  of  invasion,  they  replied,  that  war 
having  been  commenced,  there  resulted  from  the  very 
fact  of  war,  a  danger  of  invasion.  If  any  other  evi- 
dence of  such  danger  existed,  it  world  have  been 
easy  to  state  it — indeed  it  would  have  been  obvious 
to  the  whole  nation. 

But  knowing  that  no  such  danger  existed,  they  pre- 
ferred to  rest  their  claim  on  the  simple  existence  of 
war,  a  war  declared  by  the  United  States  themselves. 
We  shall  not  enter  into  the  question,  in  this  place,  of 
the  justice  of  the  war,  nor  of  its  being  an  offensive, 
not  a  defensive,  one.  We  simply  ask  the  good  peo- 
ple of  this  state,  whether  the  mere  existence  of  a  war 
is  a  sufficient  ground  to  authorize  the  President  to 
call  out  the  militia !  According  to  this  monstrous  and 
novel  construction,  the  constitution  should  be  read, 
that,  "  Congress  should  have  power  to  call  out  the 
militia  to  execute  the  law,  repress  insurrections,  and 
in  any  wars  in  ichich  the  United  States  may  be  en- 


it 

i 


« 


r« 


'ged. 


?f 


88 


If  the  framers  of  the  constitution  intended  this,  they 
adopted  the  strangest  expressions  in  their  power. — 
Nations  may  be  engaged  in  wars  of  ambition — of 
foreign  conquest ;  they  may  carry  their  arms  to  the 
remotest  quarters  of  the  globe.  If  it  was  their  inten- 
tion, that  whether  invasion  was  or  was  not  threaten- 
ed, but  merely  because,  in  all  wars,  invasion  might 
be  poaaibUf  the  President  should  have  an  unlimited 
power  over  the  militia,  they  certainly  expressed  them* 
selves  very  awkwardly,  when  they  authorized  Gon- 
gress  to  order  out  the  militia,  to  '^  repel  invasions." 

According  to  the  new  doctrine,  a  war  declared  against 
Tecumseh  or  the  Dey  of  Algiers  would  give  the 
President  a  control  over  the  whole  militia — and  this 
not  only  during  the  existence  of  the  danger  ofinva< 
sion,  but  during  the  whole  war.  For,  according  to 
the  reasoning  of  the  secretary  of  war,  so  long  as  the 
war  lasts,  there  is,  from  the  nature  of  war  itself,  a 
possibility  of  invasion — and  the  President  being  the 
isole  judge  of  this  danger,  the  militia  may  be  kept  in 
service  during  the  war.  Words  or  argumeuts  can- 
Bot  make  this  point  clearer.  If  to  '^  repel  invasion^' 
means  the  danger  of  possible  invasion  when  there  is 
no  probability  of  it,  and  if  the  President  is  the  ex. 
elusive  judge  upon  this  point,  then  the  limited  poWr- 
ers  of  the  constitution  are  of  no  avail,  and  the  Pres- 
dent  is  the  absolute  commander  of  every  man  in  the 
United  States,  and  may  keep  him  in  service  so  long 
as  he  chooses  to  have  a  war  on  foot  with  any  nation, 
from  the  meanest  tribe  of  savages  to  the  conqueror  of 
Murope. 

We  now  enquire,  sixthly,  whether  if  the  absu;  d 
doctrine  should  be  maintained,  that  in  case  of  re> 
stricted  powers,  the  delegate  shall  be  the  exclusive 
judge  of  the  extent  of  his  powers,  and  if  Congress 
may  decide,  whether  the  cases  provided  for  by  the 
constitution  do  or  do  not  exist,  still  if  the  people 
should  be  satisfied  that  they  surpass  their  authority,  and 
abuse  their  trast,  there  is  any  better  remedy  than  for 


89 

Hic  Executives  of  the  several  states  to  refuse  to  order 
out  tbe  militia  ? 

There  hone  other  remedy,  and  that  is,  fur  the  in- 
dividual soldier  to  resist — and  if  attempted  to  be  for- 
ced into  service,  contrary  to  the  constitution,  to  kill 
his  assailant,  or  to  collect  his  friends  to  rescue  him. 

Every  man  will  admit  that  this  remedy  is  a  dread- 
ful one ;  and  yet  it  must  be  granted  that  the  militia,  not 
being  voluntary  soldiers,  ought  not  to  be  forced  into 
service,  to  be  compelled  to  change  their  habits  and 
become  mercenary  soldiers,  during  a  whole  war,  as 
may  be  the  case,  without  any  remedy. 

Even  if  the  President,  therefore,  is  the  exclusive 
judge,  which  we  deny,  still  in  case  of  a  gross  abuse 
of  his  power,  sucli  as  in  the  present  instance  in  de- 
claring that  the  United  States  is  in  danger  of  inva- 
sion, when  every  man  knows  and  feels  that  they  are 
not ;  we  see  no  better,  more  quiet,  or  constitutional 
remedy  than  for  their  superior  and  immediate  com- 
manding officer  to  refuse. 

He  takes,  to  be  sure,  a  solemn  responsibility  upon 
liimf^elf ; — ^but  if  he  acts  honestly,  and  prudently, 
and  coolly,  he  ought  to  meet  with  the  support  and 
confidence  of  those  whom  it  is  liis  duty  to  protect. 

Our  most  excellent  Magistrate  has  taken  this 
course — and  he  has  availed  himself  of  the  admirable 
provision  of  our  constitution,  by  requiring  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Judges  of  our  own  supreme  court,  which, 
so  far  as  respects  all  citizens  of  Massachusetts,  must 
be  considered  as  the  law. 

Indeed,  what  man  of  common  sense  will  dare  to 
«ay,  that  actual  invasion  has  existed,  or  that  great 
and  immi7ient  danger  of  it  which  would  authorise  the 
Governor,  to  tear  the  husbands,  fathers  and  sons  of 
our  industrious  yeomanry  from  tlieir  families,  to  sick- 
en, to  bleed,  and  perish  in  the  camps  of  an  army  wa- 
ging a  war  of  ambition  and  conquest. 

We  shall  now  state,  in  conclusion,  some  strong  rea- 
sons  why  this  demand  upon  the  militia  is  unreasoua- 


9d 

bU,  dangetous  to  the  liberty  of  tlie  subject,  and 
fraught  with  most  destructive  consequences  to  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  people; 

It  is  unreasonable,  because  Congress  !)eing  invested 
Ivith  the  whole  revenue  of  the  United  States  ;  having 

Sower  by  direct  and  indirect  taxes  to  take  the  last 
ollar  from  the  pockets  of  the  people — and  having 
iilso  the  power  of  raising  armies  without  limitation,  and 
of  maintaining  them  even  in  time  of  peace ;  they 
ought  not  to  declare  war  until  they  have  provided  the 
adequate  means  to  carry  it  on.  The  case  would  be 
Very  different,  and  the  feelings  of  the  people  of  a  dif- 
ferent cast,  if  a  foreign  nation  had  waged  war  against 
us  and  had  taken  us,  unawares. 

To  subject  the  people  in  addition  to  the  sacrifices 
and  losses  of  war — to  its  burdens  and  taxes  ;  to  quit 
their  farms  and  their  occupations,  and  to  render  per- 
isonal  service  in  camps,  subject  to  martial  law,  and 
without  their  having  any  option  in  the  business,  is 
ve^  unreasonable. 

Even  if  the  war  was  necessary,  still  we  can  see  no 
reason  vi^hy  it  could  not  have  been  postponed  until  the 
armies  were  raised  who  were  to  carry  it  on. 

We  do  indeed  perceive,  that  if  it  had  been  delayed 
only  six  weeks,  the  great  cause  of  it  would  have  been 
removed,  and  probably  Congress  would  not  have 
been  persuaded  to  declare  it — we  hope  it  was  not 
hastened  on  that  account,  lest  the  repeal  of  the  Brit- 
ish Orders  in  Council  should  prevent  the  adoption  of 
so  desperate  a  measure. 

The  measure  of  ordering  out  the  militia  is  danger- 
ous to  our  liberties-^because  it  is  an  assumption  of 
power  not  granted  by  the  Constitution — because  wheii 
they  are  amalgamated  and  consolidated  with  the  mer- 
cenary ttoops,  the  people  will  have  no  means  of  de- 
fence left  to  them  against  the  ambition  of  a  conoipt 
President — because  on  the  principle  on  which  they 
are  ordered  out  they  may  be  kept  in  service  dur- 
ing the  whole  of  any  and  every  war  which  the  Pres- 


Oi 

ideni  and  a  majority  of  Congress  may  sec  fit  to  de- 
«;lare. 

The  militia*  according  to  this  doctrine,  will  be  at 
piny  and  all  times  subject  to  martial  law,  without  hav- 
ing voluntarily  enlisted.  They  will  bear  all  the  <2t«. 
gi'uce  of  defeats f  and  will  enjoy  none  of  the  honours 
or  rewards  of  victory.  Tliere  is  no  provision  for 
their  support  in  case  they  are  wounded ;  and  every 
disaster  is  charged  to  their  want  of  discipline  or  couTt 
age. 

It  is  said  the  Governors  may  abuse  this  power  of 
judging  whether  they  will  order  out  the  militia.  To 
this  we  have  a  short  reply  ; — ^We  do  not  know  why 
it  should  be  presumed  that  the  Governors  will  abuse 
this  trust  more  than  the  President.  If  however,  a 
few  of  them  should  do  it,  it  could  nqt  produce  much 
injuiy  to  the  United  States,  because  the  latter  ought 
rather  to  rely  on  their  own  forces  than  on  the  militia. 
If  a  major  part  of  the  Governors  should  refuse,  it 
would  be  a  conclusive  proof  that  the  war  was  not  a 
proper  one.  But  if  the  President  should  grossly  a- 
buse  his  trust,  the  liberties  of  the  people  will  }}e  de- 
sstrov.d.      •* 


\ 


i! 


NO.  XVII. 

IN  rAVOR  OF  A  GEND'ARMIR  NATIOXALE,  UNDER  THE  MILJ> 
•1  n  LE  OF  A  LOCAL  VOLUNTEER  FORCE. 

Quia pterumqueinopcs,  acvaffi,  sponte  militiam  cuniunf.— tAcitvs. 

It  is  natural  that  men  who  for  more  than  thirty  years 
liave  been  accustomed  to  regard  the  interests  and 
wishes  of  France  as  considerations  of  great  political 
weight — men  who  were  unwilling  that  even  our  in- 
dependence and  fisheries  should  be  secured  without 
the  consent  of  the  French  Court— men  who  have  al- 
ways liad  the  confidence  and  have  received  the  prais- 
es of  the  successive  French  ministers  in  our  country^ 


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— ^men  ivho  have  been  honoured  with  Che  rank  and 
privileges  of  French  citizens,  and  decorated  with  the 
cordon  of  the  Legion  of  Honour — men  who  have 
made  a  negoti&don  with  France,  restoring  her  to  aYl 
her  ancient  privileges,  without  obtaining  the  reim- 
bursement of  one  dollar  of  the  many  millions  placed 
in  the  Emperor's  caiae  d'amortissement — men  who 
declared  the  French  decrees  repealed  on  the  1st  day 
of  November,  1810,  which  the  Emperor  on  the  S8th 
of  April  last  flatly  contradicted — men,  in  fine,  who 
luive  now  entered  into  war  on  the  side  of  France,  ^r- 
mally  against  Great-Britain  alone,  but  substantially  a- 
gainst  Russia,  Spain  and  Portugal. — It  is  natural  that 
snch  men  should  become  attached  to  all  the  French 
modes  of  inteTnal  and  external  policy  and  arms. — It 
was  not,  therefore,  with  surprise,  though  we  confess- 
it  was  with  some  emotion,  we  saw  them  attempt  the 
introduction  of  the  conscription  laws  of  France  a- 
gainst  the  plainest,  most  indisputable  sense  of  the 
constitution. 

We  have  frequently  called  this  attempt  of  the  Pres- 
ident to  coerce  the  militia,  conscription — we  will  now 
explain  why  it  is  justly  so  called.  The  militia  are 
enrolled  against  their  otrn  inclination — it  is  not  a 
matter  of  choice,  but  necessity.  They,  however,  were 
intended  both  in  Great-Britain  and  this  country  only 
as  a  local  defence,  and  not  to  supply  the  place  of 
standing  troops,  especially  for  foreign  conquest. — 
When,  therefore,  Congress  draft  100,000  militia,  they 
order  them  out  without  giving  them  an  opinion — it  is 
force,  not  inclination — it  is.  necessity,  not  patriotism, 
which  obliges  them  to  go.  If  this  be  done  in  a  case 
where  the  militia  are  not  obliged  by  the  constitution 
to  serve,  it  is  an  attempt  at  usurpation — if  carried  irflo 
execution  by  force,  it  is  tyranny. 

The  conscription  laws  of  France  arc  founded  on 
the  same  principle. — ^The  militia  are  drafted  as  w;t!i 
us  ;— the  only  difference  is,  that  the  draft  is  confined 
in  France  to  the  youths  of  nineteen  years  of  age,  a 


93 


.ge,  a 


system,  which,  by  withdrawing  all  the  youth  beibre 
they  are  qualified  for  any  profession,  destroys  their 
morals,  defeats  their  prospects  in  future  life,  and  par- 
alizes  the  industry  of  the  nation. 

But  even  this  demoralizing,  debasing,  corrupting, 
wicked  example,  is  not  without  its  charms  in  the 
eyes  of  the  adnirers  and  imitators  of  France  in  this 
country.  It  seems  an  army  of  recruiting  officers 
were  attempted  to  be  sent  to  entice,  corrupt  and  kidnap 
our  sons  and  apprentices — ^Measures  were  in  contem- 
plation, though  checked  by  the  Senate,  of  a  nature, 
of  a  severity  which  the  people  of  Britain  will  not  en- 
dure. Apprentices,  cannot  in  that  country  be  enlist- 
ed,  and  even  in  the  sea  service,  the  great  bulwark  of 
that  nation,  where  if  any  thing  would  justify  the 
breach  of  private  rights,  the  importance  of  maintain- 
ing their  maritime  power  would  do  it,  apprentices 
cannot  betaken  during  the  first  three  years  of  ap- 
prenticeship, and  during  the  remainder,  the  master  is 
to  receive  their  wages.  But  here,  freedom —  eman- 
cipation— wages  were  intended  to  be  oifered  as  the 
means  of  seduction  to  the  sons  of  our  farmers  and  th« 
apprentices  of  our  mechanicks. 

There  is  but  one  point  in  which  the  comparison 
between  the  French  and  American  conscriptions  does 
not  hold. 

The  conscripts  are  there  collected  by  the  gen  d'ar- 
merie,  chained,  and  sent  to  the  depot,  or  rather  driv- 
en as  we  drive  cattle. 

In  this  country  we  have,  as  yet,  been  deficient  in 
that  part  of  the  machinery  of  internal  police,  the 
gens  d'armes,  and  the  local  volunteer  force  is  pre- 
cisely to  fill  this  gap. 

After  this  shall  be  complete,  Congress  will  laugh — 
Mr.  Madison,  Dr.  Eustis  (he  knows  well  tchy  I  men- 
tion him,  J  and  Gen.  Dearborn,  will  sneer  nt  the  re- 
fusal of  the  militia  or  opposition  of  the  local  Govern - 
ours. — tYext  year,  unless  we  defeat  the  project  in- 
stantly, next  year  our  militia  will  be  drafted  '^vithout 


the  eotisent  of  the  Governours,  and  will  be  marched 
ehained  to  the  place  of  rendezvous. 

Do  not  let  people  startle  at  this  prophecy,  or  con« 
sider  it  a  bold,  unwarrantable  thing.  It  is  not  more 
against  general  opinion,  than  a  prophecy  we  made 
two  years  a^o,  that  we  should  adopt  the  Continental 
Sifstenif  and  enter  into  a  war  on  the  side  of  France. 

The  fall  of  Roman  liberties,  when  Julius  GsBsar 
obtained  the  command  of  the  armies  of  both  Gauls, 
was  not  so  probable  as  a  civil  war,  and  the  destructitm 
of  our  liberties  from  the  organization  of  this  Praetorian 
band — ^this  gen  d?armerie  in  the  midst  of  us — ^this  lo- 
cal, pensioned  corps,  I  care  not  whether  you  call 
them  ^<  Sicaires,  Guards,  Presidential  Janizaries,  or 
J^iocal  Volunteers." 

I  shall  say  something  about  their  resemblance  to 
the  gens  d'armeSf  and  about  their  unconstitutional, 
dangerous  alarming  character — and  give  a  few  bints 
as  to  the  remedy,  or  barrier  against  this  arbitrary 
stretch  of  power. 

The  gens  d*armes  of  France  amount  to  about 
iOO,000  men,  in  a  population  of  35  millions. 

The  gens  d'armes  of  Madison,  the  volunteers,  a- 
inount  to  00,000,  in  a  population  of  7  millions,  so  that 
ihe  proportion,  which  our  police  spies  and  guards 
|l>ear  to  the  whole  people,  is  more  than  twice  as  great 
PA  that  of  France. 

The  French  gens  d'armes  are  sufficient  to  keep  the 
people  in  a  state  of  abject  slavery — -Our  gens  d'armes 
pu^ht  of  course  to  be  still  more  competent  to  the  same 
object. 

The  French  gens  d'armes  are  selected  for  their 
zeal  and  fidelity  to  the  Emperor-^Ours  are  selected 
|n  the  same  manner.  It  is  only  the  most  hitter,  and 
violent,  and  persecuting,  and  blind  Mends  of  admin- 
istration, who  offer  themselves,  or  are  accepted. 

The  French  gens  d'armes  are  officered  by  the  £m- 

Seror — Our  gens  d'armes  are  officered  by  the  Presi- 
ent.  The  French  gens  d'armes  are  scattecpd  througli 


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nee  to 
itional; 
w  bints 
rbitrary 

about 

lerSf  a- 
so  tbat 
guards 

us  great 

teep  the 
d'armes 
he  same 

or  their 
selected 
ter,  and 
[  admin- 
ted, 

the  Ern- 
ie Presi- 
througU 


05 

ih6  \^hole  country — are  always  ready  to  inform — iv 
check  freedom  of  discussion— to  execute  the  Emper- 
or's will.  OvLt  gens  d'armes  are  in  like  manner  dis- 
seminated through  the  whole  country  to  watch- — to 
check  disaffection,  and  obey  their  chief* 

The  French  gend'armerie  seldom  olr  never  fight  » 
publick  enemy — they  live  in  and  near  home--«lead  an 
idle  life,  and  draw  great  pay.  Our  volunteers,  Mr» 
Madison  recommends,  should  not  be  obliged  to  leave 
home — If  the  enemy  comes  to  their  houses,  perhaps 
they  might  fight,  but  they  are  to  be  paid  for  living  in 
idleness— paid  for  their  loyalty-^-^&id  for  their  votes 
— paid  for  watching  the  opposition — paid  for  cutting 
their  fellow-^citizen's  throats  (if  need  should  be)  or  if 
Madison  should  so  order» 

Our  constitution  recognizes  but  two  species  of  land 
forces,  regular  troops  and  militia.  Bo  long  as  Con- 
gress confined  themselves  to  raising  regular  troopg 
by  means  of  volunteer  enlistments,  they  were  perfect- 
ly right ;  only  it  ought  to  be  understood  that  the  vol- 
unteers  formerly  ordered  to  be  raised,  are  in  all  res- 
pects regulars — -and  ought  to  be  added  to  the  stand- 
ing army. 

In  this  view.  Congress  authorized  a  standing  army 
of  eighty-five  thousand  men,  to  wit,  35,000  to  be  en<' 
listed,  and  dO,000  to  be  accepted  as  volunteers.  But 
as  the  latter  have  the  same  pay,  are  officered  by  the 
President,  and  are  subject  to  martial  law,  to  be  shoi 
for  desertion  or  cowardice,  I  can  see  no  difference  be^ 
tween  them  and  regularsv 

For  the  same  reason  that  men  would  not  enlist^  to 
wit,  that  they  hate  the  war,  and  despise  the  degrada- 
tion of  common  soldiers,  a  sentiment  which  we  pray 
to  God,  our  yeomanry  may  always  feel,  they  would 
not  volunteer. 

What  then  is  the  scheme  proposed  ?  That  volun- 
teers may  be  raised,  officered  by  the  President,  draw 
Ipay,  and  stay  at  home.     An  imperium  in  imperio 


96 


with  a  witness  !  A  mongrel  breed  of  soldier  citizens 
and  citizen  soldiers. 

Can  Congress  raise  troops  upon  such  a  condition  ? 
Pay  them  for  not  fighting  ? 

We  not  only  think  this  attempt  dangerous  to  the 
citizen,  but  we  think  it  subversive  of  the  constitution. 
Congress  may  raise  as  many  troops  as  they  please, 
but  it  must  be  to  form  an  army. 

The  mode  proposed  is  only  an  insidious  way  of 
destroying  the  militiaf  or  of  getting  the  power  of  offi- 
cering it,  and  commanding  it  from  the  several 
states,  and  vesting  it  in  the  President. 

If  Congress  can  accept  50,000,  they  can  500,000 
volunteers.  They  are  not  bound  to  take  even  the 
50,000,  in  due  proportions,  in  the  several  states — 
they  may  accept  them  al!  in  one  state — ^tlicy  may  ac- 
cept 50,000  volunteers  in  Massachusetts.  Where 
then  would  be  Gov.  Strong's  command  of  the  militia  ? 
Where  that  of  our  Major-Generals  ? — ^We  do  not 
object  to  Congress  accepting  the  services  of  any  men 
who  will  go  forth  to  fight,  and  endure  the  dangers  of 
the  field.  But  we  do  deny  its  right  to  defeat  the  in- 
tent of  the  constitution,  by  transferring  the  whole  mi- 
litia to  the  President — by  bribing  men  to  remain  at 
home,  and  prove  disloyal  to  their  own  state  govern- 
ments. 

My  remedy  would  be,  that  the  militia  higher  offi- 
cers should  insist  on  these  volunteers  doing  militia 
duty — ^that  the  legislature  should  punish  any  officers, 
who  shall  seduce  any  militia  from  their  ranks  and 
duty — and  also  we  advise  a  vigilant,  jealous,  and 
vigorous  attention  to  arms;  in  the  militia,  who  are  not 
corrupted. 


97 


itizeus 

lition  ? 

to  the 
itution. 
please^ 

way  of 
of  oflR- 
several 


JOOjOOO 
ven  the 
itates- — 
may  ac- 
Wheic 
militia  ? 
do  not 
^ny  men 
tgers  of 
the  in- 
i,ole  mi- 
Lain  at 
50vern- 

^er  ofii' 
[mititia 
Officers, 

Ls  and 
,,  and 
lire  not 


NO.  xvm 

N  RECAPITULATION  AMD  COHCLUSION. 

We  have  now  finished  the  remarks  which  we  in- 
tended to  make  on  the  Message  of  the  President— 
with  what  fidelity  and  sueeess  this  has  been  done,  the 
the  PURLICK  must  (l^cide.  We  are  aware,  that  in  exe. 
euting  this  task,  much  time  has  been  consumed,  and 
that  the  great  and  interesting  topicks  which  that  Mes- 
sage presented,  have  required  more  developement  than 
it  will  be  in  the  power  of  most  readers  to  follow,  with 
that  undivided  attention  which  their  importance  ^- 
mands.  Indeed  we  have  a  right  to  remark,  that  it  is  im- 
possible, in  a  discussion  divided  and  separated  as  it 
must  be  in  the  essays  suited  to  our  weekly  journals,  that 
any  man  can  follow  the  chain  of  reasoning,  and  trac6 
all  the  connections  of  it,  without  some  general  sum- 
mary, which  shall  embnce  and  display  the  whole  in 
a  compact  and  simple  forin.  This  is  the  object  of  our 
present  and  last  essay. 

Our  first  object  was  to  shew,  that  the  apparent  of- 
fers of  peace  and  negotiation,  on  the  part  of  our  cab- 
inet, were  perfectly  illusory ;  that  they  had  no  other 
foundation  or  design,  than  to  quiet  the  fears  of  our 
citizens — ^to  check  the  exertions  of  the  friends  of 
peace — ^to  secure  the  election  of  Mr.  Madison,  and 
so  to  paralize  the  exertions  of  the  British  ministiy,  as 
to  ^»vent  their  taking  any  eifectual  measures  to  de- 
fend Canada,  which  it  was  hoped,  by  this  artifice, 
would  have  been  conquered  before  this  time. 

It  was  ahown,  from  ample  quotations,  and,  as  we 
believe,  arguments  unanswerable,  that  such  terms 
were  proposed,  as  it  was  well  known,  from  former 
negotiations,  Great-Britain  would  necessarily  reject ; 
that  even  as  a  condition  of  Aauspension  of  hostilities, 
preparatory  to  a  negotiation,  it  was  required,  that 

13 


I 


9S 

Gr^'at-Britain  should,  bv  an  informal  but  clear  and 
inck' "mutable  understanding,  bind  herself  to  yield  the 
only  question  in  dispute,  a  question  from  which  Mr. 
Monroe  declared  she  could  not  recede,  especially 
from  compulsion,  when  she  had  refused  to  recede 
from  it  by  amicable  negotiation. 
'  We  have  shown,  that  through  all  the  sttbseqnent 
instructions  of  our  cabinet,  this  point  was  pertina- 
ciously adhered  to,  and  that  even  in  the  last  letter  to 
Sir  John  Borlaise  Warren,  it  wa8.repeated  that  hos- 
tilities would  not  cease  until  Great-Britain  should 
agree,  as  a  preliminary,  to  yield  this  most  essential 
point  of  the  whole  controversy.    We  neglected,  how- 
ever, in  our  argument,  to  notice,  one  most  conclusive 
proof  of  the  insincerity  of  our  cabinet,  and  of  their 
belief  that  the  offers  they  had  made  to  Great-Britain, 
would  be  rejected.     It  shews  a  persuasion  apriori, 
which  goes  to  the  absolute  conviction  of  their  insin- 
cerity.   We  allude  to  the  refusal  of  the  offers  of  Sir 
G«orge  Prevost,  to  agree  to  an  armistice,  a  suspension 
of  the  shedding  each  others  blood.    These  offers 
were  made  before  any  answer  was  received,  as  to  the 
propositions  gent  to  Great-Britain.    They  were  pre- 
dicated on  the  repeal  of  the  Orders  in  Council,  and 
910  catise  of  war  remained,  but  the  subject  of  impress- 
ments.   If  our  government  had  been  sincere  in  their 
propositions  through  Mr.  Russell,  and  if  they  had 
thought  they  were  such  as  Great-Britain  could  or 
might  accept — ^in  the  name  of  humanity — of  honour 
-—of  fair  and  honourable  dealing,  why  not  agree  to  a 
suspension  of  the  horrors  of  war,  until  the  answer 
could  be  received  ?  '  ,  *■ 

It  must  have  been,  because  they  expected  the  re- 
fusal, and  they  were  afraid  they  should  lose  the  "un- 
gathered''  laurels  of  the  Generals  Hull,  and  Smyth, 
and  Dearborn. 

We  have  shewn,  that  the  only  equivalent  offered 
to  Great- Britain,  was  the  exclusion  of  British  seamen 
from  our  vessels  in  future ;  but  what  should  consti- 


r  and 
Id  the 
tiMr. 
icially 
fcccdc 

eriina- 
itterto 
nt  ho8- 
should 
isential 
I,  how- 
cluaive 
>f  their 
Sritain^ 
ipriori, 
r  insin- 
3  of  Sir 
pension 
offers 
to  the 
repre- 
il,  and 
npress- 
n  their 
ey  had 
mid  or 
honour 
■ee  to  a 

NSWER 

the  re- 
e  "un- 
Jmyth, 

loffered 

jeamen 
consti- 


99 

tute  a  British  seaman — ^whether  a  reaidenee  of  one 
day,  or  of  two  years,  in  the  United  States,  together 
with  the  mysterious  operation  of  an  act  of  Congress, 
and  an  oath  before  a  counly  court,  should  transform 
a  Scotch  or  Irish  sailor  into  a  genuine  American — 
whether  a  bill  of  Mr.  Wria^t,  or  Mr.  Williams,  should 
sever  the  inseparable  allegiance  which  eveiy  man 
owes  to  his  native  country — whether  any  and  what 
provisions  should  Ve  made  against  a  fraudulent  abuse 
of  naturalization,  (not  by  our  government,  for  that 
could  not  bd  presumed)  but  by  the  seamen, — ^were 
points  which  were  left  wholly  untouched  in  the  in* 
structions  and  offers. 

Nay,  to  render  these  Tague  proposals,  if  possible, 
still  more  untangible,  Great-Bntain  was  assured,  that 
by  our  constitution,  the  President  could  make  no 
stipulations  for  Congress. 

If  any  one  would  be  desirous  of  knowing  what 
would  probably  be  the  temper  of  Congress  on  this 
subject,  let  him  take  with  him  the  two  following  an- 
ecdotes, founded  on  indisputable  facts : — ^Mr.  Dana, 
of  Connecticut,  has,  for  three  or  four  years  past,  pro- 
posed and  brought  in  bills  to  require,  that  the  mer- 
chant vessels  of  the  United  States  should  be  navigat- 
ed, in  certain  proportions,  say  three-fourths,  by  na- 
tive seamen ;  and  his  attempts  have  been  abortive. 
Last  winter,  a  committee  of  the  House,  consisting  of 
Messrs.  Wright,  and  Pitkin,  and  Tallman,  were  ap- 
pointed on  this  subject.  The  two  latter  having  given 
an  opinion  in  favour  of  excluding  British  sailors  from 
our  ships,  Mr.  Wright,  who  was  opposed  to  it,  being 
the  chairman,  never  called  the  committee  together  af- 
terwards, in  order  to  defeat,  as  it  was  supposed,  the 
project. 

In  fine,  it  may  be  asked,  if  any  serious  intention 
had  existed  to  make  this  offer  the  foundation  of  a 
'peace,  why  did  not  the  President,  who  knew  his  own 
incompetency  to  make  any  stipulation  without  the  con- 
sent of  both  Houses,  recommended  to  them  to  pass  a 


li-lillUP 


100 

law,  ia  June  lasti  conformable  to  the  offers  he  was 
about  to  make  ?  He  had  a  precedent  in  the  law  rela- 
tive to  the  repeal  of  the  Orders  in  Council,  and  if  h^ 
had  gone  Hbrward  to  Great-Britain  with  a  speeiilck 
and  authorized  proposition,  guaranteeins  her  against 
the  future  loss  of  her  seamen,  there  would  have  been 
at  least  the  appearance  of  sincerity. 
[  We  then  entered  at  lar^  into  the  merits  of  this 

auestion,  so  much  the  subject  of  complaint,  and  so 
ttle  understood.  We  shewed  that  Great-Britain 
disclaims  the  pretence  of  taking  •American  seamen, 
and  only  claims  the  ri^ht  to  take  her  own  subjects 
out  of  merchant  ships,  on  the  high  seas,  and  in  her 
pwnports. 

We  adduced  the  most  abundant  authorities  to  shew, 
{hkt  by  the  consent  of  all  nations,  allegiance  is  per- 
petual—that it  is  not  weakened  or  affected  by  time, 
place,  or  swearing  aUegiance  to  unother  power.  That 
^ese  are  the  Aindamental  principles  of  the  common 
law  of  England,  have  been  maintained  by  her  courts 
^d  jurists  from  the  earliest  times,  and  of  course,  al- 
though she  naturalixes  the  subjects  at  other  states, 
she  does  not  claim  the  right  to  absolve  them,  or  to 
protect  them  against  their  own  natural  sovereign. 

We  shewed,  also,  that  the  same  doctrine  had  been 
maintained  in  ous  own  country,  in  the  case  of  one 
Williams,  tried  for  entering  into  the  service  of  France, 
even  when  we  were  atpeace-^^to  which  we  now  add 
the  cases  of  Jonathan  iN  utting,  and  one  George  Bat- 
ternu^n,  convicted  in  this  town,  in  the  year  1794,  for 
the  same  offence. 

We  then  proved,  that  this  practice  of  Great-Britain 
has  been  exercised  by  her  ever  since  the  year  1640, 
jigainst  all  nations,  and  without  complaint^  We  cit- 
ed, also,  a  succession  of  French  ordinances,  from 
1694  to  the  present  war,  shewing  that  France  mun- 
tains  ^e  same  claims  over  her  own  seamen,  and  exe- 
cutes them  with  more  rigour^-We  now  add  to  the 
cases  before  cited,  another  ordinance  of  France^  which 


101 

requires  every  vmed  cruiser  to  be  fumished  with  aa 
able  linguiat  or  interpreter,  and  directs  that,  without 
regard  to  passports  or  protections,  he  shall  examine 
all  the  orews  of  merchant  ships,  which  they  may  meet 
with  on  the  high  seas,  in  order  that  he  may  oburve 
tehether  they  apeak  the  language  of  the  country  to 
which  they  pretend  to  belong,  correcUn. 

Thus  making  the  ear  of  a  foreign  linguist  the  court 
to  decide  the  citizenship  of  a  netUrai  crew.  What 
iiecomes  of  Mr.  Madison^s  sad  complaint  of  t*.^  crueU 
ty  of  erecting  a  midshipman  into  a  judge  ? 

We  then  entered  into  the  impolicy  of  (^ur  waging 
war,  for  the  privilege  of  employing  Britiah.  aamra. 
We  said  that  it  was  contrary  to  the  policy  of  all  en- 
lightened states,  to  give  so  much  encouragement  to 
foreign  sailors,  to  the  prejudice  of  their  own ;  that 
that  our  naval  power — -our  commerce— the  superior 
protection  which  our  own  seamen  would  experience, 
by  our  abandoning  this  practice  of  covering  foreim 
aailors,  all  invited  us,  honestly  and  fairly,  to  exclude 
them  altogether. 

We  remarked,  that  Great-Qritun  was  peculiarly 
situated.  Her  marine  power  was  her  only  security 
against  the  horrible  scenes  which  have  been  recently 
acted  at  Moscow.  That  the  siniilarity  of  language 
afforded  facilities,  the  higher  rate  of  wages  tempta- 
tions  to  her  seamen  to  enter  our  service,  and  that  alt 
though  atpreaent  her  loss  had  not  exceeded  S0,000 
or  30,000  men,  yet  if  our  merchant  ships  should  be- 
come a  perfect  asylum  to  her  aeamen,  the  mutiny  at 
the  JVore  would  be  a  trifle  to  the  danger  she  would 
run  ;-•— That  the  knowledge  that  they  are  liable  to  be 
impressed  UQW  restrains  her  aeamen,  and  that  alone. 

We  added,  that  even  were  it  a  new  case  in  the  law 
of  nations,  the  extremity  and  importance  of  it  would 
make  her  excusable,  for  insisting  upon  some  remedy 
for  such  an  abuse  of  our  neutrality,  growing  out  of 
our  peculiar  relative  sitoation  to  her.  We  cited  one 
example  of  tiaimUar  acknowledged  claim,  which  was 
liable  to  as  great  abuses,  and  that  is  the  right  to  take 


10» 

horn  neutral  mercliant  shipii  ilie  peraons  of  your  ene- 
my-— this  includes  the  rient  of  search  for  persona  as 
vml  08  goods — and  if  the  neutral  cannot  cover  or 
withdraw  from  a  belligerent  the  ^rsons  of  the  belli. 
Cerent's  enemy,  because  bv  so  doing,  he  deprives  the 
belligerent  (^  one  of  the  rights  of  war,  a  fortiori,  Vfe 
asked,  can  such  neutral  cover  or  protect  the  subject 
of  the  belligerent  captor,  who  is  more  important  to 
him,  because  when  he  sets  an  enemy,  he  is  always 
ready  to  exchange  him  for  a  subject  ? 

We  then  entered  into  a  full  display  of  tlie  famous 
negotiation  of  Monroe  and  Pinkney,  with  the  Fox 
ministry.  We  demonstrated,  that  while  there  was 
the  most  anxious  solicitude  in  that  ministry  to  retain 
the  good  will  of  the  United  States — ^to  remove  all 
just  causes  of  complaint — awhile  such  offers  were 
made  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  them  in  future,  as, 
in  our  opinion,  would  do  it  more  effectually,  than  the 
plan  proposed  by  Mr.  Madison,  because  we  are  satis- 
fied tnat  such  abuses  would  soon  creep  in,  as  would 
oblige  Ghreat-Britain  to  recur  to  her  former  practice, 
even  at  the  expense  of  peace — while  indeed  our  own 
ministers  were  satisfied  of  the  fairness,  eligibility,  and 
honoundile  character  of  these  offbrs,  her  statesmen, 
the  most  friendly  to  this  country  of  any  who  have,  for 
thirhr  years,  swayed  the  councils  of  that  nation,  sol- 
emnly declared,  that  no  ministry,  under  any  emergen- 
cy, would  ever  dare  to  yield  up  the  question  of  right. 

It  is  then  reduced  to  tliis  simple  question — Shall 
we  fight  for  a  shadow  when  we  can  have  the  sub- 
stance? Shall  we  fight  to  compel  Great-Britain  to 
yield  a  claim  older  than  our  nation?  A  right  exer- 
cised  by  France  and  all  other  European  nations  ?  A 
claim  rounded  upon  principles  recognized  and  ad- 
judged by  our  own  courts  ?  A  claim  which  if  conce- 
ded will  make  our  country  swarm  with  Enslish, 
Scotch  and  Irish  sailors  to  the  great  injury  and  de- 
pression  of  our  own  ?  A  claim,  which  if  yielded  now, 
will  certunly  be  resumed  the  moment  the  dreadful 
effects  of  its  relinquishment  shall  be  felt  ? 


103 


exer- 
?  A 
ad- 
once- 
glish, 
1  de- 
now, 
iadful 


We  then  made  some  remarks  on  the  demand  upon 
Governor  Strong  for  the  militia,  and  the  inUmation 
of  the  President  tliat  he  had  failed  in  his  duty  in  not 
ordering  them  out. 

We  proved,  that  Congress  have  no  sort  of  control 
over  the  militia  except  in  three  specified  cases.  That 
neither  of  these  cases  had  occurred — ^that  the  Gk)vem- 
or  was  the  constitutional  and  sole  judge  on  this  point, 
and  with  his  usual  consummate  prudence  he  haa  con- 
sulted the  Judges,  and  with  his  accustomed  firmness 
he  had  acted  m  pursuance  of  their  advise  and  the 
dictates  of  his  own  judgment. 

The  People  ought  to  feel  grateful  to  him  for  thus 
breasting  the  danger  in  defence  of  the  constitutionrJ 
privileges  of  the  people. 

We  concluded  with  some  remarks  which  we  deem 
of  great  importance  as  to  tlie  organization  of  a  stand- 
ing military  force,  under  the  name  of  volunteers,  to 
reside  in  tb«}  m^lst  of  us,  to  the  utter  ruin,  if  it  suc- 
deeds,  of  the  miliila. 

We  have  now  completed  tliis  arduous  duty. — ^We 
cannot  hope  that  tlie  idle  and  the  thoughtless  will 
have  derived  much  benefit  from  discussions  which  re- 
quire so  much  and  so  constant  attention.  We  ap- 
peal, however,  to  the  sober  and  reflecting  part  of  so- 
ciety— and  by  their  judgment  we  are  willing  to  a- . 
bide. 

We  have  endeavoured  soberly,  fairly  and  honoara- 
bly  to  discuss  the  great  question  on  which  depends  the 
peace  and  prosperity  of  the  U.  S.  The  question  is  a 
vital  one.  The  vineyard  is  extensive  and  overgrown 
with  thorns,  and  the  laborours  are  few.  If  a  most  ar- 
dent love  of  country,  a  strong  desire  to  promote  its 
permanent  and  best  interests,  though  the  means  of 
doing  it  are  ungrateful  to  those  who  undertake  it,  en- 
title a  citizen  to  the  good  wishes  of  the  publick,  we 
shall  not  rest  without  hope.  If  we  fail  Li  this,  we 
shall  have,  what  the  world  cannot  take  away,  the  tes- 
timony of  a  good  conscience. 


I 

M 

Id- 


I 


SOME  GENERAL  BRIEF  REMARKS 

ON  THE  CAUSES  AND  OBJECTS  OF  THE  PRESENT  WAR—ON 
THE  ERRONEOUS  OPINIONS  TO  WHICH  OUR  PARTIAL  SUC 
CESSES  AT  SEA  HAVE  GIVEN  BIRTH,  AND  ON  THE  DAN- 
GER,    THAT  OUR   CITIZENS    MAY  BE   DRAWN  IN  TO  AU) 

.  BY  LOANS  IN  THE  PROSECUTION  OF  A  WAR,  WHICH  THEY 
DETEST.  ^ 

NO  many  who  has  paid  even  a  moderate  degree  of  at- 
tention to  the  policjr  of  Mr.  Jefferson  and  Mr.  Madison,  for 
the  last  twenty  years  (I  mean  since  the  beginning  of  the  war 
between  Great-Britaui  and  France)  can  doubt,  that  the  present 
war  between  the  United  States  and  Great-Britain,  is  the  con- 
summation which  they  have  devoutly  wished  for.  The  author 
of  the  present  essays  has,  for  six  years  past,  laboured  inces- 
santly to  satisfy  the  people,  that  war  with  Great-Britain  was 
the  ultimate  and  darling  object  of  administration,  and  that  it 
must  and  would  take  place.  It  has  always  appeared  to  him 
to  be  totally  indifferent  to  administration,  whether  there  was 
cause  of  war  or  not,  or  whether  it  could  or  could  not  be  a4* 
justed  by- negotiation.  The  great  labour  on  their  part  has 
seemed  to  be,  to  find  plausible  pretexts  to  keep  the  nation  in 
a  flame,  to  smother  and  conceal  the  injuries  and  insults  of 
France,  which  would  have  counteracted  their  views  against 
Great-Britain,  and  gradually  to  lead  the  nation  to  the  preci- 
pice  of  war.  How  far  many  of  the  real  friends  of  peace,  by 
joining  in  the  clamour  against  Great-Britain,  by  denying  the 
intentions  of  the  administration  to  enter  into  war,  and  by  stim- 
ulating the  pride  of  the  partizans  of  government,  may  have 
unintentionally  promoted  the  secret  views  of  Mr.  Madison,  is 
a  quesUon  I  have  no  disposition  to  discuss. 

I  should  not  have  even  mentioned  it  at  this  time,  if  I  had 
hot  been  apprehensive  that  a  game  of  the  same  sort  is  now 
attempted  to  be  played  off  upon  the  friends  of  peace  wit'  re- 
spect to  the  navy. 

One  of  the  greatest  obstacles  td  the  general  prevalence  of 
the  belief  that  our  administration  are  absolutely  devoted  to  the 
views  and  interests  of  France,  and  are  bent  upon  the  destruc- 
tion of  Great-Britain,  hat.  been  the  want  of  visible  motive. 
While  some  zealous  men  have  charged  even  the  head*  of  the 
French  party  with  direct  bribery  and  corruption,  sober  people, 
seeing  no  evidence  of  this  fact,  and  feeling  shocked  at  what 
they  considered  a  calumny,  have  been  disposed  to  go  as  far 
the  other  way,  and  to  doubt  the  existence  of  any  bias  whatever. 


.R— ON 
LSUC 
&  DAN- 
ro  AW 
I  THEY 


;e  of  at- 
,on,  for 
the  war 
present 
;he  con- 
s  author 
d  inces- 
tain  was 
id  that  it 
d  to  him 
lere  was 
>t  be  ai* 
part  has 
lation  in 

IBUltS  of 

against 
e  preci- 
sace,  by 
ing  the 
y  stim- 
have 
ii'son)  is 

If  I  had 

now 
wtJ  re- 

ence  of 
i  to  the 

lestruc- 

notive. 

of  the 

Ipcople, 
\t  what 
1  as  far 
katever. 


105 

For  ourselves,  while  we  perceive  as  plainly  as  we  do  the 
course  of  the  planets  in  the  zodiack,  the  absolute  and  entire 
ascendency  of  France  in  our  counsels,  we  do  not  believe  in 
the  direct  application  of  bribes  to  the  higher  minded  men  in 
the  French  interest. 

We  are  astonished  that  people  ahould  doubt  that  there  are 
motives  vastly  stronger  than  those  produced  by  corruption. 
Corrupt  men  are  never  so  zealous  as  enthusiasts  who  are 
honest  in  their  intentions.  What  contests  were  ever  so  bit* 
tor — what  party  ties  so  strong,  as  those  arising  from  religious 
feuds — fi  om  divisions  about  metaphysical  points  that  neither 
party  tomprehends  ?  What  partizans  were  ever  30  devoted, 
so  desperate,  so  constant,  as  the  adherents  of  the  unfortunate 
house  of  Stuart,  who,  not  having  the  means  of  subsistence 
themselves,  could  not  be  suspected  of  bribery  ? 

Grant,  therefore,  only,  that  a  party  in  favour  of  France  wa» 
once  organized,  I  care  not  by  what  means,  it  will  always  find 
materials  for  its  support  and  encouragement;  obstinacy,  pride, 
the  spirit  of  rivalry,  ^vill  confirm,  and  irritate,  and  increase  a 
party  once  formed. 

That  such  a  partv  has  existed,  and  still  continues  in  most 
dreadful  power  and  force,  it  would  be  almost  as  absurd  to 
attempt  to  prove  at  this  day,  as  it  would  be  the  height  of 
impudence  to  deny.  Who  has  forgotten  the  devotion  to 
Genet,  to  Adet,  to  Fauchet  ?  the  attempt  to  force  Washing- 
ton fix>m  his  neutrality  ?  the  clamour  for  war  instead  of  nego- 
ciatinn  in  1794?  Mr.  Madison's  famous  resolutions  intended 
to  drive  the  nation  into  war  ?  the  abuse  of  Mr.  Jay  and  the 
President,  for  daring  to  preserve  peace  with  Great-Britsdn  ? 
the  humiliating  submission  of  Mr.  Munroe  to  the  French  Di- 
rectory ?  the  opposition  made  to  Mr.  Adams,  when  he  at« 
tempted  to  vindicate  the  honour  of  the  nation,  trampled  under 
foot  by  France,  who  insulted  our  envoys  and  demanded  a 
tribute  from  the  nation  ?  These  are  things  of  elder  time,  and 
fit  only  for  the  historian.  They  prove  not  only  a  blind  devo- 
tion to  France  in  the  present  men  in  administration,  but  they 
saUsfy  us  that  it  is  a  prejudice  which  has  had  time  to  strike 
its  roots  deep,  and  to  send  them  out  far  and  wide.  Its  nutri- 
ment has  been  at  all  times  the  honour  and  commercial  pros- 
perity of  our  country.  These  it  has  absorbed — on  these  it 
has  thrived,  until  it  has  almost  exhausted  the  fertility  of  the 
soil.  Prejudices  like  these,  are  not  easily,  we  may  add,  are 
never  rooted  out.  Who  does  not  know  that  when  we  ought 
to  have  been  neutral,  constant  prayers  were  offered  up,  by 
these  advocates  of  France  here,  for  success  to  all  her  projects 
of  universal  dominion  ?  Did  France  add  a  new  victim  to  her 
1^ 


I 


100 


Ambition?  they  applauded.  Did  Great-Britain  meet  'with 
disaster  in  hej*  stand  against  French  power  ?  they  rejoiced  as 
openly  as  the  Gens  d'armes  des  Tuileries.  Did  France  ex- 
hibit a  scene  of  internal  anarchy— of  horrors^  at  which  the  in- 
fernal legions  of  Milton  would  grow  pale  I  they  saw  in  them 
only  the  struggles  of  suffering  Freedom.  Did  these  French 
anarchists  yield  to  the  arms  of  a  military  deafiot^  and  groan 
under  the  most  ruthless  tyranny  ?  they  stood  ready,  with  Gov. 
Gerry  and  Mr.  Livingston,  to  praise  the  incomparable  hero  and 
sage,  and  to  offer  their  incense  to  the  successor  of  Robespierre 
whom  they  had  before  saluted  as  a  god. 

By  encouraging  such  firejudicet  Mr.  Madison  rose  to  dis- 
^ction.  And  if  we  should  admit  that  a  great  mind  like  his, 
eould  easily  shake  them  off,  (which  we  doubt),  still  it  is  not  in 
his,  or  any  other  man's  power,  to  change  at  pleasure  the  feelings 
and  opinions  of  a  whole  party.  Attachment  to  France,  an  inter- 
est in  French  successes,  and  a  hatred  to  Great-Britain,  had  be- 
come the  religion  of  the  party,  and  they  were  ready  to  go  to 
martyrdom  in  defence  of  those  opinions. 

Under  such  omens,  and  probably  himself  as  deeply  imbued 
with  the  same  passions,  Mr.  Madison  came  into  power.  Has 
his  conduct  always  corresponded  with  this  view  which  we 
have  given  of  his  feelings  I  It  should  be  remembered  that  the 
French  government,  if  it  has  not  been  in  secret  correspond- 
ence with  these  leaders,  (which  I  doubt),  has  been,  however, 
fier/ectly  well  informed  of  their  feelings  of  dependence  on 
France ;  of  the  exact  state  of  parties — their  strength— their 
wishes— their  designs— their  movements. 

I  beg  any  man  who  doubts  this,  to  turn  to  any  of  Grenet's  or 
Adet's  correspondence,  but  especially  to  Fauchet's  intercept- 
ed letter.  They  know  the  strength  and  weakness  of  every  con- 
tiderable  man  in  the  United  States. 

Let  it  be  here  distinctly  understood,  that  I  exclude  from  my 
argument  any  idea  of  corruption. 

With  this  knowledge  of  the  state  of  parties,^  and  of  Mr. 
Madison's  partialities  and  preferences,  Bonaparte  has  put  our 
President's  patriotism  and  love  for  France  to  the  most  cruel 
trials.  Would  to  God  his  patriotism  had  been  any  match  for 
his  love  to  France  and  hatred  of  Britain  !  But  Bonaparte  was 
sure  of  his  game.  The  ministers  successively  sent  to  France, 
he.  considered  as  fair  samples  of  the  administration  which 
deputed  them.  Who  has  forgotten  Mr.  Livingston's  incense 
to  the  Emperor,  and  his  undiplomatick  attack  on  Great-Bri- 
tain, with  whom  we  were  at  peace,  in  his  letter  upon  Drake's 
correspondence  ?  Not  a  minister  from  any  of  the  tributary 
courts  could  vre  with  the  envoy  of  the  United  States  in  the 
submissivencss  of  hiti  reply. 


107 

Yet  Mr.  Livingston  was  the  best  of  the  three  ;  and  wouU 
not  have  been  fitted  for  the  dark  projects  for  which  Mr.  Bar- 
low was  probably  sent— to  negotiate  the  conditions  of  alliance} 
and  submission  to  the  continental  system. 

Now  what  has  Bonaparte  done,  and  to  what  have  our  ad- 
ministration submitted,  without  resistance,  and  even  mithoiu 
comfilaint,  if  we  except  a  sentence  or  two  in  every  philippick 
against  Great-Britain,  just  calculated  to  deceive  tAoae  only 
who  iviaA  to  be  deceived  ? 

We  cannot  give  any  detail ;  the  time  and  occasion  will  not> 
allow  of  it.  We  shall  only  hint  at  what  all  the  world  knows  ; 
the  tacts  are  both  notorious  and  recent. 

In  1806,  Bonaparte,  having  by  the  conquest  of  Prussia,  got 
as  he  supposed,  the  command  of  the  continent,  determined 
to  destroy  a  rival  whom  he  could  not  reach  by  arms,  by  tho 
destruction  of  her  trade.  So  far  as  respected  the  continent) 
the  plan  was  easily  accomplished.  But  to  make  the  experi* 
ment  complete,  the  cooperation  of  the  United  States  was  in- 
dispensibly  necessary.  That  cooperation  has  been  obtained 
from  the  year  1807  to  the  present  day,  but  never  so  complete- 
ly as  he  demanded,  till  we  entered  into  the  war.  How  this 
has  been  brought  about,  the  world  can  never  know.  What 
menaces,  how  much  intrigue,  solicitation,  what  promises  of 
personal  aupfiort  to  adminiatration^  if  any,  can  never  be  known. 

We  can  only  judge  of  publick  facts ;  and  from  these  we 
infer,  that  Bonaparte  knew  that  he  was  so  inseparably  con* 
nected  with  the  power,  and  so  riveted  in  the  affections  of  his 
party  here,  that  he  might  put  them  to  the  severest  trials  with- 
out endangering  their  loyalty.  The  Berlin  decree  subjected 
every  American  vessel  to  capture  going  to  or  from  a  British 
port.  Instead  of  resistance,  not  even  a  remonstrance  waa 
made  to  this  act.  It  i  as  been  justly  observed  in  the  resolu- 
tions of  New-York,  that  our  government  having  assigned  the 
British  orders  in  council  as  one  of  the  juat  causes  oj  war,  have 
s^dmitted  that  the  Berlin  decree  was  also.  How  then  can 
they  justify  themselves  for  submitting  to  it  ? 

But  Bonaparte  found  his  Berlin  decree  ineffectual,  and  he 
accordingly  negotiated  with  Armstrong  an  Embargo— or 
rather  a  monstrous  thing,  misnamed  an  Embargo,  which  was 
permanently  to  cut  off  our  trade  with  Britain.  That  this  was 
settled  at  Paris,  and  merely  adopted  very  loyally  by  Congreaa, 
is  proved  by  the  report  first  reaching  us  from  Paris  and  Hol- 
land. Many  merchants  in  this  town  got  knowledge  of  the 
proposition  from  Europe  before  it  had  been  even  whis- 
pered here.  On  the  arrival  of  our  messenger.  Dr.  Bullus, 
who  reported  the   declaration  of  the  Emperor,  <(that  he 


"•VS'I    i?1 


108 


Would  baye  no  neutr&Is,"  the  embargo  was  hastily  adopted. 
The  representatives  of  a  great  commercial  nation,  afforded 
the  astonishing  example  of  the  sacrifice  of  a  whole  people  to 
the  caprice  of  an  European  tyrant !  The  patience  of  that  peo-r 
pie  was  beyond  all  example,  and  can  only  be  accounted  for  by 
the  astonishing  influence  which  France  has  acquired  over  a 
certain  portion  of  them.  The  dangers  to  which  our  com* 
merce  was  exposed,  were  the  pretexts  for  that  measure. 
And  yei  every  man  of  sense  knew  that  at  that  very  moment 
our  vessels  could  have  been  insured  to  Great-Britain  for  five 
per  centum*  and  to  India  and  back  for  eleven.  In  short)  insut 
rxnct  VTM  ?Lt  peace  firemiunu  .' .' 

But  even  our  patience  at  last  had  its  bounds ;  and  afler 
eighteen  months  proof  of  our  disposition >  to  aid  France,  gov-* 
eminent  was  compelled  to  yield  up  the  Emfieror'a  favourite 
measure,  though  to  appease  his  rage  a  Nonolntercourse  with 
Britain  was  substituted.  Tyrants,  accustomed  to  obedience, 
are  not  so  easily  appeased.  The  Emperor's  rage  broke  out 
in  every  species  of  insult  and  contumely,  as  well  as  injury. 

In /anj*ua^f ,  by  a  letter  dated  February  16,  1810,  he  told 
ua> "  the  Americans  canno'  hesitate  as  to  the  part  which  thet^ 
fire  to  take.  They  ought  to  tear  to  pieces  the  act  of  their  In- 
dependence^  or  to  take  measures  to  prevent  their  commerce 
being  taxed  by  England,  which  renders  them  more  dependent 
than  the  o^ony  of  Jamaica,  which  has  at  least  ils  assembly  of 
representatives,  and  its  privileges.  Men  without  political 
views,  vnthout  honoury  without  energy,  may  allege,  &c." 

Though  some  little  symptoms,  transient  publick  symptoms 
of  sensibility  were  discovered  on  this  occasion,  yet  no  apology 
has  ever  been  made,,  and  the  subject  was  suffered  to  slumber 
in  oblivion,  never  again  to  be  revived. 

But  the  rage  of  his  Majesty  did  not  evaporate  in  words. 
In  defiance  of  the  laion  of  all  civilized  aocietyy  by  a  decree  tvt 
Rambouillet,  he  confiscated  all  American  vessels  which  had 
entered  his  ports  at  any  time  within  six  monitia  next  fireceding 
the  decree.  Of  the  amount  of  this  plunder,  we  have  no  other 
evidence  than  the  declaration  of  Gen.  Armstrong,  who  know- 
ing the  Emperor's  character,  said  there  was  no  hope  of  resto- 
ration, as  the  amount  was  twenty  millions  of  dolIars-~>a  sum 
too  large  to  restore  even  to  the  rightful  owners  1 1  About  this 
period  too,  the  Emperor  invented  a  new  mode,  (as  Jefferson 
mildly  characterized  it),  *'  of  exercising  might  contniry  ta 
right."  In  violation  of  the  settled  principles  of  maritime  law, 
his  cruisers  had  orders  to  burn  on  the  high  seas  all  neutral 
vessels  whom  they  should  find  trading  with  the  enemy.  This 
practice  has  continued  down  to  the  present  year.    The  very 


\ 


had 

En 

]V 
((  f 

on 

tun 

gov 


109 

last  French  squadron  which  scoured  the  seas,  Feretier'S)  waH 
more  ferocioas  than  any  former  one.  This  was  the  laat  geii' 
tie  hint  to  our  delaying  counsels.  This  was  the  immediate 
precursor  of  an  alliance  with  France,  and  a  compliance  with 
the  Emperor's  views.  Could  it  be  believed  if  we  had  not  seen 
it,  that  a  President,  who  upon  every  occasion  presents  the 
whole  picture  of  British  wrongs,  including  thoae  tettled  and 
comfiromitedi  as  well  as  others,  should  have  neglected  for 
seven  years  to  mention  in  one  tingle  instance  to  Congress^ 
these  reiterated  acts  of  piracy  of  France  ? 

But  the  darkest,  and  most  dreadful!  part  of  the  picture  of 
partiality  for  France  and  contempt  for  our  understandings  is 
to  be  exhibited. 

In  1810,  the  United  States  having  offered  to  withdraw  iheir 
restrictive  measures  from  either  of  the  two  nations  which 
should  cease  to  violate  our  neutral  rights  leaving  them  in 
force  as  to  the  other,  the  President  declared  solemnly  that  it 
was  not  his  intention  to  give  France  this  benefit  until  she  not 
only  should  repeal  her  decrees  but  should  restore  the  propers 
ty  «  unjustly  aurjirized  in  her  /iort»."     I  use  his  own  words. 

Nevertheless  upon  the  Due  de  Cadore's  promise,  condit 
tional  promise,  that  the  decrees  would  be  repealed  on  certain 
terms  on  the  first  of  November,  1810,  though  accompanied 
with  a  declaration  that  the  "  property  unjustly  surprized" 
wouK  not  be  restored,  the  President,  directly  against  his  own 
ass'     mce,  declared  the  decrees  actually  repealed. 

T  ugh  proof  heaped  upon  proof  in  the  course  of  the  suc-< 
ceedmg  winter,  that  the  decrees  were  not  repealed — though 
their  execution  on  the  high  seas  was  not  even  suspended,  yet 
administration  proceeded  to  enforce  the  act  against  Grea^ 
Britain,  and  to  swear  to  the  good  faith  and  honour  of  France. 
Nine  months  after  the  pretended  repeal,  Mr.  Russell  begged 
the  French  minister  to  give  the  United  States  some  proof  of 
their  repeal^  and  told  him  that  he  kept  the  John  Adams  waiti 
ing  for  30*^"'  evidence  to  justify  the  liberal  credit  which  our 
government  iiad  advanced  to  the  Emperor.  None  could  bo 
obtained,  except  the  release  of  two  ships  lohick  did  not  come 
within  the  decreet.  Against  their  repeal  we  had  evidence  the 
most  abundant ;  and  we  had  most  direct  proofs  that  Bonaparte 
had  resolved  we  should  take  more  active  measures  against 
England,  than  a  new  pacifiek  Non  Importation. 

Mr,  Tureau  told  our  government,  in  Decembor,    1810, 

"  These  modifications  (of  the  French  trade)  will  not  depend 

on  the  chance  of  events,  but  will  be  the  result  of  other  mean 

^ttires,  firm,  and  pursued  with  perseverance,  which  the  twa 

governments  will  continue  to  adopt  to  withdraw  from  the  vexa' 


^^ 


110 

lion  of  the  eommon  enemy  a  commerce  necestory  to  France  as 
well  as  the  United  States." 

Here  we  find  the  toar  firedieted  and  demanded.  The  Non 
Importation  and  pretended  repeal  of  the  decrees,  were,  it 
seems,  the  concerted  meaturea  of  the  two  govemmenta :  But 
the  Emperor's  favour  would  depend  upon  our  continuing  to 
adopt  stronger  measures  against  the  common  enemy.  Nor 
did  the  Emperor  leave  us  to  doubt  whether  Tureau  was  au- 
thorized to  hold  such  a  language.  The  Due  de  Cadore,  in  the 
presence  of  his  Majesty,  on  the  third  of  December,  declared, 
that  **  as  long  as  England  shall  persist  in  her  orders  in  coun- 
cil your  Majesty  will  persist  in  your  decrees.'*  And  in  March 
following,  in  an  address  to  his  Council  of  Commerce,  the  £m^ 
peror  in  person  said,  "  The  decrees  of  Berlin  and  Milan  are 
the  fundamental  laws  of  my  empire.  I  will  favour  the  Amer- 
ican commerce  if  they  will  conform  to  my  decrees,  otherwise 
I  will  chase  their  vessels  from  my  empire." 

This  was  four  months  after  Madison  declared  the  decrees 
repealed.  But  the  Emperor  did  not  confine  his  contradiction 
of  Mr.  Madison  to  words.  On  the  fourth  of  July,  1811,  (the 
day  of  the  declaration  of  our  Independence)  the  ship  Julian  was 
captured  on  the  high  seas,  and  on  the  tenth  of  September  fol- 
lowing was  condemned,  "  because  she  had  been  visited  by 
British  cruisers."  I'he  Emperor  in  person  condemned  in 
September,  1811,  four  vessels,  which  had  been  carried  into 
Dantzick  for  offences  which  were  created  by  the  decrees,  and 
by  them  alone.  And  our  agent,  Mr.  Russell,  in  his  letter  to 
our  Secretary  of  State,  dated  May  8th,  181 1,  six  months  after 
Madison's  proclamation  of  the  repeal  of  the  French  decrees, 
states,  "  that  it  may  not  be  improper  to  remark  that  no  Amer- 
ican vessel  captured  since  November  1st.  1810,  has  yet  been 
released." 

One  would  have  thought  the  climax  of  our  disgrnee  had 
been  reached — that  the  measure  of  humiliation  was  full—- but 
we  were  reserved  for  still  further  disgraces.  In  May,  1812, 
the  Emperor  published  a  decree  bearing  date  April  28th, 
181 1,  in  which,  reciting  our  obedience  and  loyalty  in  exclud- 
ing British  goods  and  admitting  his,  he  declares  on  that  ac-> 
count  his  decrees  repealed  so  far  as  regards  us.  Thus  giving 
in  the  face  of  the  whole  world  the  lie  direct — the  lie  without 
apology— 'the  lie  without  circumlocution  to  all  the  declarations 
of  our  government,  as  to  the  repeal  of  the  French  decrees  in 
November,  1810— cutting  up  also  by  the  roots  the  foundation 
of  all  our  statutes  against  Great  Britain,  the  last  of  which  was  in 
March  preceding  the  repeal  of  the  French  decrees,  and  which 
were  founded  on  her  refusal  to  believe  the  decrees  repealed 


Ill 

in  November,  'the  main  reason  for  which  we  went  to  war 
with  Great  Britain  was,  that  she  would  not  repeal  her  orders 
in  three  months  after  France  repealed  her  decrees,  which  she 
was  bound  to  believe  took  place  in  November,  1810.  Now 
Bonaparte  justifies  her  incredulity,  and  accuses  Mr.  Madison ' 
of  rashness  and  folly. 

The  manner  of  doing  this  last  act  has  something  extreme- 
ly wicked  9nd  suspicious  on  the  face  of  it That  Bonaparte, 

when  so  otten  urged  and  solicited  to  furnish  the  evidence  of 
the  repeal  of  the  decrees,  should  have  kept  back,  for  1 2  months, 
a  decree  affecting  only  u«,  and  necessary  to  the  vindication  of 
his  constant  friends  in  America,  is  extraordinary.  It  matters 
not  whether  it  existed  at  its  date,  or  was  antedated.  In  either 
case  it  was  kept  back  till  he  was  satisfied  that  we  had  come 
to  the  striking  fioint.  It  was  kept  back  until  it  was  impossible 
it  should  produce  an  operation  in  England,  and  that  operation  be 
known  here  before  the  war.  It  was  well  known  to  France  and 
America,  that  the  word  of  Great  Britain  had  been  pledged  to 
repeal  her  Orders  in  Council  as  soon  as  France  should  repeal 
her  decrees.  It  is  a  word  never  lightly  given,  and  never  for- 
feited. Can  any  man  have  charity  to  beUeve  that  this  almost 
simultaneous  repeal  of  the  decrees— of  the  Orders  in  Coun- 
cil, and  of  the  declaration  of  war,  was  the  effect  of  accident  ? 
In  short  that  it  was  not  the  "  result,"  as  Tureau  says, "  of  oth- 
er measures  which  the  two  Governments  have  continued  to 
take  against  the  common  enemy  V* 

Let  any  doubting  man  look  at  the  Emperor's  publick  dec- 
laration inMarch  last,  that "  his-decrees  should  be  the  funda- 
mental laws  of  hii  Empire,  until  the  principles  of  the  treaty 
of  Utretcht,  shall  be  recognized  by  Great  Britain.*' 

Let  him  look  at  the  refusal  of  our  Government,  to  make  e- 
ven  an  Armiaticcy  after  the  total  repeal  of  the  Orders  in  Coun- 
cil and  all  other  blockades. 

Then  let  him  say  whether  this  war  is  not  a  fulfilment  of  the 
reiterated  demands  of  France,  to  enter  into  the  coalition. 

Let  him  consider  how  admirably  it  was  timed  for  the  inter- 
ests of  France — how  it  cooperates  with  her  views  upon  Rus- 
sia and  Spain,  by  making  a  serious  diversioi)  of  the  British 
forces  at  this  most  critical  juncture,  which  the  world  has  seen 
for  20  years,  and  then  let  him  soberly  ask  himself,  whether 
the  war  is  carried  on  for  Frencli  or  American  interests  ? 


It  is  not  one  of  the  least  evils  of  this  unnatural  and  unjust 
war,  that  the  noblest  virtues  of  the  citizen  may  be  converted 
into  the  means  of  favouring  the  views  of  the  Administration, 
and  of  prolonging  the  duration  of  the  war.     It  is  impossible 


■^ 


113 

for  a  generous  mind  not  to  view  vrith  the  highest  feelings  of 
appi'obation,  the  gallant  efforts  of  our  naval  ofiieers  and  sea- 
men.  That  unconquek-able  spirit,  that  self  devotion,  that  skill 
«nd  coolness  which  have  rendered  the  British  marine  so  su- 
periour  to  that  of  all  other  nations,  have  been  displayed  in  the 
highest  degree  by  our  infant  NAVY. 

But  a  reflecting  man,  who  is  sincerely  desirous  of  seeing 
peace  restored  to  our  Country,  cannot  but  perceive  that  an 
artful  administration  will  convert  this  natural  and  generous  en- 
thusiasm  into  the  means  of  promoting*  their  own  views.  AN 
ready  we  are  told  by  Mr.  Madison,  with  a  triumphant  air, 
that  our  naval  victories  "  will  dispose  Great  Britain  to  peace, 
and  that  oxxt  firoafierout  career  may  be  accelerated^  but  cannot 
be  prevented  by  the  assaults  made  upon  it."  See  his  last 
message  covering  Decatur's  letter. 

It  is  because  we  believe  this  proposition  absolutely  false— 
that  the  reverse  of  it  is  true,  to  wit,  that  our  naval  successes 
will  procrastinate  the  period  of  peace,  and  render  all  attempts 
at  negotiation,  while  this  state  of  things  continues,  abortive. 
And  because  we  fear,  that  some  men  may  be  led  to  believe 
that  Great  Britain  can  be  humbled  on  the  ocean,  of  which 
there  is  as  little  prospect  as  there  was  when  the  war  was  de- 
clared, that  we  deem  it  a  solemn  duty  to  make  some  remarks 
upon  the  subject. 

We.  think  it  proper  to  premise  that  we  have  never  doubted, 
thatour  Country  was  capable  of  producing  excellent  officers 
and  sailors. 

The  same  causes  which  have  rendered  the  British  marine 
hitherto  so  superiour,  operate  as  powerfully  in  our  favour.-— 
We  have  the  same  hardy  courage—the  same  enterprise— the 
same  skill. 

We  have  been  of  opinion  that  a  marine  force  was  our  nat- 
ural defence,  and  ought  to  have  been  fostered  and  encourag- 
ed. We  have  never  believed  that  even  British  ships,  conduct- 
ed by  their  ablest  officers,  would  be  an  over-match  for  ours, 
in  vessels  of  equal  size,  and  especially  where  we  should  have  a 
decided  superiority  of  force. 

But  though  such  are  our  opinions,  we  think  we  are  in  some 
danger  of  falling  into  two  errors  on  that  subject,  one  of  which 
is  disreputable  to  us  as  a  brave  and  magnanimous  nation,  and 
the  other  may  be  of  fatal  consequence. 

The  first  is,  a  boastful,  sanguine  and  overbearing  temper. 
The  officers  of  our  Navy  have  too  much  of  the  true  spirit  of 
brave  men  to  fall  into  this  error.  They  know  too  well  the  char- 
acter of  their  adversaries  to  undervalue  either  their  bravery  or 
their  skill.  You  will  never  hear  any  of  the  most  experienced 
among  them  utter  such  idle  boasts,  as  that  "  man  for  man 


113 


man 


and  gun  for  gun,"  yre  shall  always  beat  the  British.  They 
know  that  in  two  out  of  three  of  the  contests  which  have  taken 
place,  the  superiority  of  force  on  our  side  was  such  that  while 
it  would  have  been  disgraceful  for  our  officers  to  hav9  been 
beaten,  no  degree  of  reproach  could  attach  to  the  foe  whom 
they  subdued  for  yielding  to  the  most  powerful  single  decked 
ships  in  the  world. 

We  feel  a  perfect  confidence,  that  such  men  as  Decatur, 
Hull,  and  Jones  will  agree  with  us  in  every  proposition  we 
shall  advance; 

The  opinions  and  sentiments  to  which  we  allude,  and  which 
we  think  reprehensible,  arc  those  of  hasty  men,  who  draw  in- 
ferences from  single  examples  which  th?y  certainly  do  not 
warrant. 

You  hear  them  every  day  .declaring  that  one  of  our  large 
frigates  would  capture  a  British  74—- that  we  have  wrested  the 
Trident  of  Neptune  from  Great  Britain — that  we  shall  always 
be  superior  to  them  in  single  ships. 

To  hear  such  persons  discourse,  one  would  imagine  that 
they  were  astonished  to  find  we  could  beat  even  an  inferior 
British  ship— that  they  had  believed  us  incapable  of  meeting; 
the  Europeans  in  equal  conflict,  and  that  they  were  so  trans- 
ported and  surprised  by  the  unexpected  success,  that  they 
now  believed  the  age  of  miracles  had  returned,  and  that  the 
British  banner  was  no  longer  to  float  upon  the  ocean. 

Enthusiasm  has  its  uses,  but  it  may  produce  its  evils.  Lit- 
tle as  they  may  believe  it,  the  chances  of  war  may  turn,  and 
the  mortification  and  chagrin  is  always  in  proportion  to  the 
previous  exultation.  We  had  a  recent  and  terrible  example 
in  the  case  of  Gen.  SMYTHE.  The  man  who  presented  him- 
self as  a  conqueror,  with  such  a  ridiculous  gasconade,  three 
weeks  since,  is  now  exhibiting  his  excuses  to  an  unauthoriz- 
ed association  on  the  frontiers  of  New  York.  His  soldiers  are 
breaking  their  muskets  in  pure  mortification,  and  his  officers 
their  swords. 

If  indeed  success  should  always  follow  our  Navy,  still  one 
evil  would  result  from  this  boasting  spirit,  it  would  diminish 
the  glory  of  victory. 

We  trust,  however,  and  believe  that  this  extravagant  and 
bombastick  spirit  is  not  a  very  general  one.  That  while  we 
cherish  and  honour  and  reward  the  gallantry  of  our  Navy,  we 
shall  and  do  imitate  their  modesty,  and  their  justice  towards 
the  vanquished. 

The  fr  ible  which  we  have  first  been  considering,  is  only  a 
small  blemish,  and  would  not  be  productive  of  any  serious 
consequences. 

15 


114 

The  other  opinion  advanced  bjr  Mr.  Madison  is  a  serious 
one,  and  deserves  a  thorough  consideration. 

Is  it  true  "  that  the  capture  of  five  or  even  ten  British  frig- 
ates' will  dispose  Oreat  Britain  to  fieace^  and  does  this  sort  of 
contest  "  accelerate  our  prosperity,"  as  Mr.  Madison  says  \ 

If  these  successes  will  dispose  her  to  peace,  it  must  be  on 
the  ground  upon  which  Mr.  Madison  seems  to  have  rested 
his  hopes,  and  that  is  that  it  will  satisfy  her  that  we  are  a  more 
formidable  nation  on  the  ocean  than  she  thought  us,  and  that 
if  the  war  is  continued  we  can  wrest  from  her  the  Trident  of 
Neptune. 

Now  let  us  consider  this  point—- Oreat<>Britain  has  a  terri- 
tory about  as  big  as  the  New-England  states.  She  never 
would  have  attained  to  a  primary  rank  among  the  European 
nations,  if  she  had  not  cultivated  and  encouraged  a  navy.  Her 
insular  situation  renders  it  necessary  that  she  should  maintain 
one.  She  owes  her  liberties  to  that,  and  that  alone— These 
propositions  are  as  obvious  to  her  as  they  are  to  us. 

Can  it  be  believed,  that  she  will  surrender  her  maritime 
superiority  ?  Will  she  make  peace,  while  her  arms  are  tar- 
nished with  the  stains  whieh  we  have  imprinted  upon  them  ? 
Will  she  not  say,  "  my  navy  is  my  only  defence,  it  must  not 
only  be  superior,  but  its  reputation  must  be  unimpaired  ?'* 
"  However  disposed  I  might  have  been  to  make  peace  with 
America,  I  cannot  do  it  till  this  disgrace  is  wiped  off." 

Will  any  man  doubt  her  power  to  do  this  I  Is  there  any 
one  so  prejudiced  as  to  believe,  that  she  cannot  rouse  her  citi- 
zens to  fight  with  as  much  gallantry  and  skill  as  ours  ? 

We  are  the  same  peoples-have  the  same  general  features 
of  character,  and  though  we  have  not  degenerated,  I  see  no 
reason  to  presume  that  we  have  improved  on  the  original 
stock. 

We  have  seven  frigates,  and  four  or  five  smaller  ships-*> 
She  has  200  ships  of  the  line,  350  frigates,  and  three  or  four 
hundred  smaller  vessels  of  war. 

It  is  in  her  power  to  send  a  squadron  of  line  of  battle  ships, 
to  destroy  our  marine,  without  a  contest. 

If  Bonaparte,  starting  with  the  old  marine  of  France,  of 
Spain,  and  Holland,  comprizing  nearly  200  ships  of  the  line, 
and  devoting  yearly  to  his  navy  alone  150  millions  of  livres, 
SO  millions  of  dollars,  (amounting  to  the  whole  of  our  war 
expenses,  for  both  army,  navy,  and  civil  list)  has  been  unable, 
during  twelve  years,  to  make  the  smallest  head  against  the 
British  navy,  can  we  expect  to  do  it  with  our  little  squadrouj 
and  witliout  any  revenue  but  loans  ? 

It  is  said,  however,  that  we  are  a  different  race  of  men  from 


shipS) 

|nce,  of 
line} 
1  Uvre«, 

lit  war 
inablet 
^st  the 
^adroii} 

from 


115 

the  French  and  Dutch.  fVe  can  beat  Oreat'Britain)  though 
rAey  could  not.  Both  France  and  Holland  have  obtained  as 
many  and  more  signal  victories,  in  single  ships,  over  Great- 
Britain,  than  we  have  done.  Nay,  they  have  been  more  formid- 
able rivals  to  her  than  we  could  possibly  become  in  many- 
years.  And  yet  the  conaciouanett  of  the  abtoiute  neceattty  of 
her  navy  to  her  existence,  has  made  Great-Britain  rise  su- 
perior to  all  her  enemies  or  rivals. 

It  is  impossible,  from  the  constitution  of  human  nature,  that 
you  can  ever  rouse  a  nation  to  so  great  exertions,  for  a  ques- 
tion on  which  its  existence  does  not  depend,  as  for  one  upon 
which  it  does.  Hence  nations  will  not  fight  as  strenuously  in 
foreign  wars,  in  wars  of  conquest,  as  in  wars  of  self-defence^ 
and  when  their  fire-sides  are  invaded. 

Now,  though  our  marine  is  important  to  us,  it  is  by  no 
means  so  vital  an  interest,  as  it  is  to  Britain.  To  us  it  guards 
important  rights,  and  produces  a  security  to  a  trade  necessary 
to  our  opulence— with  her,  it  is  the  bulwark  which  defends 
her  temples  and  her  fire-sides. 

Our  farmers,  though  they  would  maintain  a  respectable 
navy,  would  never  be  taxed  to  support  150  ships  of  the  line, 
and  200  frigates,  which,  at  the  rate  of  the  expense  of  our  pre- 
sent navy,  would  cost,  for  their  first  equipment,  150  millions 
of  dollars,  and,  for  their  annual  support,  50  millions  of  dollars 
per  annum,  at  least. 

I  cannot  perceive,  then,  that  the  capture  of  twenty  British 
frigates,  nor  the  building  of  ten  74's,  would  the  more  dispose 
Great-Britain  to  peace  ;  nor  does  any  sensible  man  believe  it. 
On  the  contrary,  it  will  render  fieace  im/iosaibley  until  Great- 
Britain  shall  have  put  at  rest  the  question  of  naval  superiority, 
and  have  vindicated  the  injured  honour  of  her  flag,  which  every 
coal-heaver  in  the  nation  will  feel  to  be  a  wound  in  his  own 
honour-i-Much  less  can  I  perceive,  with  Mr.  Madison,  how 
the  capture  of  a  few  British  frigates,  followed  up,  as  it  will 
be,  with  the  blockade  of  our  ports,  and  the  destruction  of  our 
navy,  accelerates  our  proaperity. 

ON  THE  SUBJECT  OF  LOANS  IN  UNJUST  WARS. 

In  just  and  necessary  wars,  it  is  the  duty  of  all  good  citizens 
to  contribute  according  to  their  means.  Whether  their  per- 
sonal services  in  the  field — their  councils  in  the  cabinet— «r 
their  money  be  required  in  the  treasury,  they  ought  to  render 
them  with  alacrity.  If,  however,  the  war  be  such  an  one  as, 
in  their  consciences,  they  cannot  approve,  it  is  equally  their 
duty  to  withhold  every  thing  \vhich  the  government  cannot 
by  law  command. 


116 


This  dutjr  is  the  more  imperious,  if  the  war  is  of  such  a 
character  as  tends  to  destroy  the  commerce,  and  injure  the 
rights  and  interests  of  that  part  of  the  country  to  which  such 
citizens  belong. 

It  is  evident,  that  one  of  the  most  embarrassing  impedi- 
ments, which  our  administration  encounters,  is  the  difliculty 
of  finding  resources  to  carry  on  the  war. 

Mr.  Gallatin,  for  three  years  past,  has  calculated  on  loans 
as  the  means  of  supporting  the  expenses  of  war,  and  he  has 
attempted  to  deceive  the  money  holders,  by  stating,  that  in 
the  peace  which  must  necessarily  succeed  to  all  wars,  the 
revenue  will  always  be  sufficient  to  pay  the  interest  of  the 
debt  contracted  during  war. 

The  government  dare  not  resort  to  direct  taxes.  The  war 
has  alienated  already  all  the  northern  states.  1  axes  would 
complete  what  is  begun,  and  administration  would  be  left 
wichout  support. 

Under  this  view  of  our  affairs,  the  men  who  are  opposed  to 
the  war,  and  at  the  same  time  loan  their  money  necessary, 
absolutely  necessary,  to  its  continuance,  are  as  much  respon- 
sible for  its  consequences,  as  any  of  those  who  voted  fer  it 

We  know  how  hard  a  struggle  it  is  for  those  who  have  b  n 
accustomed  to  regular  increase  of  capital,  to  suffer  it  to  no 
in  an  unproductive  state.  It  is  not,  that,  by  letting  it  lie  idle, 
they  make  any  real  sacrifices,  in  any  degree,  in  proportion  to 
what  other  citizens  suffer ;  but  it  is  hard  to  control  a  power- 
ful passion. 

We  are  aware,  that  patriotick  motives  are  cold  and  inope- 
rative against  the  seducing  and  tyrannical  influence  of  a  love 
of  increase  and  gain ;  but  we  would  say  a  word  or  two  as 
to  their  interest. 

Does  any  one  recollect  in  history,  any  war  to  be  compared 
to  that  which  now  deluges  Europe  with  blood  ?  Will  any 
statesman  undertake  to  predict  the  period  of  its  termination  i 
Are  there  any  rational  data,  by  which  we  can  suppose  that 
our  war  with  Britain  will  have  a  speedier  termination  ? 

The  annual  expense  of  the  war,  for  the  next  year,  is  esti- 
mated at  32  millions  of  dollars.  The  deficit, ^o  be  supplied 
by  loans,  will  be  20  millions.  When  the  army  is  full,  the  an- 
nual expense  cannot  be  less  than  50  millions,  and  the  revenue 
will  not  exceed  five  millions.  How  long  will  it  be  at  this 
rate,  before  the  monied  capital  will  be  exhausted  ?  Will  the 
interest  of  the  debt  be  paid  after  the  loans  c?ase  ?  Or  will  the 
southern  people  throw  away  the  /tea/,  after  they  have  squeez- 
ed the  orange  ?  Will  they  tax  themselves,  to  pay  a  debt  of 
honour  to  those  "  wretches  of  tlie  north,"  as  they  have  lately 


117 


iqueez- 
debt  of 
e  lately 


called  us  ?  I  trust  our  capitalists  have  too  much  good  sense 
and  puhlick  virtue)  to  lend  their  money  to  support  such  a 
cause—- to  support  a  cause  calculated  to  effect  their  ruin— If 
tlicy  do,  they  will  fall  unpitied. 

It  should  be  remembered,  that  the  southern  statesmen  op- 
posed  the  funding  erf  the  debt  of  the  revolution,  and  that  in  the 
late  loan  of  thirteen  millions,  the  southern  states,  which  voted 
for  the  war,  have  subscribed  but  one  million,  and  most  of 
them  not  a  dollar. 

There  is  no  country  on  the  face  of  the  globe,  where  the 
monied  interest  has  so  little  political  influence  as  in  ours,  or 
where  it  is  so  much  the  object  of  jealousy  and  hatred.  The 
southern  states  despise  and  detest  it,  because  they  have  no 
participation  in  it,  and  because  it  offends  the  aristocratick 
pride  and  pretensions  of  the  planters  and  slave-holders. 

In  New-England,  our  farmers  have  something  of  the  same 
feeling.  Who  have  hitherto  supported  the  banking  and  mon- 
ied interests  of  this  country,  atid  the  credit  of  the  publick 
funds  ?  Men  of  talents  and  political  information  and  influence, 
who  were  in  no  degree  benejiitted  personally  by  the  protection 
given  to  capital.  To  Hamilton  and  Ames,  in  an  especial 
manner,  were  the  capitalists  indebted  for  the  security  and 
protection  they  have  received. 

But  can  the  c  ipitalists  calculate  upon  the  support  of  such 
men,  in  future,  for  the  loans  which  they  may  now  make,  to 
enable  administration  to  carry  on  a  war  ruinous  to  the  com- 
mercial Stat*.  H  ? 

•I  should  suppose  they  would  as  soon  vote  pensions  to  Sea- 
ver,  and  Porter,  and  Mr.  Madison,  the  authors  of  the  war,  as 
they  would  funds  to  pay  the  interest  of  loans,  expressly  open- 
ed to  enable  the  government  to  carry  on  a  war,  destructive  of 
the  interests  of  the  northern  states,  and  blasting  to  the  hopes 
of  all  the  young  men  of  talents  in  these  commercial  states. 

There  is  one  other  important  idea  which  I  wish  to  suggest 
on  this  subject. 

Madison  and  Gallatin  have  too  much  wit  for  our  monied 
men.  They  probably  reasoned  thus—"  Let  us  plunge  into 
this  war.  In  will  destroy  external  commerce  ;  it  will  destroy 
property  vested  in  wharves  and  stores,  and  other  conveniencies 
necessary  to  foreign  trade.  The  banks  will  diminish  their 
discounts.  The  rate  of  interest  wiH  fall.  The  anxious  spirit 
of  monied  men  will  be  sharpened  in  proportion  to  their  losses. 
They  will  be  coy  at  first,  and  make  a  bluster  of  their  princi- 
ples, but  they  will  finally  yield.  If  they  make  the  most  solemn 
resolutions  not  to  subscribe  to  our  loans,  still  they  will  buy 
into  the  stocks,  and  that  is  precisely  the  same  thing  to  us. 


iv 


lis 

No  man  can  stand  the  temptation  of  six  per  cent.  Mrhen  he 
cannot  get  more  than  five  in  other  employments.  It  is 
beyond  human  nature  to  keep  capital  wholly  unemployed 
during  a  war  without  prospect  of  end.  To  be  sure,  the  debt 
ivill  amount  during  the  new  term  of  presidency,  to  two  hun- 
dred millions,  and  to  be  sure  a  peace  revenue  will  never  de- 
fray the  civil  list  and  the  interest  of  this  debt ;  but  after  we 
have  reduced  these  northern  purse-proud  gentry  to  the  con- 
dition in  which  they  were  in  1787,  we  shall  leave  it  to  the 
wisdom  of  Mr.  Troup  and  Bibb,  and  the  other  gentlemen  of 
the  south,  whether  it  is  expedient  to  manage  these  capitatists 
any  longer,  after  we  have  attained  all  our  objects  of  them. 
Let  us  wipe  off  the  old  score,  and  let  these  northern  hives  be- 
gin to  gather  their  honey  anew." 

It  is  curious,  but  not  more  curious  than  true,  that  the  very 
measures  which  impoverish,  and  perhaps  were  intended  to  im- 
poverish, our  merchants,  our  banks  and  our  insurance  offices, 
also  render  our  remaining  cafiital  unproductive  ;  and  by  those 
very  means  favour  the  views  and  facilitate  the  projects  and 
loans  of  Administration. 

The  same  effect  is  calculated  upon  to  recruit  our  armies. 
Mr.  Madison  says  our  farmers  are  too  happy  and  too  rich  to 
enlist.  The  war,  he  thinks  no  doubt,  will  make  them  poorer ; 
and  they  will  soon  be  glad  to  sell  themselves  cheap  to  the 
lashes  of  the  Serjeants,  and  to  subject  themselves  to  the  dis-r 
eases  and  horrors  of  the  camp. 

Thus  publick  misfortunes  and  private  distress  are  che  nu- 
triments of  the  war,  and  the  means  upon  which  administration 
may  coolly  and  wisely  calculate  to  forward  and  accomplish 
their  views. 

There  is  one  other  thought,  which  men  are  afraid  to  exam- 
ine, because  it  is  too  alarming,  i  mean  the  possibility  of  a 
settled  design  to  subdue  the  refractory  spirit  of  the  Northern 
States  by  the  sword.  If  we  had  not  the  direct  threats  of  Mr. 
D.  R.  Williams  and  others,  if  we  did  not  know,  that  it  is  tho 
private,  every  days  conversation  of  these  warm  bloods  of  the 
south,  that  they  will  teach  Governor  Strong  and  the  governors 
of  the  other  Yankee  States  their  duty,  and  the  necessity  of 
obedience,  surely  the  creation  of  a  gens  d'armes,  a  volun- 
teer force  in  full  pay,  and  to  be  permitted  to  stay  at  home, 
recommended  by  Mr.  Madison,  ought  to  excite  the  attention 
and  jealousy,  if  it  does  not  the  feara^  of  all  prudent  men.  I 
have  no  doubt  that  designs  are  seriously  formed  by  some 
southern  people,  to  subdue  by  force,  the  majorities  of  the 
north,  who  are  opposed  to  them.    Is  this  the  time  to  lend 


lid 


sn  he 
It  is 
iloyed 
idebt 
jhun- 
er  de- 
ter we 
iC  con- 
to  the 
men  o£ 
titafists 
them, 
ves  be- 

[»e  very 
d  to  im- 
!  offices, 
by  those 
:cts  and 

armies. 
I  rich  to 
1  poorer ; 
to  the 

the  disf 


them  our  money  ?  Would  it  not  be  as  prudent  and  judicious 
to  '"lep  it  for  ourselves  ? 

Wt  have  said,  the  revenue  will  be  insufficient  to  pay  the 
interest  of  the  debt,  if  the  war  lasts,  which  it  probably  will 
four  years  more. 

Let  us  make  peace  how  and  when  we  will,  we  are  never 
again  to  be  a  neutral  state  between  two  great  belligerents. 
If  we  make  peace  with  Britain,  we  shall  be  at  war  with 
France  and  the  continent.  If  there  is  a  general  peace,  we 
shall  be  excluded  from  the  profitable  trade  of  all  the  world, 
for  each  nation  will  restore  its  system  of  monopoly. 

Besides,  the  habits  of  smuggling  have  taken  such  deep  root 
that  they  can  never  be  eradicated.  The  encouragement  given 
to  manufactures  by  the  war,  will  also  lessen  our  importations. 
We  shall  never  again  in  twenty  years  see  I  revenue  of  twelve 
millions  of  dollars.  The  peace  establishment  of  army,  navy, 
and  civil  list,  will  consume  eight  millions  at  least.  How  is 
the  interest  of  two  hundred  millions  of  new  debt  to  be  paid  ? 
As  long  as  you  lend,  they  will  pay  you  the  interest,  but  not  a 
moment  longer. 


ihe  nu- 
listration 
complish 

to  exam- 
lity  of  a 
Northern 
ts  of  Mr. 

it  is  tho 
ds  of  the 

•overnors 
cessity  of 

a  volun- 
at  home, 
attention 

,  men.  I 
by  some 

les  of  the 

le  to  lend 


^ 


